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ABSTRACT 
DO INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION METRICS MATTER? 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL'S 
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 
Omar Elemere Hawthorne 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. David Earnest 
This dissertation examines the impact of Transparency International's (TI), 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CP1) and whether or not the CPI and hence TI matter. It 
examines the impact of TI's CPI on policymakers. It explores three areas: world's 
political and economic responses and Jamaica's policy responses to the CPI. Jamaica is 
selected for a case study due to TI's high corruption perceptions index rating for the 
country: a country that legally has strong anti-corruption laws but, nonetheless, sees its 
CPI ranking worsen almost yearly. 
This study comprises mixed methodologies, using both qualitative and 
quantitative measures to assess the impact of the CPI on development policies. Taking 
into consideration the importance scholars and policymakers both give to corruption's 
effect on development; the findings of this study indicate that the CPI, the most cited 
corruption index, does not change the world's political and economic policymakers' 
behavior. As in, when the index is published yearly, there is no measured change as it 
regards world's political and economic policymakers. Nonetheless, Jamaican 
policymakers pay significant attention to their performance on TI's CPI. Corruption is 
regarded as a key hindrance to development policies and TI's CPI is used as the 
authoritative tool to assess countries' corruption perceptions score by both international 
governments and several international agencies. The use and reference of TI's CPI does 
not translate as the main factor in regards to the increase and or decrease of aid flow. 
Surprisingly, there was no evidence that the CPI affected the credit rating and or 
investment flow into Jamaica. It indicated however, that TI's CPI is reflective of the 
global market perceptions of Jamaica's economy. But the research shows that the index 
does change policy responses in Jamaica as government officials across varying agencies 
pay attention to the index and the progress and or worsening of the country's score. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
No country can ignore Transparency International (TI) 
—Economist, October 30, 1999 
It is often said that civil society, locally and globally, ought to play a greater role 
in taming the beast of corruption. There is no doubt that corruption continues to plague 
countries in every region of the world. But, as Sandholtz and Koetzle state, "corruption, 
like the poor, will probably always be with us."1 Thus, the manner in which we as a 
society recognize and deal with the issue of corruption, its effects on development, 
growth, sustainability and well-being of others is intrinsic to the overall growth of 
society. Daniel Kaufmann, on the issue of corruption, reiterated quite convincingly that, 
"nobody disputes the ethical failings associated with corruption. Yet the ambiguities 
about corruption, its causes, its effects, and its cures cause many to wonder whether 
fighting it should be a true priority or merely a rhetorical one. Not in dispute is the fact 
that fighting corruption has become a rhetorical priority."2Thus the focus on holding 
governments accountable and demand for greater transparency might ultimately lead to 
some reduction in corruption, or at least the perception of a reduction. 
Corruption, according to Transparency International (TI), "is operationally 
defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain."3 The issue of corruption is not 
'Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle, "Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, 
Democracy, and Trade," International Studies Quarterly, (2000): 31. 
2Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption: The Facts," Foreign Policy 107. No. Summer (1997): 115. 
The definition of corruption varies widely. The most widespread one seems to be the misuse of 
public office for private gain used by the World Bank, a number of authors including: Nye (1967), 
2 
new; it is probably as old as the state as a political organization with the prerogative to 
allocate resources. Episodes and investigations of corruption activities are found within 
public administrations in numerous countries around the world. Hunger, child mortality, 
illiteracy, poverty cannot be eradicated as long as corruption continues to sap resources 
from the world's poorest countries. 
Economic development is generally regarded as being tied to corruption. There is 
not a development plan that does not speak of the need to address corruption. Corruption 
is widely seen as the main hindrance to development and growth. With this pressing need 
to eliminate corruption, a correlation which TI officials and other development scholars 
have pointed to, is that, "one key lesson from the last 30 years of development efforts is 
that the progress in poverty alleviation in the world's poorer countries with high level of 
corruption and weak institutions has not been substantial and/or sustained."4 It can also 
be argued further that environmental regulation such as forest and biodiversity protection 
will not be effective as long as law enforcement and other decision-makers can be 
bought. 
Academic disciplines have examined corruption from many perspectives: 
sociology, economics, political science, law, development studies et. al. However, to my 
knowledge there has not been any research that has studied the impact of TI's Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) on changing behaviors of businesses, investors, governments, 
countries or their officials as a result of the publication of the TI CPI report. It is only 
befitting that TI, often cited as the most influential global civil society on corruption, 
Huntington (1968). Rose-Ackerman (1975) amongst others. However. I have opted to use TI's definition of 
corruption for this study. Transparency International. "Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption" 
http://www.transparency.org/nevvs_room/faq/corruption_faq (accessed February 19 2012). 
4 Ibid. 
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ought to be examined. After all, the CPI is unique in the sense that it was the first index 
created specifically to address this once taboo topic in development issues. It assigns 
numbers to countries and TI has justified why the ranking and changes of countries 
occurs over the years. Undoubtedly "corruption affects the poorest the most, in rich or 
poor nations, though all elements of society are affected in some way as corruption 
undermines political development, democracy, economic development, the environment, 
people's health and more."5 
Today corruption is a major problem in many of the world's developing 
economies. According to one World Bank estimate it accounts for "over $1 trillion per 
year accounting for up to 12% of the GDP of nations like Nigeria, Kenya, and 
Venezuela."6 Quite often the argument has been made that poverty is a cause of 
corruption, the argument is that the existence of a high level of poverty is a breeding 
ground for anti-social and unethical behavior such as bribe taking. That argument is 
supported by "all the surveys conducted since 1995 matching wealth/poverty of nations 
to their levels of corruption. The world's most corrupt nations are also among the 
poorest."' Augustine Nwabuzor made a critical observation that "while poverty is 
certainly a plausible explanation for the so called "petty corruption" the really serious 
incidents of corruption in developing nations are perpetuated by top government officials 
and well-placed executives not by the nations' poor."8 This is a seemingly common trend 
3Anup Shah. "Corruption," Global Issues: September 04, 2011, 
http://www.globalissucs.org/article/590/corruDtion (accessed February 19, 2012). 
6 Augustine Nwabuzor, "Corruption and Development: New Initiatives in Economic Openness and 
Strengthened Rule of Law," Journal of Business Ethics 59. (2005): 121. 
7 Ibid., 124. 
8 Ibid. 
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in many developing countries. The perpetrators occupy positions of influence and power 
in government, industry and commerce. Consequently, the individuals who hold high-
ranking positions in society and their positions of privilege are often accused of abusing 
their positions. General poverty in society cannot explain the actions of such corrupt 
senior officials. With stronger civil society to keep reports and or incidences debate to the 
fore. The creation of National Chapters of TI in countries seeks to strength TI's work and 
reporting efforts on incidents of corruption. 
Over the years numerous studies on corruption have been researched and 
presented, hence outside the academic debate it will be interesting to see the actual 
effects of TI's CPI changing behavior. While TI is the leading International Non-
Governmental Organization (INGO) focusing on corruption, it is yet to be ascertained 
whether this index, established in 1995, actually has any impact on the economy, market 
and political policies as it relates to the countries on its index. Thus, this study is relevant 
for a number of reasons: it assesses the impact of the prominent index on corruption, and 
will evaluate the following: 1) does TI's CPI influences markets and investors as it relates 
to a developing country? 2) What are the world's political responses to the CPI? 3) Does 
CPI have political impact within countries, or does it have any impact/ effect on political 
responses from World Bank, USAID, foreign aid etc.? 4) Do countries adjust their 
behavior to improve their CPI score? 
If the study discovers that TI indeed has an impact which influences 
policymakers, the finding be significant and would demonstrate that non-state actors, 
especially when it relates to such a sensitive topic as corruption, are influencing decision­
making. Such a correlation would be good for not only TI but for other INGOs. On the 
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other hand, if the study shows that TI has no impact on domestic or international 
policymakers it is probably more interesting as an organization formed primarily to 
address transparency. This finding would be significant since TI was formed to measure 
transparency, and its index affects business perceptions, yet the findings would have 
shown that TI's work has little or no effect. This outcome would lead to questions as to 
whose interest does TI serve. Consequently, if it does not have any measurable impact, 
does 'public awareness alone justify the need for TI? Additionally it also brings to the 
fore the reliance academics and others have given to TI's CPI in regards to countries' 
rankings and their interpretation of its impact and or importance. 
The importance of the study cannot be overstated in that given the importance that 
scholars and policymakers both give to corruption's effect on development, Transparency 
International's CPI has become very influential. One would expect negative movement in 
the CPI to cause donors to withhold aid and firms to forego business in a corrupt country. 
The academic literature and development studies have all emphasized the negative effects 
of corruption on a society. Therefore, the CPI being the source where academics and 
policymakers both attribute countries CPI score one would expect the CPI to have some 
effects as it impacts the behavior of policymakers when it is published. Remarkably, 
however, no one has yet examined whether the CPI has these hypothesized effects on 
development. 
Corruption, ranked as the most frequently discussed global problem, surpassing 
climate change, extreme poverty and hunger in 2010, has been at the forefront of 
6 
academic and policy debates for many years.9 Transparency International's Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) established in 1995 is often touted as an indicator of corruption 
levels within countries and it is often credited10 with putting greater focus on the issue of 
corruption on the international agenda. Perhaps as interesting as the yearly ranking of 
countries' corruption perceptions is the method by which countries are ranked as corrupt 
and the variation in the methodology used by Transparency International (TI) over the 
years. 
Given the importance that policymakers place on conniption and seeing that TI is 
the leading authority on corruption. The expectation would be that the index should 
impact policymakers. This in and of itself is significant as an index created by a civil 
society group would, if policymakers behaviors change accordingly, emphasize the role 
and importance of TI. But on the other hand, if the study shows that only lip service is 
paid to TI by world's political and economic policymakers it would leave one to question 
how and why a index which is seen as the authority on an issue do not have any measured 
effect after it is published. 
Corruption occurs at all levels of society, from local and national governments, 
civil society, judiciary functions, large and small businesses, military and other services 
and so on. The case for better governance and anti-corruption to fight poverty has been 
9BBC World Service Poll, "Global Poll: Corruption Is the World's Most Talked About Problem" 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2010/12_december/09/corruption.shtml (accessed 
November 15 2011). 
10 Paul Wilhelm, "International Validation of the Corruption perception index: Implications for 
Business Ethics and Entrepreneurship Education," Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 35, (2002): 177-89; 
Also, Jong-Sung You and SanjeevKhagram, "A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption," 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 70, (2005): 137-57; Stephen Knack, "Measuring Corruption: A 
Critique of Indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia," Journal of Public Policy Vol. 27, no. 3, (2007): 
255-91. These authors amongst others have acknowledged TI for being the first index specifically assigning 
numbers to a country's corruption perceptions. 
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debated by a few, and as Cobus de Swardt," Managing Director of Transparency 
International notes, 
The vision expressed in the Millennium Development Goals of equitable 
development and end of abject poverty is endangered by pervasive corruption -
the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Transparency International's 2007 
Global Corruption Barometer shows that citizens in the poorest countries pay 
bribes more frequently than those in wealthy ones. And studies by our national 
chapters in countries such as Bangladesh and Mexico, show that the poorest 
citizens in a given country bear the greatest burden - with bribe payments 
absorbing up to a quarter of household income - robbing them of already scarce 
resources. (Cobus de Swardt, Civil G8 Dialogue Kyoto, April 2008) 
It cannot be underscored then that the need to reduce and or eliminate corruption will 
address some of the development issues that many developing countries face. 
Corruption is widespread and has particularly serious impacts in developing 
countries, most noticeably where badly needed development funds are often in short 
supply. Foreign aid and subsequently attracting foreign direct investment to enhance the 
growth and development of many developing countries' economies is often met with 
issues of corruption. But what civil society groups such as TI will or might contribute is 
their quest for greater transparency, accountability and integrity of transactions and 
players involvement as a key feature in development. For this point, President Johnson's 
1964 statement: "The most important ingredient in the development of a nation is neither 
the amount nor the nature of foreign assistance. It is the will and commitment of the 
I government and people directly involved," " is relevant. Thus it beckons us to assess the 
role of not only aid, but that of good governance. 
"Cobus de Swardt, "Better Governance and Anti-Corruption as Pillars of the Fight against 
Poverty and Climate Change" www.transparency.org/news_room/speeches_and_articles (accessed 
February 18 2012). 
12 President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid." 19 (March 
1964), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=261 18#ixzz 1 n3Ecan33 (accessed February 21, 
2 0 1 2 ) .  
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The principal aim of this study is to attempt to fill the gap in the literature on TI's 
CPI and its ability to change behavior of policymakers. Does TI corruption score, and 
hence TI matter? What impact, if any, does the publishing of the index have on 
markets—do they react negatively? If a perception is widely held, it is a given that 
markets have already priced the information into transactions, the index should not 
influence the market. Transparency International, an International Non-Governmental 
Organization and, like many NGOs, has been accused of having their own agenda which 
may or may not be socially beneficial. Therefore outside of TI's own interests does the 
index actually change anything? Accompanying donor dollars to developing countries is 
often a very narrow and quite often western definition of corruption. This in turn shifts 
the equally narrow methods to measure it. The following statement raises the said 
contextual or rather definitional aspect of what is corruption, and who defines it. 
"Powerful definitions are the definitions of the powerful and in the history worn 
asymmetric encounters between Africa and developing countries in general and the West 
the latter's international business-centric view of'corruption' prevails."13 
TI is the most prominent anti-corruption NGO in the world, most notably, the 
corruption measurement instrument, the CPI. For the better part of 16 years CPI results 
have been accepted by donors, recipient governments, academia, media, NGOs, etc., as a 
valid and reliable indicator of the perceptions of corruption. Now is an appropriate time 
to assess the impact of the CPI on the political economy behaviors of different actors. 
Over the last two decades the eminence of Transparency International and other civil 
society groups has increased. The role of NGO actors is often said to be a driving force 
| J  Emphasis added: William De Maria. "Measurements and markets: deconstructing the corruption 
perception index," International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 21 no. 7, (2008): 778. 
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behind social change in the 21st century and often credited with their role in keeping 
social issues at the fore.14 With the level of interconnectedness of states and globalization 
of economic production, non-state actors are seemingly increasing influence. Some of 
these actors' roles are socially beneficial and wholesome, but there have been many 
questions about the agendas many seem to serve. TI is one of the leading, and often seen 
as the leading NGO on the issue of corruption and the drive to increase transparency in 
national and international transactions. The political economy of civil society is 
imperative especially as it relates to development policies. 
The proposition of why corruption matters and why TI matters inter alia, can 
probably be summarized as follows: even though corruption creates problems for any 
political system, the bigger problem is that "it directly challenges some of the 
fundamental principles of democratic governance."15 Being the first NGO formed 
specifically to address corruption; Transparency Internationa] has been at the front of the 
corruption debate. Huguette Labeile, Chair of Transparency In ternational notes, "This 
year (2011) we have seen corruption on protestors' banners be they rich or poor. Whether 
in a Europe hit by debt crisis or an Arab world starting a new political era, leaders must 
heed the demands for better government."16 According to Transparency International's 
2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, "it shows some governments failing to protect 
citizens from corruption, be it abuse of public resources, bribery or secretive decision-
14 JanAartScholte, "Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance," Global Governance, 
Vol. 8, no. 3 (July-Sept., 2002): 281-304. 
l5Sandholtz and Koetle, 31. 
16 Year added for specificity, Huguette Labeile, Chair of Transparency International, Corruption 
Perceptions Index, 2011, Press Release, 
http://www.transparencv.org/nevvs room/latest_news/press releases/2011/2011 12 01 cpi (accessed 
December 21, 2011). 
making."17 Transparency International warned that protests around the world, often 
fuelled by corruption and economic instability, clearly show citizens feel their leaders 
and public institutions are neither transparent nor accountable enough. On the surface this 
statement is seemingly true, but it should be stated that lack of transparency and 
accountability speaks of efficiency in the system of government but it is not necessarily 
corrupt. Therefore, it is imperative to assess whether the index affects development 
policies. Thus it is important to evaluate whether world leaders and policymakers take 
note of TI's index when making their policies. 
Beyond stating the obvious, corruption has been a matter of concern for many 
centuries. The nature of the corruption, as well as its causes and consequences, has been 
intensely researched over the last few decades. Thus, both the persistent lack of concern 
until the 1990s as well as the subsequent rise may, up to a point, be explained by a kind 
of informational flow like mechanism. Transparency International's perceptions index 
itself has contributed to this flow. Assigning numbers to perceived levels of corruption 
the index has made corruption real in the political domain and has created the impression 
that it can possibly be control by public policy. Without public numbers corruption may 
remain private. 
This ultimately leads to the question of how to keep the debate on corruption, 
accountability, and transparency alive while at the same time adding global focus. It is 
one thing to point to a few countries which historically have been referred to as corrupt, 
but it is also imperative to highlight, where possible, where attempts have been made by 
states to address corruption and whether these policies have been proven to be beneficial. 
To some degree Transparency Internationa] attempts to fill this gap. The role of civil 
17 Ibid. 
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society as a catalyst for fighting corruption and mobilizing pressure on governments and 
multilateral governmental organizations to adopt public sector reforms cannot be 
underestimated. In many parts of the world, businesses are partnering with civil society to 
prevent corrupt practices, strengthen public institutions, and foster an anticorruption 
culture in society. The prominence of Transparency International and other civil society 
groups have increased; especially over the last two decades. But the level of impact TI 
has had on development policies is yet to be ascertained. Thus my aim is to assess TI's 
overall impact on the development policies of Jamaica as a case study regarding its 
development policies. 
Jamaica, like so many other developing countries, is swamped in debt, high 
inflation rates, low credit scores and high levels of corruption. A key feature in the 
development of any society is efficiency, transparency and accountability. And not until 
it is treated as such, Jamaica, like other developing countries, will continue to be a 
developing nation with a host of potential, but muddled in conniption, flawed 
bureaucratic procedures and a country seen for its strength in sports, culture, music, etc., 
with great potential to develop but lagging behind its peers in making strides in 
development. As the OECD's overview of Jamaica reiterates, 
Despite its rich natural assets and a period of robust development in mining, 
manufacturing, construction and tourism, the economy has in recent times 
experienced a prolonged period of negative growth, with a poverty rate of 16.5% 
in 2009 and an unemployment rate of 12.4% in 2010 (between 2007-10 there was 
a cumulative decline of 5.1%). The country was recently classified as an upper-
middle income country, but it remains highly indebted with a debt to GDP ratio of 
128%."(OECD, "Overview of Jamaica," 2011) 
Jamaica, despite its size has long held an influential position on the international scene. A 
country with a rich cultural heritage, renowned for its strength in track and field, reggae 
music, Caribbean studies scholarship, amongst other qualities. However, today it is a 
highly indebted nation with an extremely high murder rate per capita and, in spite of its 
'potential,' its internal policies continue to be one of its key hindrances to growth and 
development. On average Jamaica's CPI score by TI have been 3.1, with 1 representing 
the highest perceptions level of corruption and 10 being the lowest. Jamaica has never 
scored at the median range of the CPI. 
Research Questions 
Does TI corruption score, and hence TI matter? 
What evidence is there to suggest that TI's score and by extension TI itself matters in 
development policies? Are policymakers paying attention to TI or is TI touting its own 
horn as to its relevance and importance in the anti-corruption debate. 
Does change in CPI lead to change in behavior? 
Different issues influence the world's political responses. Many developing countries are 
reliant on international financial institutions from development aid. Therefore what 
effect, if any, does TI's CPI have on world's political responses? Do policymakers pay 
attention to TI's CPI and what effect does it have on the creation of policies with 
developing countries such as Jamaica. 
13 
Do countries change their behavior to try to change their CPI? 
Many countries including Jamaica see changes in its T1 ranking yearly—hence what 
evidence is there to suggest that change in a country's CPI lead to change in behavior? 
Are there increased activities by the authorities to arrest and charge individuals on 
corruption related offences? 
Do countries try to dispute the CPI measure? Do they try to game the system? 
It is understandable that some countries would not find favor with their low ranking on 
TPs CPI. Therefore, what evidence is there to suggest that countries dispute the CPI 
measure yearly? Do they express their displeasure at TI's index or is TI's index taken as a 
given? 
Do economic actors take note of the CPI and change their behavior? 
There are numerous factors that affect countries' credit rating. Therefore what effect does 
TI's CPI have on Standard and Poor's credit rating of Jamaica? Is there any correlation 
between TI's CPI and change on the credit rating? Does the CPI affect bond ratings and 
or foreign exchange rate? 
14 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
Given the significance that policymakers and scholars give to the effect of 
corruption on development, Transparency international's CPI has become very 
influential. The CPI is widely cited by academic literature and uses it is used extensively 
in studies of development. A claim purported by the donor community is that essentially 
billions of dollars in official development assistance depends in part on a recipient's CPI 
scores. Given this evident importance, one would expect that large-scale indicators of 
development—amounts of foreign aid; foreign direct investment; credit ratings, bond 
yields; corruption enforcement—will respond to changes in the CPI. Thus one would 
expect negative movement in the CPI to cause donors to withhold aid and firms to forego 
business in a corrupt country. Surprisingly, however, no one has yet examined whether 
the CPI has these hypothesized effects on development. 
Transparency International has carved out a niche for itself in the civil society 
groups. With TI being the leading source for corruption ranking it comes as no surprise 
that many question the veracity of the index. Theresa Thompson and Anwar Shah's 
"Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index: Whose Perceptions Are 
They Anyway?"18provides in-depth analysis on TI's CPI. Additionally, whose interest is 
the index representing? One of the purposes of this research is to examine whether TI's 
CPI is a status quo or valuable policy tool. Thus finding out whether Tl is simply 
reiterating the image of some countries as corrupt or whether TI's index is a valuable tool 
in development policies in regard to stemming corruption in different countries is of 
significant importance. 
18 Theresa Thompson and Anwar Shah, "Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions 
Index: Whose Perceptions Are They Anyway?" Discussion Draft, Revised March 2005. 
http://g0.w0rldbank.0rg/l 1RTMZYUAO (accessed November 12, 2011). 
In the last few years a growing group of political scientists have raised some 
criticisms about civil society groups, the way in which they function, their agenda and the 
purposes they serve. Civil society groups like TI undoubtedly play a role in society; if 
nothing else, it keeps the debate on corruption at the forefront. One of the difficulties 
with TI's index, and other indices on corruption, that makes it difficult and problematic to 
apply for policy purposes is their wobbly bridge to real corruption. It does not really help 
to claim that perceived corruption might have as strong an effect as its actual counterpart. 
If so, the policy instruments that address perceptions are likely to be different from the 
ones addressing the real problem. 
The broad objective of the study is to assess, outside the interests of Transparency 
International, whether or not the CPI actually changes anything, does the CPI change 
behavior? Importantly, do markets react negatively when the index is published? Do 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) or lending government react differently towards 
a country? If a country's ratings in the corruption index decrease does that country 
receive less aid or assistance? Other than TI's Islands of Integrity, is there any empirical 
evidence that the CPI makes a difference? If it does not make a difference then it is 
unclear what TI adds to development policy other than reinforce pre-existing beliefs and 
to undergird bureaucratic inertia at the IFIs. This dissertation will seek to answer the 
question of how best to assess the impact of TI on policy formation. Specifically, how do 
international rating agencies and domestic governments respond to the ranking conducted 
by TI? Essentially, does TI matter? 
Debates on development policies are often complex. They involve multiple 
objectives, including reduction in corruption, poverty alleviation, reduction in inequality, 
improved human development indicators and other social goals. There is virtually no 
single instrument that can guarantee improvement along every single dimension of each 
of these objectives. In regard to poor economies, sustained rapid growth remains one of 
the most important variables to pursue these objectives. While this may be true, it can be 
said that corruption is often seen as an obstacle to developing economies. Many 
developing countries rely on aid in many shapes and forms from International Financial 
Institutions, lending governments, improved relations with MNCs, etc. How does the 
ranking of corruption in these countries affect their economies? 
Corruption manifests itself in many ways. In some countries it is blatant in others 
it is hardly detectable. Corruption has many faces, because it is deep-seated to human 
nature and cannot be described or even measured in universally acceptable ways. 
Transparency International has done a lot for the anti-corruption cause. It has kept the 
issue on the international agenda but it has not escaped criticism. The methodology of the 
index does raise some cause for concern. There is no one set methodology and data 
source for the CPI. It changes yearly and on an ad hoc basis, a survey might be used one 
year and might not be the following. De Maria, Galtung, Kalnins amongst others have all 
raised questions regarding methodological issues of the CPI. Some of the issues these 
authors have highlighted are: respondents in the surveys do not have to directly witness 
'corruption', the answers are based on personal impressions and hearsayare usually 
harvested. De Maria raised the concern of the amplification and abbreviation of 
impressions about corruption.19 
The precise working varies from country to country, and it has changed overtime. 
Thus year-on-year comparisons can be misleading. This is probably one of the greatest 
weaknesses in using TI as a research tool. If the methodology changes from year to year 
it greatly reduces the reliability of comparison analysis. Thus, what exactly were the 
contributing factors as to why one country will move significantly up or down on the 
ranking scale? TI is aware of the index's shortcomings, but what impact, if any, does TI's 
annual snapshot of corruption, rather than a focus on year on year trends, have on the 
behavior of lending governments, MNCs, IFIs, the governments labeled as 'corrupt', or 
the international markets? What evidence is there to suggest that the TI index changes 
development policies? There is widespread recognition that the CPI is amongst the most 
useful indicators of corruption available today. Today there are few scholarly 
publications on corruption that do not cite TI. Thus, beyond the academic realm, is TI an 
influential tool to policymakers. 
In spite of the variants in TI's CPI it is still used as a measure to state whether a 
country has improved or worsen as it regards corruption perceptions. This study is 
important, as there is yet to be a study to examine the effects of the CPI on policymakers' 
behavior. Since the CPI is used and referred to as the authority on corruption. One would 
expect a negative movement in the CPI to cause donors to withhold aid and firms to 
forego business in a corruption country. Surprisingly, however, no one has yet examined 
19 For De Maria, "the former occurs when perceptions of "corruption" by business people 
respondents are untrustworthy because they may have been temporally elevated in the lead up to the 
completion of the survey simply by being exposed to media reportage on local "corruption" stories. 
whether the CPI has these hypothesized effects on development. An important finding of 
this study, by contrast, that the CPI has no demonstrable effects on anything other than 
corruption enforcement efforts. Therefore, why does the most important measure of 
corruption fail to explain changes in development economics and politics? 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL—THE GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
Transparency international, formed in the early 1990s, first published its CPI in 
1995. Today, it might seem as if the rest is history. In May 1993 TI held its launch 
conference in Berlin amid much fanfare with people from the three sectors that are core 
international stakeholders in anticorruption process: national governments in the South, 
the international development community, and transnational corporations. From the onset 
TI's existence has changed the anticorruption scene beyond recognition and changed it 
from being an off-limit topic in international circles to the major focus of attention. At the 
core of TI's institutional strategy is what Peter Eigen calls, 'natural coalitions of 
interests',20 and the make-up of TI's first board of directors reflects the said statement. 
Peter Eigen is often seen as the key figure behind the creation of TI. His efforts started 
after he resigned from his position as The World Bank's regional director for East Africa. 
By the end of 1992 a substantial group of supporters formed Transparency International's 
initial board of directors and advisory council, including the likes of Nobel laureate Oscar 
Arias, President Olusegan Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Kamal Hossain, a prominent human 
20 Peter Eigen being quoted by Fredrik Galtung, "A Global Network to Curb Corruption: The 
Experience of Transparency International." in Ann Florini, Editor, The Third Force: The Rise of 
Transnational Civil Society, (Washington D.C.: Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo and the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2000), 23. 
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rights lawyer from Bangladesh and the country's former minister of justice and foreign 
affairs.21 
Professor Dr. Johann Graf Lambsdorff of the University of Passau is synonymous 
with the CP I however, since 2009 he no longer works on the computation of the CPI. As 
Professor Lambsdorff says, "in 1995 I invented the Corruption Perceptions Index and 
have orchestrated it ever since, putting TI on the spotlight of international attention."22 It 
could not have been said better than by the creator of the index himself when he stated: 
The CPI certainly was one of our most controversial tools - and maybe precisely 
due to this highly successful in changing perceptions. I am grateful to the many 
fierce debates we had on its strengths and weaknesses. I am grateful for having 
learned so much about the realities at the national level that lied behind each of 
the crude numbers I produced. I was happy for being criticized, when data failed 
to match with reality, and happy for being thankful, when my work helped raise 
awareness for so many National Chapters.23 
The work of Lambsdorff has generated criticism and praise. It unwittingly comes with the 
territory of assigning ranks to countries based on perception of corruption. Moreover the 
changing methodology and lack of ability for the index to be used in time series data 
analysis is one of the key problems and generates the more serious criticisms levied 
against the CPI. 
In the years since TI came into existence, the anticorruption scene has changed 
beyond recognition. From being the taboo topic it once was in international circles, 
21 For more information see Fredrik Gaitung, "A Global Network to Curb Corruption: The 
Experience of Transparency International," in Ann Florini, Editor, The Third Force: The Rise of 
Transnational Civil Society, (Washington D.C.: Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo and the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 22-25. 
"Global Integrity, "Johann Lambsdorff Retries from the Corruption Perceptions Index," 18 
(September 2009), http://www.globalintegritv.org/node/452 (accessed January 25, 2012). 
2jLambsdorff being quoted by Global Integrity, "Johann Lambsdorff Retries from the Corruption 
Perceptions Index," 18 (September 2009) http://www.globalintegrity.org/node/452 (accessed January 25, 
2012). 
corruption has become a major focus of attention and the subject of international treaties. 
TI in collecting, analyzing and disseminating information to raise public awareness about 
the damaging impact of corruption on human, economic, and social development. In 
addition to building national, regional and global coalitions that embrace the state, civil 
society, and the inclusion of the private sector to fight domestic and international 
corruption, TI has managed to keep the discussion on corruption at the fore. On the 
surface it might seem that probably TI's biggest effect is its scope of raising public 
awareness on the issue. The CPI, a collection of professional polls and surveys that 
captures the perception of thousands of international business l eaders, risk analysts, and 
business journalists on the relative degree of corruption in almost 187 countries. 
It is probably more suitable to argue that TI, through refining its methodology 
over the years, has remained at the top in regards to being the 'global civil society' on 
corruption. Some might argue that corruption is nothing new; in fact some have argued 
that while corruption has its negative effects it might help the functioning of society. 
Civil society such as TI has essentially created a concerted effort of developing 
progressive global governance, TI has had it fair share of criticisms since its launch; there 
has been calls for the index itself to be abandoned citing the quality of the Index and the 
lack of actionable insights created from a simple country ranking. 
Given the versatility of the term 'global civil society,' often seen as one of the 
reasons for its rising popularity, there is need for more in-depth analysis of TI. Empirical 
perspectives on global civil society have limitations. In spite of a growing body of data, 
the actual contours of global civil society remain elusive, to which one might say, for 
understandable reasons. This is another reason why this study on TI is important. TI itself 
states that its index cannot be compared yearly, as in, a time series data study.24 This 
raises the question as to why should TI be taken seriously or whose interest does the 
Index serve. Based on the varied methodology used to calculate the index yearly a 
perception of improved or decreased performance on the index undoubtedly produces 
false results. Or how can it be said a country has improved in the rankings if what is 
being measured cannot be compared yearly? 
Hence, the same mechanism that has contributed to the impact of particularly the 
TI perceptions index on the corruption policy flow, that is, the strong interaction between 
agents' perceptions has at the same time raises serious doubts about perception indexes as 
research tools, and as an instrument for measuring the effects of anti-corruption policies. 
Thus, how can we use TI's index to measure corruption when it in and of itself is merely 
compositing perceptions. 
Consequently, while the issues raised and will be discussed about TI's veracity 
throughout this study are important, in the end, even if the study shows that TI's effect on 
policy development in Jamaica or another country is not statistically significant the 
importance of having a global civil society focusing on corruption and need for greater 
transparency and accountability cannot be underestimated. This to some extent is a 
paradox. In that, if the study shows that TI's CPI does not hold any statistical significance 
on shaping Jamaica's or countries policies it raises the question of does TI matters? 
Particularly, if countries are not paying attention to TI's CPI then why do they exist? 
Whose interest is TI serving? Could one come to the conclusion that global civil society 
like TI does not matter in the end? 
24 Deborah Hardoon, Senior Research Coordinator, Transparency International, email message to 
author, January 18, 2011. 
The history of democracies teaches us that probably the greatest threat often 
comes from within, from the inattention and neglect of its citizens. Thus, while TI might 
at best be a flawed method for measuring corruption, it serves the purpose of keeping the 
issue of corruption at the vanguard of politics. In the 80s and 90s civil society groups 
were lauded as key players in governance in society but in more recent times a number of 
political scientist are more critical of NGOs, their roles, agendas, funding patterns and the 
issues they concentrate on. The CPI is now the best-known measure of corruption in the 
world. Quite noticeably in every publication of TI's new ranking there is great fanfare 
and the spotlight is shown on corruption by academics, governments, NGOs, media, etc. 
Countries ranked poorly sometimes make attempts to institute new laws that would 
improve their corruption perceptions. 
Perception and reality of an issue might very well be polar opposites. Quite often 
an individual's perception of an actual event or issue might vary significantly from the 
actual event. The social lenses of the actor viewing an issue or event might be affected by 
a number of things. Thus, to some degree, it begs the question, does TI's perception 
matches up to the reality of corruption in Jamaica. Furthermore, how much does 
perception affect and influence individuals, companies' and institutions' dealings? 
Therefore, in reality, the prevalence of various types of corruption is likely to vary by 
country. Corruption, may take the form of bribes or favors related to many activities; a 
short list of these being taxes, licenses, regulations, import duties, foreign exchange, 
government contracts or procurement, payoffs for political favors or support, preferential 
access to bank credit, and high level embezzlement. In addition, corruption, depending on 
23 
the type, is likely to affect different sectors of the economy and or segments of the 
population differently. 
Overview of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 
The validity and reliability of the CPI is not the focus of the dissertation. 
Although it is important given its variance and why countries pay attention to CPI, if they 
do, given this variance the methodology of the CPI varies over the years. In one year it 
might be seven, nine or thirteen surveys used. The change in the methodology of the 
index renders it not the most suited time-series dataset, but this is exactly how it is often 
used. Academics, scholars, students, the media, NGOs, politicians amongst others uses 
the CPI yearly to say whether a country's ranking on the index has improved or has 
gotten worse. Thus precedence and practice of using the CPI as a time series dataset will 
be employed in my research process. 
Since 1995 the annual computation of now 187 countries is disseminated by the 
Berlin-based NGO. "The CPI is now the best-known 'measure' of 'corruption' in the 
world."25 The CPI is essentially a poll of polls. The CPI's methodology has been 
discussed, as it pertains to its reliability and validity to measure corruption.26 On this note 
it is probably prudent to state that the very nature of corruption itself is secretive and 
private. And this in and of itself makes it hard to have a true and actual measure of 
coiruption, as this would require the participants to report on themselves. Corrupt 
behavior is conducted in private and more often than not, it is never reported. As De 
23 William De Maria, "Measurements and Markets: deconstructing the corruption perception 
ind ex," International journal of Public Sector Management, Vol.21 no. 7,(2008): 778. 
26 Ibid., 779. 
Maria note, "there are a number of frameworks available to develop our thinking about 
corruption."27 Corruption itself is organized around different key concepts; institutional 
corruption,28 human rights corruption,29 democratic corruption,30and donor corruption31 
to name a few. 
TI's CPI has been scrutinized for a number of reasons. There are some32 who will 
argue that the injury corruption can cause to businesses is now the dominant discourse in 
anti-corruption program planning. Thus this reflects the bias in the way questions are 
posed in the polls used by TI. To a large extent there is an over-weighted interest in 
business welfare in the polls reflected throughout the literature: it maintains social and 
political inequality,33retards business growth more than taxation,34 leads to lower levels 
27 Ibid., 778. 
2BJoseph LaPolombara, "Structural & institutional aspects of corruption," Social Research, Vol. 
61, no. 2, (1994): 325. 
29Selcuk Akcay, "Corruption and Human Development," Cato Journal, Vol. 26 no. 1, (2006): 29. 
30 Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus and Michael Lusztig, "Corruption, Democracy, and 
Economic Growth," International Political Science Review Vol. 27, no. 2 (2006): 126. 
31 Allan Doig, "Dirty hands and the donors. Dealing with corruption in a post-Mugabe 
Zimbabwe", Political Quarterly, Vol. 77 no. 1, (2006): 71. 
32 See the works of the following authors for the costs and consequences of corruption. Pranab 
Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35 
(September), no. 3 (1997): 1320-46. Cheryl W Gray and Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption and 
Development," Finance & Development. Vol. 35 March, no. 1 (1998): 7-10. Sanjeev Gupta et at. "Does 
Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?". IMF Working Paper (May 1998), Washington DC; 
Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, "Corruption, Public Finances and the 
Unofficial Economy." Policy Research Working Paper no. 2169 (Aug., 1999), The World Bank. 
33 Peter Enderwick, "What's bad about crony capitalism?" Asian Business & Management, 
Vol. 4 no. 2 (2005): 117-32. 
34 Raymond Fisman and Jskob Svensson, "Are corruption & taxation really harmful to growth? 
Firm level evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 83 no. 1 (2007): 63-75. 
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of investment,35and increases borrowing costs for governments and businesses in 
emerging economies.36 With these and other concerns in mind, TI's chairman and 
founder, former World Bank employee Peter Eigen was prompted to defend the 
prominence given in the CPI to the business focus, "the best available method of 
compiling comparative data [about "corruption"], therefore, is to build on the experience 
and perceptions of [business people] who are most directly confronted with the realities 
of corruption in a country."37 
Transparency International's CPI is a composite of various corruption indicators. 
There are surveys and opinions of business individuals and institutions around the world. 
Some of the sources such as "Business International and Wall Street Journal Central 
European Economic Review are used in only one year's CPI, while other sources such as 
the World Competitiveness Report and the Asian Intelligence Issues are included in all 
years from 1995 until 2003."38 Up until 2002, TI included three years of data (if 
available) from surveys and only one year in the case of expert assessments. As 
Thompson and Shah note; 
There were two major changes in the CPI starting with the 2002 edition, having to 
do with the selection of sources for the component indicators and the 
methodology used to compute the CPI. Regarding the choice of sources, TI 
decided to no longer include surveys of the general public, but rather include only 
expert assessments and surveys of business people. (Thompson and Shah 2005, 2) 
35Mauro, P. (1998), "Corruption and the commission of government expenditure," Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 69 No. 2, pp. 263-79. See also Shang-Jin Wei, "How taxing is corruption on 
international investment," NBER, Working Paper 6030 (1997) www.nber.org/papers/w6030 (accessed 
November 12, 2011). 
36Fancisco Ciocchini, Erik Durbin, and David T.C. Ng, "Does corruption increase emerging 
market bond spreads?" Journal of Economics & Business 55 (2003): 503-28. 
" Andrea Bistrich 2004 "Countries rob countries of their potential," interview with Peter Eigen 
cited by de Maria, (2008): 786. 
jS Thompson and Shah, 3. 
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Since 2002, the new standardization procedure, referred to as "matching percentiles"39 
occurs in two steps. The inputs to standardizing a particular indicator according to 
Thompson and Shah are;l) rankings of countries covered by that source, and II) the 
previous year's CPI scores for that same subset of countries.40 
The CPI ranks countries on a zero-to-ten scale; with a score of zero representing 
very high corruption. Since each source of data about the level of corruption uses a 
different scale, the scores need to be standardized before being averaged into the CPI.41 
Once standardized, each source receives equal weight in the index. In other words, it is 
the simple mean of the standardized sources. Transparency International's method of data 
collection has varied over the years. The number of sources used in the index tends to 
change from year to year as do the number of countries scored. Thus it is important to 
assess what is being measured; notwithstanding of the accuracy of the conniption ratings, 
it is unclear what the corruption ratings actually tell us, since corruption is such a broad 
concept. However if one were to take TPs stance when it indicates, the objective of their 
Corruption Perceptions Index is "enhancing understanding of levels of corruption from 
one country to another"42 through data on perceptions of corruption. But the question that 
needs to be asked is whether this translates into actually influencing development 
policies? The difficulty arises because there are many ways that corruption can manifest 
itself and different types of corruption may cause different problems depending on the 
39 Ibid., 4. 
40 Ibid. 
41 For example, one source rates countries on a 0-6 scale, while another rates on a 0-10 scale. 
42Lambsdorff, The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999—Framework 
Document, p. 1 
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circumstances. Since there are different forms that corruption may take the "degree of 
corruption might refer to the frequency of corrupt acts, the amount of bribes paid, or the 
gain (financial or otherwise) that contractors achieve through corruption."43 
As TI postulate and even some skeptics have agreed, 
It has become recognized that corruption is rarely an isolated phenomenon found 
only within a specific institution, sector or group of actors. Rather, it is usually of 
a systemic nature, and therefore lighting it also requires a holistic and systemic 
strategy. In turn, a successful anti-corruption strategy is premised on the 
involvement of multiple stakeholders, including government, civil society, and 
other governance actors, since it requires both, supply-side political will as well as 
demand-side civic pressure for greater transparency and accountability. (TI, 
National Integrity System. Assessment, 2011) 
It is here, that Transparency International's N1S assessment tool, which according to TI 
"combines evidence-based advocacy with a participatory multi-stakeholder approach, 
presents a unique contribution to the field."44 As TI's methodology is faced with more 
scrutiny, TI tries to allay its critics and articulates that, 
The NIS assessment approach is targeted towards country-level civil society 
organisations, which work in the field of anti-corruption and good governance. It 
can be a relevant tool in a variety of contexts and for a wide range of purposes, 
such as: advocacy & policy reform, monitoring and comparing, planning, building 
coalitions, and guide to more research. (TI, National Integrity System Assessment, 
2011) 
The methodology of the CPI undoubtedly has its flaws. But the fact that scholars, 
academics, governments, the media, NGOs and other interest groups repeatedly refer to 
the TI as it relates to countries improvement or decreased status on the index is 
interesting and worth examining. The translation from acknowledging the CPI and the 
CPI influencing policymakers will be a key discussion within the findings. In that, 
theoretical and policy attention devoted to the CPI is grossly out of proportion with its 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
apparent impact on corruption. TI itself notes that the CPI is not comparable across 
countries or over time. This in and of itself is an inherent weakness in the CPI. This is a 
remarkable claim for a measure that is so widely cited and used in the field of 
development economics. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation will be comprised of seven chapters including an introductory 
chapter, a theoretical framework chapter, a methodology chapter, three chapters on 
analysis of Transparency International's impact on development policies and a 
concluding chapter. The introductory chapter has discussed the topic and gives an outline 
of how the dissertation will proceed. Chapter two will make the theoretical connection 
between global civil society and transnationalism and global governance. Chapter three 
will then discuss the methods, data, justification and hypotheses. Chapter four will 
evaluate the world's political responses to the CPI. hi this chapter attention will be placed 
on institutions and organizations such as the World Bank, USA1D, U.S. Department of 
State, EU, etc. Chapter five will evaluate world's economic responses to CPI; for instance 
bond markets, trade, exchange rates, etc. Chapter six will assess Jamaica's responses to 
the CPI—what steps are taken domestically to reduce corruption, does the government 
acknowledge TI's CPI, and are they making short-term changes to game the system? 
Chapter seven recommendations and conclusions based on the findings. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
No country can ignore Transparency International You consult, but the 
government is in charge. The government makes the decision. That's what I 
wanted to make clear. Now, 1 know the NGO has a sexy appeal as civil society. 
You go in some of these countries; I don't know what civil society means. Before 
I got to this position, I knew what it was. Now, I don't know. Anybody who left 
office would create his NGO, and then, that's civil society. You know that.1 
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
The purpose of this chapter is to situate, Transparency International in 
international relations theory. Recently, international relations theories have sought to 
understand phenomenon: global governance, transnationalism, pluralism, and collective 
social action with empirical research on civil society and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). Traditionally, it is states that always play the crucial role in the study of 
international, relations. Primarily, the study of international relations has been concerned 
with the struggles for power, wars, and the efforts of states to forge national interest that 
began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Realism or structural realism has continued 
that tradition. Nonetheless, since the last decade of the 20th century a variety of non-state 
actors has become increasingly involved in the decisive issues of world pol itics. Samuel 
Huntington2 postulates that with the third wave of democratization new challenges 
emerged for many of these newly and or growing democracies. 
1 Mr. Ali BadjoGamatie, Minister of Finance of Niger, quoted by, William Reuben, The World 
Bank, (2002) "Tell me: who are those guys? To whom are they accountable? Dilemmas for representation 
and accountability" (Presented to the Workshop on International Studies in Planning and to the 
Transnational Contention Group, Cornell University, February 22, 2002): 1. 
2 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
Corruption has been widespread in these countries and it affects their 
development process in more ways than one. Coupled with the declining role of the states 
and the increased emphasis on private sector initiatives, the emergence of civil society 
has led to different players in the development agenda. This shift from a narrow state 
focus to include private sectors and civil society has brought about a new set of issues, 
but also challenges and opportunities for a host of NGOs. The emergence of organized 
civil society and of NGOs as organizational manifestations of broader social movements 
has dramatically altered the global political economy landscape. 
There is a growing incompatibility between the empirical evidence of global 
political actors and relationships in one sphere and state-centric model of international 
relations, on the other. The presence of large numbers of non-state actors in international 
politics is now an empirical fact. Like the concept of civil society, the related concepts of 
democracy and democratization have received new attention since the 1980s from 
political theorists and comparativists as well as from international relations scholars. A 
possible area of impact of global civil society is on the nation-state. It must be borne in 
mind that the real and potential influence of other global actors. As Friedman el al. 
argues, "Scholars from varying theoretical perspectives have called for revisiting theories 
of sovereign state control."3 Sovereignty is no longer a monolithic concept, or that states 
are the only actors to be considered in international politics. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: giving a general introduction of civil society, 
and discussing TI and other civil society group's roles in theory and practice in the field 
of international relations . 
J Elisabeth Jay Friedman, et al. Sovereignly, Democracy, and Global Civil Society: State-Society 
Relations at UN World Conferences, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 21. 
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Defining Global Civil Society 
Transparency International defines itself as "the.global civil society organization 
leading the fight against corruption, brings people together in a powerful worldwide 
coalition to end the devastating impact of corruption on men, women and children around 
the world. TI's mission is to create change towards a world free of corruption."4 Perhaps, 
because it has become so fashionable, the idea of civil society is increasingly ambiguous 
today. Thus when articulated by social actors, the notion of rejuvenating or preserving 
civil society certainly tends to increase mobilization. There is an important empirical 
challenge in defining what constitutes civil society.5 For one set of authors, on the 
surface, any grouping that assumes representation of collective interests can essentially 
be claimed as part of civil society, or civil society may be defined as the totality of civic 
engagements citizens commit to join in the polity.6 On the other hand, for Michael 
Edwards, the concept of civil society is conflated with that of social capital.7 It was 
Edwards himself who lamented the fact that the explosion of internationally registered 
civil society groups or NGOs post-Cold War has caused some scholars to lump all 
prominent civil society groups into one big tent, when in fact their organizational 
missions are so diverse and not all are dedicated to promoting better institutional 
performance. 
4 Transparency International, "What is Transparency International?" 
http://wvvw.transparencv.org/about us (accessed January 1, 2012). 
5 Zhang Ye, "China's Emerging Civil Society," (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2003): 
21, define civil society as "an area of association and action independent of the state and the market in 
which citizens can organize to pursue purposes that are important to them, individually and collectively." 
6 See the works of Helmut Anheier, Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy. (Sterling, 
VA: Earthscan, 2004); Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1992); Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society," Dissent 38, no.2, (1991): 298-304. 
7 Michael Edwards, Civil Society (Cambridge, UK Maiden, MA: Polity Press ; Distributed in the 
USA by Blackwell, 2004). 
Civil society has drifted its way through the academic world on a torturous path. 
For Alison Van Rooy, "ideas have been attached and detached, origins have been 
ascribed and divorced, social meanings have been generated and debunked."8 The term 
civil society has a long history in political philosophy, and its definition had been altered 
with Roman, Lockean, Hegelian, Marxist and Gramscian interpretations long before it 
was resurrected in the 1990s as commonly understood, civil society institutions include 
non-governmental organizations, for example, Transparency International. Since 
Aristotle, political thinkers have debated, disputed and failed to reach consensus 
regarding the nature and meaning of civil society. "For de Tocqueville (1835, 1840), civil 
society limits the state; for Hegel (1821), civil society is a necessary stage in the 
formation of the state; for Marx, civil society is the source of the power of the state; and 
for Gramsci (1929-1935),"9 civil society is the space where the state constructs its 
hegemony in alliance with the dominant classes. 
Civil society, according to the Cato Institute in Washington DC, means 
"fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society by expanding free markets and 
individual liberty."10 The Advocacy Institute refers to civil society as "the best way 
forward for politics in the post-Cold War world."11 Edwards referring to Anthony 
Giddens'12 and Benjamin Barber's claim that civil society, by gently correcting 
s Alison Van Rooy, Civil Society and the Aid Industry. (London: Earthscan. 2000), 7. 
9Ibid., 8. 
10 Cato Institute cited by Michael Edwards Civil Society, (Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Inc., 
2004), 2. 
" Advocacy Institute cited by Michael Edwards Civil Society, (Maiden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing Inc., 2004), 2. 
12 Anthony Giddens. The Global Third Way Debate. (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 
generations of state and market failure, could be the missing link in the success of social 
democracy.13 
Robert Putnam (1993) demonstrated the link between civic associationalism and 
institutional performance. Mark Warren (2001) has provided important theoretical 
elaboration on how civil society encourages associational life that may provide the pillars 
for good governance. For Warren, associations may contribute to institutional conditions 
and venues that support, express, and actualize individual and political autonomy as well 
as transform autonomous judgments into collective decisions.14 
Civil society is most often defined as if it were a collective noun, the sum of all 
the organizations that to some extent we feel are responsible for bringing civility closer to 
home. In practice, civil society has been made synonymous with the voluntary sector, and 
particularly with advocacy groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social 
movement agents, human rights organizations and others actors explicitly involved in 
'change work'.15 To some extent it is probably correct to assert that it cannot be denied 
that civil society plays an essential role in society and NGOs themselves play an 
increasingly important role in international relations, in comprehending the roles of 
NGOs, the question must be answered: what are NGOs' definitions and what are their 
functions? If the concept of civil society can be used by groups of every ideological 
divide with equal dexterity and presumably, in some cases, much profit, civil society 
must assuredly prove advantageous for all. And this leads one to ask why? 
13 Anthony Giddens and Benjamin Barber cited by Michael Edwards Civil Society, (Maiden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing Inc., 2004), 2. 
14 Mark Warren, Democracy and Association. (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
6 1 .  
15 Alison Van Rooy, 15. 
Globalization, Civil Society and the State 
Due to the normatively marked heritage of the concept civil society, it is 
somewhat difficult to find systemic social theorists who focus primarily on the issue of 
civil society. The development of the components of civil society in modernity a new 
form of individuality, subjectivity, rights, plurality, publicity, legality and sociality now 
appears as nothing but an effect of power relations. Graeme Chesters posits the view that 
almost uniformly that Global Civil Society (GCS) has been perceived as progressive and 
democratizing, its composition varies according to one's ideological position.16 Kaldor's 
framework provides the 'activist definition of GCS, in that it takes on a Utopian quality 
and is manifest in the interstices between markets and states.17 Kaldor and Keane further 
elaborated that in the neoliberal version it is an essential adjunct to the globalizing forces 
of free trade and privatization. In the normative ideal-type, Kaldor and Keane favor, it is 
a "dynamic nongovernmental system of interconnected socioeconomic institutions"18 that 
is capable of pluralizing power and problematizing violence. 
The idea of the nation-state as the principal organizing unit of political and 
economic life is called in to question by the growth of extra-national social organizations, 
transnational corporations and the liberalization of capital and investment flows. Chester 
in referring to others (Castells 1996;Appadurai 1990; and Urry 2000) made the argument 
that has led some to the conclusion that "global networks" "scapes" and flows" should be 
the primary focus of investigation in the social sciences as these are the 'true 
l6Graeme Chesters, "Global Complexity and Global Civil Society," Internationa! Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 15, no. 4 (December 2004): 323 
l?Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War? (London: Polity Press, 2003). 
l8John Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8. 
architectures of the new global economy"' an economy that has catalyzed a marked 
acceleration in the disparity between rich and poor along a number of axes.19 Some of 
which as identified by Castells are "hemispherically from south to north, regionally 
between "peripheral" and "core" countries, and nationally across class and ethnic 
boundaries."20 Nonetheless, the dense ties that once connected civil society to the state 
are being detached and redirected across national boundaries to form a thickening global 
public sphere. Yet these connections and flows are not autonomous, are not arbitrary 
patterns crossing in the sky, but are shaped by the strong magnetic field of nation states.21 
When the collective action of a group of individuals is sustained over time in an 
identifiable way and reflects an important emerging social change, it is termed a social 
movement. TI has strongly emphasized the need and role of civil society in increasing 
transparency and accountability and in fostering good government and governance. Thus 
with this premise the philosophy is held that the best approach to addressing corruption is 
a coalition of three pillars: government, the private sector and civil society. This inclusion 
or stress to acknowledge non-state actors draws to the neoliberal school, which 
acknowledges that non-state actors play a role in international relations. 
Often, citizens' growing loss of trust in institutions they rely on to protect 
interests of social import has fanned a need for new mechanisms to foster social capital 
' 'Chesters, 327. 
20Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, Information Age (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 66. 
2lMichael Burawoy, Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections and Imaginations in a Postmodern 
World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). 
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formation that Putnam would describe as 'outward looking' and 'bridging.'22 Due to this 
lack of trust in national governments to be transparent and or accountable in their actions 
citizens are often inclined to believe the perceptions rating of corruption from an 
organization outside the country. Primarily because the organization would not have 
direct personal gains from ranking one country as more corrupt compared to another. 
Therefore, it can probably be characterized that when the interests embodied in a social 
movement evolve structurally to form a freestanding presence within the broader 
institutional environment, the resulting entity is termed an NGO, which to a large extent 
embodies TI. Not surprisingly, Peter Eigen in 'The Role of Civil Society,' articulated, 
"We at Transparency International believe that the involvement of civil society is vital in 
the fight against corruption. A non-governmental organization ourselves, we regard the 
mobilization of civil society as crucial to achieving success."23 
The richness of the concept of civil society and the fact that it now has, yet again, 
acquired new content will lead to more discussion in academia. The concept of civil 
society has been objected to most strongly and is deemed to be the biggest source of 
ambiguity. Undoubtedly the most obvious problem related to the question is which actors 
and organizations are considered to be a part of global civil society. Rupert Taylor24 
"Robert D. Putnam. Democracies in Flux : The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary 
Society (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 11. 
23 Peter Eigen, "The Role of Civil Society", in Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in 
Developing Countries, (1998). 
24 Rupert Taylor, "Interpreting global civil society," Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary 
and Nonprofit. Organizations, Vol. 13, no. 4, (2002): 339-347. For Taylor, the term global civil society is 
now fairly commonplace within academia, in mass media, and amongst a broader public. A second and 
possibly more serious kind of objection to the concept is that global civil society, rather than just creating 
confusion by being vague, may systematically be leading research in an undesirable direction. The 
accusation is that global civil society posits an implicit analogy between global and domestic spheres, 
importing into globalization studies precisely the statist assumptions that global civil society is supposed to 
be reconfiguring or transcending. 
finds that "when employed, the term has generally served as a kind of catchall term for 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or social movements, of all shapes and sizes, 
operating in the international realm."25 
The literature on civil society often applies the concept asymmetrically. Many 
scholars treat the notion of spontaneous harmony as a description of life in advanced 
industrial democracies, but an unrealized ideal for other places and often encourages less 
industrialized countries to develop more civil society, which in practice usually means 
more NGOs. Many scholars use "civil society" to denote a realm of peaceful social 
organization independent from and often antagonistic to the state. Joel Migdal's26 (198 8) 
influential study of weak states assumes that strong states control society by dominating 
alternative sources of social power, whereas weak states confront strong social groups 
that defy their authority. Although some really weak states may not have social groups -
because of conflict, or subjugation by the state - for example, Somalia, North Korea. 
Migdal, it can be said, never considered the possibility of strong states being matched 
with strong societies. His foursquare matrix, diagramming the possible combinations of 
strong and weak societies and states, leaves the strong state/strong society quadrant 
blank.27 Not surprisingly, this drew a lot of criticisms; others have argued that the 
strongest, best-organized and most representative societies appear in strong or high 
capacity states. Thus Putnam's work seems to reverse Migdal's formulation. 'Social 
capital,' he writes, "as embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the 
25 Ibid., 339. 
26Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States : State-Society Relations and State Capabilities 
in the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 35. 
27 Ibid. 
performance of the polity and the economy, rather than the reverse: strong society, strong 
economy; strong society, strong state."28 
Functions of Civil Society—77 
Using P. J. Simmons', "Leaning to Live with NGOs" it would seem as if NGOs 
affect national governments, multilateral institutions, and national multinational 
corporations in four ways: setting agendas, negotiating outcomes, conferring legitimacy, 
and implementing solutions.29 Civil society like TI achieve these four ways by means of 
keeping the issue of corruption at the fore, governments, international institutions and the 
media et al all cite and refer to TPs CPI and countries improvement. The issue of 
governance is also related to negotiating outcomes. When countries borrow from 
international Financial Institutions (IFIs) there is greater focus placed on improving 
governance and reducing waste, cost overrun and excessive spending. TI confers its 
legitimacy by governments around the world paying attention to their ranking on the CPI, 
addressing their improvement or decline. Some of TPs recommendations to address 
corruption are being implemented and its results are reflected in the reduced perceptions 
of corruption. 
Simmons taxonomic approach to NGOs provides some insights into 
understanding NGOs, their goals, membership, and where they get their funding. As it 
pertains to corruption TI has set itself up as the leading civil society group on corruption. 
It has kept the discussion on corruption on the forefront, but the influence of TI on 
28Robert D. Putnam. Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work : Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). 176. 
29 P.J. Simmons, "Learning to Live with NGOs," Foreign Policy 112 (Fall 1998): 84. 
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forcing leaders and policymakers to pay attention is yet to be ascertained. The functions 
of civil society should also be assessed in terms of the framework for measuring civil 
society. Dimensions such as its structure, environment, values and impact are of 
particular importance. 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
The concept of'governance' first surfaced in international relations in 1989. This 
was when the World Bank described the situation in Africa as a 'crisis of governance.' 
From then on, the term governance has been primarily, if not exclusively, related to the 
politics of development, and mainly to development in the post-colonial world.30 James 
Rosenau defined global governance in general terms as "an order that lacks a centralized 
authority with the capacity to enforce decisions on a global scale."31 Lawrence 
Finkelstein suggests that governance should be regarded as an activity, and not as a 
system of rules, for which the regime theory already existed and quite sufficiently. 
Essentially, his position is that global governance is "doing internationally what 
governments do at home."32 In the case of TI, its focus on transparency and 
accountability is what governments themselves should be doing. 
There is somewhat of a difference as one examines the arguments of global 
governance and global civil society. Global governance is not an embryonic form of a 
30 For an overview of global governance, see James N. Rosenau and Ernst 0. Czempiel eds., 
Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992) and Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair eds., Approaches to Global Governance Theory 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1999). 
Jl  James Rosenau (1992b), "Governance, order and change in world politics," in James Rosenau 
and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-29. 
p
~ Lawrence Finkelstein, "What is Global Governance," Global Governance, Vol. J, No. 3 (Sep-
Dec, 1995): 369. 
world government modeled after the modern nation-state. It appears that global relations 
are regulated without a single center of authority. To which Jan Aart Schotle notes, "as a 
consequence, the governance of supraterritorial spaces is characterized by democratic 
deficit, since 'global governance is not democratically legitimate."33 On this point it is 
relevant to point out that "civil society, therefore, serves a different function than in 
previous epoch and has to find new ways for establishing itself within this new global, 
postnational constellation."34 During the 1990s, both the engagement and the 
representation of civil society organizations and networks shifted from monitoring to 
active participation in governance.35 
The contemporary scholarship has shown that there is a strong committed notion 
to the idea that organizations of civil society play a strong positive role in facilitating 
democracy. Some lineage lies in the work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) 
linking civic culture with the growth of liberal democracies, but the tendency is 
particularly noticeable since Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work (] 993). Civil 
society promotes democratic sustainability and enhances state institutional performance. 
The scholarship has shown confounding results regarding civil society's impact in 
improving the quality of democracy and governance. As Tusalem notes, "Bermeo and 
Nord's (2000) work advances the argument that in 19lh century Europe, civil society's 
Jan AartScholte, "Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance." Global Governance, 
Vol. 8.. no. 3 (July-September 2002): 292. 
34 Jody Jensen and FerencMiszlivetz, "Global Civil Society: From Dissident Discourse to World 
Bank Parlance," in Peter Wagner ed. The Languages of Civil Society" (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 
194. 
33 John Foster, "Knowing ourselves: A Brief History of Emerging Civil Society," Washington,' 
DC: 4 lh CIVICUS World Assembly, (2001). See also Michael Edwards, 'Herding Cats? Civil Society and 
Global Governance,' New Economy 9, no. 2, (2002): 71-76. 
excesses did not necessarily promote the longevity of democracy, because its many 
configurations did not play a convincing role in promoting a democratic political 
culture."36 Sydney Tarrow also puts forward the argument that civil society per se does 
not promote better governance. But rather, states that have a high level of organizational 
capacity (those that have institutionalized the rule of law and achieved high levels of 
legitimacy) are more likely to foster polities that can have strong civil societies.37 In the 
end, strong state institutions matter more than civil society in promoting good 
governance, not negating the role civil societies play. Others, such as Gill 2000, also 
claim that the relationship between civil society and institutional performance is mutually 
reinforcing. 
Ariel Armony offers one of the first extensive empirical studies in this area. By 
focusing on contemporary Argentina, he discovers that "al though the presence of human 
rights and civil rights groups brought awareness to human rights abuses, these groups had 
a very minimal influence in implementing judicial and police reforms."38 hi fact human 
rights groups were restrained in promoting higher levels of political participation. To 
some degree it can be said that Armony's study reminds us that scholars are still debating 
the effect of civil society on democratization and solid empirical research is still lacking 
in this area. Jonathan Fox skeptically noted: "civil society's contribution to accountable 
governance has been widely asserted, but the causal mechanisms that determine the 
36 Rollin F. Tusalem, "A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-Wave 
Democracies." International Political Science Review Vol. 28, no. 3 (June, 2007): 362. 
''Sydney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Apace and Time: A Critical Reflection on 
Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work "American Political Science Review 90, (1996): 389-97. 
j8 Ariel Armony, The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization. (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2004). 
patterns of civil society's influence on horizontal accountability have not been well 
specified."39 
One of the key features of global governance is coordination and not control. TPs 
aims to coordinate the ranking of the perceptions of corruption for different countries 
might be good for TI as they have carved a niche for themselves as the leading figure on 
corruption ranking. The question of governance is crucial as the literature on governance 
debate seemingly highlights the con-elation between countries that have lower indexes for 
governance tend to have higher corruption rates. 
TRANSNATIONALISM 
The central concern of classical liberalism has always been the interface between 
civil society and government. Classical liberals have drawn inspiration from various 
philosophical and religious traditions: Aristotle, Kant, utilitarianism, Christianity, and 
natural law are amongst the most obvious. John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith are 
probably the most classic of the classic liberals. The heart of classical liberalism is a 
simple policy. So long as the state provides a basic rule of law that steers people away 
from destructive or parasitic ways of life and in the direction of productive ways of life, 
society runs itself. 
Global civil society is a product of global liberalism. But Lipschutz question "if 
there is a global civil society, where is the global state to which it corresponds"40 is 
pointed. Martin Shaw hypothesizes the emergence of a global state encompassing the 
39 Jonathan Fox. "Civil Society and Political Accountability: Propositions for Discussion," 
Working Paper. (Notre Dame, IN: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University ofNotre 
Dame, 2000): 1. 
40 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Global civil society and global governmentality," in Marlies Glasius ei al 
eds. Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contents. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 199. 
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industrial heartland of the West, which may offer the political framework for global civil 
society.41 Governmentality, as Michael Foucault put it, is about management, it is: 
The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has as its target populations, as its principal form of 
knowledge, political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of 
security. (Foucault 1991a, 102) 
From a neoliberal point of view, increased actions by non-state actors in international 
relations indicate a shift in not only cooperation, but also states functioning. This would 
hold if it were shown that NGOs like TI actually influence policies. Thus, it goes without 
saying that if civil society is supposed to be the vanguard of keeping government honest 
then assessing the impact of corruption on regime legitimacy is important. TI's position is 
structured along the line that corruption has a negative impact on regime legitimacy and 
thus it is in the interest of states to reduce their corruption. 
A broader conceptual framework that appreciates the significance of the divisions 
within the civil society activist community could be labeled "complex 
transnationalism."42 For which Ayres define as, "This would take seriously those civil 
society actors adopting much less theoretically specified and, therefore less understood 
political-organizational forms and undertaking less predictable collective action against 
multilateral economic institutions."43 The general trend toward global governance 
reflects the increase in the number of contentious issues challenging states and non-state 
41 Martin Shaw. Theory of the Global Stale : Globalitv as an Unfinished Revolution. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
42 As Jeffery Ayres extrapolates, this approach would embrace the political significance and 
conceptual challenge of more than just those NGOs mobilizing to engage multilateral institutions and to 
pursue reforms to the regulatory framework for global trade, Jeffery M. Ayres, "Global Governance and 
Civil Society Collective Action: The Challenge of Complex Transnationalism," International Journal of 
Political Economy 33, no. 4 (Winter 2003/2004): 84-100. 
43 Ibid., 89. 
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actors as well as the growing complexity of their interactions on a number of global, 
regional and national scales. For which Ayres contends, "NGOs and other more 
contentious social actors have increasingly organized on a transnational scale and 
exploited new communications technologies such as the Internet."44 This mobilization 
has, in turn, put pressure on the other "club model" or "old stakeholders" model of global 
trade governance that privileged the position of states and, moreover, the interests of the 
richest Northern states in the outcomes of multilateral trade negotiations.45 
There are numerous arguments that the effects of civil society are positive, in line 
with the liberal school of thought, some of civil society's positive effects are it promotes 
development, labor solidarity, democratic accountability, and post-materialist causes in 
the developing world.46Schmitter's argument is that sometimes NGOs are able to compel 
properly authorized state authorities to prosecute, penalize, sanction, or punish errant 
public officials.47 In the event that this occurs liberals could claim pressure from civil 
society keep issues in the fore and thus forces government to act. It might be to appease 
the public or simply doing its job. NGOs such as TI, have acted as an institutional 
alternative that can monitor the transparency and efficacy of legislation and can expose to 
the public the intensity or forms of client-patron relations, nepotism in governance at the 
44Ibid 90. 
45See Jeffery M. Ayres, "Global Governance and Civil Society Collective Action: The Challenge 
of Complex Transnationalism," International .Journal of Political Economy 33, no. 4 (Winter 2003/2004): 
84-100, for his reference and discussion on FCeohane and Nye 2001. 
46 See Anheir, 2004; Ann-Marie Clark, "Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on 
Society," Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2, (1995): 507-25.DonheaHilhorst, The Real World of 
NGOs: Discourses, Diversity and Development (London: Zed, 2003); Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, 
Civil Society: History and Possibilities (London: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
47See Philippe Schmitter, "Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of 
Democracy," Working Paper, (1993) http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_10.pdf (accessed November 
15,2011). 
local or national levels. This accords a high level of involvement of NGOs in perhaps 
influencing and shaping the policies of countries. Andreson and Tverdova were correct 
when they argued, "the principles underlying democratic political systems presume that 
governments are accountable to their citizens, that they administer laws equitably and 
fairly, that their actions are transparent, and that all citizens have access to the political 
process."48 
Civil Society, Trust and Regime Legitimacy 
Transparency International rates countries based on perceptions and not actual 
acts of corruption. Corruption itself is a private act therefore truly measuring actual 
corruption is exceedingly difficult. But, while perception isnot everything, perception is 
said to matter a lot. As it concerns trade; if the people doing business with a country 
perceive it to be corrupt then this will affect the way in which transactions occur. 
Similarly, if citizens' assessing particular institutions can arrive at a reasonable 
conclusion that the said institutions do what they are supposed to do in a fair and efficient 
manner, then one would have reason to believe that people will refrain from acting in a 
treacherous manner, and probably rightly so. Therefore one could arrive at the conclusion 
or at least hold the view that most people can be trusted. "Political corruption is 
considered one of the most destructive yet unresolved problems common to most 
societies."49 Transparency International seeks to highlight such negative effects of 
48 Christopher Anderson and Yulia V. Tverdova, "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes 
toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, no. 1, 
(Jan., 2003): 99. 
49 For discussion see Eric C.C. Chang and Yun-han Chu, "Corruption and Trust: Exceptional ism 
in Asian Democracies? The Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, no. 2 (May 2006): 259. 
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corruption on the internal structure of a country but also its perception outside. The old 
Chinese maxim, 'The fish rots from the head down' is perhaps vital, because if the head 
is perceived to be corrupt then without much change in the system, there will not be an 
incentive to change. Corrupt leaders breed distrust throughout society. Therefore, an 
honest government, according to Eric Uslaner, is "one that enforces the law equitably and 
limits opportunity for private gain, can ultimately lead people to have greater faith in 
each other."50 Rothstein,51 on the other hand, finds a stronger correlation between trust in 
citizens and confidence in the legal system, 
Political and legal institutions that are perceived as fair, just and (reasonably) 
efficient, increase the likelihood that citizens will overcome social dilemmas.... In 
a civilized society, institutions of law and order have one particularly important 
task: to detect and punish people who are "traitors," that is, those who break 
contracts, steal, murder, and do other such non-cooperative things and therefore 
should not be trusted. (Rothstein 2000, 482) 
It is commonly held that the legitimacy of governments is derived from the 
people. As Peter Eigen notes, "If government is accountable to democratic control, if it is 
bound by the rule of law and if it respects universally accepted standards of human rights, 
government can rightly claim to act on behalf of the people."52 Thus this legitimacy gives 
government the strength to undertake reforms to suppress corruption that may reach far 
into people's lives. At the core of it, it is this legitimacy which makes government a 
strong and reliable partner and which enables it to set a framework better equipped to 
deal with corruption. 
30 Summarized from Eric M. Uslaner. "Trust and Corruption," p.6 in Corruption and the New 
Institutional Economics eds., Johann Graf Lambsdorf et al. (London: Routledge, 2004). 
31 Bo Rothstein, "Trust, Social Dilemmas, and Collective Memories: On the Rise and Decline of 
the Swedish Model. .Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12,(2000): 477-499. 
32 Peter Eigen, "The Role of Civil Society", in Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in 
Developing Countries (1998): 84 http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/efa/coiTuption/Chapter05.pdf 
(accessed January 10, 2012). 
The legitimacy of civil society also rests with the people although it is structured 
differently. While many non-governmental organizations can claim a mandate to speak 
on global concerns and represent those interests unrepresented in the traditional political 
process, they are not accountable to direct democratic control. Often, these organizations 
are not even democratically structured internally. Hence, what legitimizes civil society 
groups is a concern about issues that are not being dealt with. 
The most remarkable theorization of social capital lies with trust. Social networks 
are said to "elicit reciprocal norms and trust in other people, and such trust is considered 
another core element of political revitalization and effective governance, resulting in 
democratic stability."53 Although associational involvement invigorates trust in the 
general population of society, the generalized social trust is not automatically 
transformed to become trust in political institutions. This trust is also what TPs 
perceptions index seeks to capture, in that, trust affects perceptions, if people do not have 
that trust in a system, does this explains the social upheavals seen in many sections of the 
developing world? For Ji-Young Kim, "political revitalization is not an outgrowth of 
social trust, and it seems more feasible to consider that there are factors intervening 
between social capital and political outcomes rather than to anticipate social trust as a 
direct cause of political results."54Countries with high levels of corruption also show a 
correlation with having high rates of theft and tax evasion. Thus, Mauro and Rothstein's 
33 Robert Putnam cited by Ji-Young Kim, "Bowling Together" isn't a Cure-All: The Relationship 
between Social Capital and Political Trust in South Korea," International Political Science Review, Vol. 
26, no. 2 (2005): 194. 
34Ji-Young Kim, "Bowling Together" isn't a Cure-All: The Relationship between Social Capital 
and Political Trust in South Korea," International Political Science Review (2005), Vol. 26, No. 2, 193-
213, p. 195. 
argument that, "trust is marginally significant for tax evasion, while tax evasion very 
strongly tracks the level of corruption in society,"55 holds firm. 
Global civil society, like TI, has sought to highlight that this breakdown in trust, 
which citizens have for their government. In that, people see corrupt regimes and believe 
that it is acceptable to steal and especially to withhold their taxes. Otherwise their hard-
earned money would go directly into the pockets of the politicians. This ultimately affects 
the institutions in society and the legitimacy of a regime. And it adds further to the 
perceptions of corruption. Assessing more closely, as it relates to trust and corruption, 
corruption seems to matter for adherence to the law. According to Uslaner, "most of the 
time, it is trust that matters most. Trusting governments, more than honest governments, 
spend a greater share of their gross domestic product on government, spend more for 
education and on the public sector more generally, and have better functioning judiciaries 
and greater political stability."56 Civil society groups probably hold the crucial role of 
keeping the issues of corruption, need for transparency and accountability in the media, 
etc. Such efforts/pressure will actively encourage governments to comply or at least keep 
the debate on corruption at the forefront. 
Consequently, corruption, rather than mistrust, seems to lead people to break or 
evade the law. Corrupt bureaucracies get mired in red tape. Yet, judicial efficiency seems 
more rooted in trust than in corruption, hi order for a society to reduce corruption, an 
increase in trust is essential to the equation. Nonetheless, one is cognizant that in most 
countries trust changes slowly. More often than not, it is dependent upon an egalitarian 
"Eric M. Uslaner, "Trust and Corruption" (Department of Government and Politics, University of 
Maryland-College Park, 2004), 20. See also 
^'Uslaner, 21. 
distribution of wealth in a society, and economic inequality is almost as stubbornly stable 
as trust. Trust is earned over time and not until developing countries aim to strike a 
balance with increasing trust and decreasing corruption, citizens' perception of 
institutional trust will continue to wane. Furthermore, to increase trust, governments 
simply cannot increase trust by removing one set of dishonest bureaucratic officials and 
replacing them with a new set of elites. But instead trust is best demonstrated when 
governments, private society and civil society all have confidence in the system. 
Impact of civil society in changing undemocratic processes 
Amidst the praises of NGOs, of late, there are strong criticisms directed towards 
them. Amongst the most serious are those focusing on NGO performance and 
effectiveness that claim NGOs have had a poor track record and have done more harm 
than good. Thus a rising backlash is being seen by some academics, scholars and, in the 
case of Transparency International, many developing countries' governments are 
questioning their role and agenda of TI. Taking into consideration the extensively high 
expectations and enormous amount of resources and political access given to NGOs in 
the 1980s and 1990s it comes as no surprise that numerous critics of NGOs have 
surfaced. Thus some of the core criticisms that have been leveled against NGOs as Kim 
Reimann,37 postulate; 
...can be divided into five main categories: 1) issues concerning accountability, 
representation and transparency; 2) NGO performance and effectiveness in 
obtaining their goals; 3) ideological and politically motivated critiques of the 
rising influence of Western NGOs; 4) question of dependence on emergence of a 
37K.im Reimann, "Up to No Good? Recent Critics and Critiques of NGOs." Political Science 
Faculty Publications. Paper 5. (2005): 39. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/political science facpub/5 
(accessed November 11, 2011). 
highly competitive charity and activist 'market', and 5) NGOs commercialization 
and the emergence of a highly competitive charity and activist. (Reimann 2005, 
39) 
In the past two decades, the quantity and influence of NGOs have grown considerably; of 
late scholars and observers have raised some concerned on the effectiveness and role of 
civil society groups. While there were many cases of both NGO success and failure, the 
main body of evidence according to Reimann "indicated that NGOs were not performing 
as effectively as the development paradigm had promised in terms of poverty reach, cost 
effectiveness, sustainability, popular participation and flexibility and innovation."58 
Consequently, strongly interrelated to the question of NGO performance and 
effectiveness is the question of accountability. Hence the notion of watching the 
watchdogs and the issue of accountability, representation and transparency is the key. 
Although supporters of NGOs and NGOs themselves have an idealized image of 
NGOs as representatives of the people and civil society, critics have emerged who 
question the ability and the right of NGOs to make such grand claims. To some extent 
there appears to be a more sinister task of NGOs. And thus the issue arises of whether 
NGOs are losing the "n" in the nongovernmental organization abbreviation, or the "n" in 
their status as non-profit organizations. Donini. amongst others, has noted how an 
oligopoly of eight families or confederations of INGOs control up to half of the total 
funds available for development and relief activities in the 1990s, with many of them 
having budgets of $500 million or more.59 Some researchers have questioned the nai've, 
purely positive view of civil society that dominated scholarship in the early 1980s and 
58Ibid. 
59 Antonio Donini, "The bureaucracy and the free spirits: stagnation and innovation in the 
relationship between the UN and NGOs", Third World Quarterly, Vol 16, no. 3 (1995)., see also, lan 
Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism under fire—None-Profit Organizations and international Development 
51 
90s. Berman's (1997), research has shown that civil society can endanger democracy 
under conditions of social upheaval and a weak state.60 
THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
Since the early 1990s, the concept of 'global civil society' has been the focus of a 
good deal of research and criticism and with good reason. Lipschutz, referring to Michel 
Foucault (1991), situated global civil society in what he states is best understood as 
'global governmentality'. Central to Lipschutz's argument is that "much of GCS [Global 
Civil Society] is deeply imbricated with the market-perhaps intentionally, perhaps not— 
and is political only in a rather impoverished sense."61Lipschutz 1992 argues that "the 
growth of global civil society represents an ongoing project of civil society to reconstruct, 
re-imagine or re-map world politics."62 For which Ronaldo Munck has articulated that 
"the concept of GCS has acquired such prominence in both academic and policy circles 
in so short a period of time would indicate that it has some theoretical or political 
purchase in our changing times."63 Furthermore, "the danger remains that although a new 
concept may capture some novel social or political transformation under way, its 
momentum may lead us to minimize problems and inconsistencies in its formulation."64 
Hence Munck might be on to a good point when he argues that "a key problem to focus 
60 Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," World Politics 49 
(April 1997): 401-29. 
61 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Global civil society and global governmentality," in Marlies Glasiuse/ al 
eds. Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contents. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 199. 
62 Ronnie Lipschutz, Reconstructing world politics: The emergence of civil society. Millennium 
21, no.3, (1992): 391. 
63 Ronaldo Munck, "Global Civil Society: Myths and Prospects," International Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organization no. 4, (Dec 2002): 351. 
64 Ibid., 351-52. 
on has been dubbed the issue of "presentism" that seems to bedevil much of the GCS 
literature."65 For which he makes the point that "this is an assumption that present day 
observable phenomena are essentially novel in some way. It is a perspective that lacks 
historical perspective and is thus, at the very best, partial."66 
Fred Halliday has questioned the assumed novelty of the "non-state actors" that 
supposedly animate it. For Halliday, "the erosion of the Westphalian system rests upon a 
contemporary optic, and illusion."67 In not saying there isn't anything 'new' about GCS 
but Munck sought to make the argument that 'new' non-state actors can in fact trace their 
heritage back to long before the nation-state Westphalian system became dominant. 
Using Munck's and Halliday's line of reasoning Global civil society like TI, emphasize 
on the 'global' tends to obliterate an older history of transnationalism, not to mention 
internationalism. Thus Munck in putting GCS into context made the analogy that, 
One cannot understand the events in Seattle 1999 without going back at the very 
least to 1919. The ups and downs of labor internationalism are not just an 
interesting historical backdrop on the present, but an essential explanatory 
element. Yet labor internationalism—in the present, never mind the past—seems 
strangle absent from the GCS discourse. (Munck 2002, 352) 
Another criticism, which TI and GCS in general have not escaped from, is "the 
irredeemable Eurocentric bias in much of the GCS literature in spite of its importance in 
Latin America for example."68 John Keane argues that GCS names an "old tendency of 
local and regional civil societies to link up and to penetrate regions of the earth that had 
previously not known the ethics and structures of civil society in the modern European 
65 Ibid. 351. 
66 Ibid., 352 
67 Fred Halliday "The Romance of non-state actors, In: Josselin, D., and Wallace, W. (eds), Non 
State Actors in World Politics, Palgrave, London, pp. 2! -37.p. 27. 
68 Friedman et al, Sovereign limits and regional opportunities for global civil society in Latin 
America. Lat. Am. Res. Rev. 36, no. 3, (2001): 7. 
sense."69 In this sense TI itself has been accused of being Eurocentric in its views on 
'corruption' and negating cultural tradition etc. This alludes to the argument of what 
might be seen, as corruption in one country might be a long cultural tradition in another. 
Thus, "it seems a very clearly European Enlightenment version of democracy, civility, 
and ethics which underpins the notion of GCS—whatever lip service is paid to selected 
other parts of the world."70 Consequently, Munck's argument that the cultural 
universalism of this model does not really allow for diversity or the distinctive paths of 
modernity that different parts of the globe have taken is relevant. In the "cosmopolitan" 
global democracy project this Euroentrism presented as universalism becomes most 
explicit and "Enlightenment man" is seen as the privileged actor in the GCS play we are 
asked to support."71 
According to this paradigm, in assessing TI and other NGOs, the main 'actors' in 
the structure of GCS we also see semblance of the North-South issue coming to the fore. 
For critics of the structural dependency theorists, and critical theorist, the international 
NGOs are quite simply as James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer puts its "in the service of 
imperialism," given that "NGOs foster a new type of cultural and economic 
colonialism—under the guise of a new internationalism."72 This point is not to argue that 
NGOs are bad against those who think they are good. But there is the need to take a 
69 John Keane, "Global Civil Society?" Chapter 2 in Helmut Anheier, arliesGlasius and Mary 
Kaldor (eds.) Global Civil Society (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 28. http://iohnkeane.net/wp-
content/uploads/201 l/01/ikgcs2001 full.pdf (accessed November 06, 2011). 
70Munck, 353. 
71 Ibid., 
/2Petras and Veltmeyer (2001): 132 cited by Ronaldo Munck, "Global Civil Society: Myths and 
Prospects," International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organization no. 4 (Dec 2002): 353. 
somewhat more critical and robust political view of the world of NGOs as part of civil 
society and as key players in the field of GCS. 
Some estimates suggest that by the mid to late 1990s, an estimated $6 to $7 
billion dollar of official aid and foundation funding was being channeled through 
NGOs.73 On one level these increases in funding for NGOs marked a policy shift in the 
international donor community away from supporting state institutions towards a 
neoliberal, privatized approach to development and relief. Subsequently, NGOs were 
now heralded as the antidote to corrupt and failing states in developing and 
democratizing countries since they would promote bottom-up, 'people-participatory' 
development and a thriving 'civil society' that would encourage the spread of democratic 
norms and practices. Reimann (2005) essentially gives a good summary of the roles and 
perceptions of NGOs in the early 1980s and 1990s. For Reimann, the 1980s and 1990s 
were not only a time of rapid NGO growth but also a period in which NGOs came to be 
enthusiastically promoted by powerful states, international organizations and private 
foundations. The rhetoric and propaganda used by these international actors portrayed 
NGOs as the new citizen saviors that would help solve world problems ranging from 
'equitable and sustainable' development to world peace to the spread of democracy and 
human rights. In addition to their idealistic image as altruistic and selfless promoters of 
good causes, NGOs were now presented as functionally important and contributors to 
human progress.74 
Some critics have argued that NGOs represents the interest of those who fund it. 
NGOs, such as TI, are usually nonprofit organizations that gain at least a portion of their 
/3Reimann. 38. 
74 Ibid. 
funding from private sources. Thus with this said, the fact that some are prone to be 
dependent on international funding has led some scholars to argue that NGOs are not 
really local actors of civil society. Instead, they are beholden to the interest of larger 
international forces that promote globalization directives, structural adjustment policies, 
and the interests of international financial donors.75 Other NGOs are partially funded by 
the state or elite structures domestically or internationally and hence their developmental 
or state-accountability agenda can be co-opted by external forces that do not truly 
represent societal or sectorial interests. Thus the Marxist theorist would argue that NGOs 
are merely a tool for representing the interest of one group over another. 
Critical theorists, and development scholars will argue that global civil society 
plays a role in society while others will argue that global civil society are reflections of 
the structure of the international system. Citing that most global civil societies are located 
in western democracies and that they control and influence the international system. Thus 
civil society like TI, while it has some merit and seeks to address corruption and 
transparency, it perpetuates the historical divide between the North and the South. As in, 
the north is always seemingly dictating to the south what is wrong with their system of 
government or society and how to fix and address their issues. 
Subsequently, implicit in some of the theoretical discourse is the historical path-
dependency argument. That is, "states with low levels of civic associationalism are more 
prone to having institutions with substandard performance in terms of bureaucratic 
° See Sangeeta Kainat, Development Hegemony: NGOs and the State in India (New York : Oxford 
University Press. 2002); also, Sarah Medelson and John Glenn, eds. The Power and Limits of NGOs: A 
Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, (New York: Colombia University 
Press, 2002). 
effectiveness."76 The work of Putnam and his followers has been criticized for a range of 
errors. Research by Solt claims that Putnam's original argument is outright wrong: "the 
socioeconomics and history of land redistribution matter more than civil society in 
determining higher levels of Italian political participation that can facilitate better 
institutional performance."77Juan Linz analysis is also important; Liz posits that a strong 
civil society promotes regime instability, principally because outside groups such as trade 
unions or working-class societies can have too much influence in policymaking.78 
Furthermore, a classical criticism articulated by Samuel Huntington that among Pretorian 
societies that excessive group mobilization aggravates social tensions can, in some 
instances, delegitimize a functional state, is relevant.79 
The pessimism associated with some civil society has been more pronounced in 
third-wave democracies, primarily in Latin America where some of these countries have 
borne witness to 'people-power' uprisings often triggered by some civil society, which 
toppled constitutionally elected or appointed presidents since the late 1990s. Alison 
Brysk (2000) theorizes "civil society groups in Latin America have returned authoritarian 
leaders in Guatemala and Bolivia, and destroyed democratic gains in Venezuela and 
76 Rollin F. Tusalem, "A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third and Fourth Wave 
Democracies." International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, no. 3 (Jun., 2007): 365. 
" Frederick Solt 2004, "Civics or Structure? Revisiting the Origins of Democratic Quality in the 
Italian Regions," cited by Rollin F. T usalem, "A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third and 
Fourth Wave Democracies," International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 (June., 2007), pp. 366. 
78 Juan Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, andReequilibration. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978). 
79Samuel P. Huntington and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs., Political Order 
in Changing Societies (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1968). 
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Ecuador."80 For Arturo Valenzuela (2004), the Latin American region is particularly 
prone to having interrupted duties of governing because of civil society's political 
activism. Thus the skeptics have actively argued along the line that disagrees with the 
notion that civil society is a panacea that can promote democratic sustainability.81 
Why is the perception of government corruption more pervasive in some countries than in 
others ? 
There is no one answer to this question. But filtering through the literature, it 
would appear that government corruption is more pervasive in countries where the 
structure of opportunities and incentives are conducive to corrupt behavior. Additionally, 
there is another dimension that is related to political culture which "repertoires of 
cognitions, feelings, and schemes of evaluation that process experience into action."82 
Subsequently, in societies where the government seems to have its hand in the economic 
creation and development there is a positive correlation between the degree of state 
control of the economy and corruption. The argument by Sandholtz and Koetzle supports 
the position that "the effecti veness of democratic institutions in curbing corruption, 
however, depends on the presence of a set of democratic norms."83 Thus, the political 
S0AIison Brysk 2000 "Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America," cited by Rollin F. Tusalem, 
"A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third and Fourth Wave Democracies," International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 (June, 2007): 367. 
81 See Sheri Berman 1997a, 1997b who challenges the optimism of using civil society as a catch­
all cure for the institutional deficits of transitional states. For Berman the history of civil societies, absent a 
strong state, can facilitate societal discord. An historical example cited by Berman is: that in the case of 
Weimar Germany, strong civic nationalism led to the rise of the Nazi party—a party that was utterly 
inimical to the tenets of liberal democracy. 
S2Sandholtz and Koetzle, 35. 
S3 Ibid., 38. 
culture of a society might also affect how that society and its people conceptualize what 
is corruption. The role of civil society like TI, which focuses on the perceptions of 
countries, ultimately aims to drive and reform countries' policies. As one of the views as 
it relates to development is that less corruption and easier means of doing business 
without high bureaucratic red tapes would encourage foreign direct investments [FDIs] 
into a country. 
As Rose-Ackerman argues, "If one wants to understand the functioning of 
democracy, it will not be possible to follow the conventional economist's inclination to 
ignore more constraints upon self-seeking behavior, certain political virtue and moral 
beliefs are necessary in both publics and politicians."84 Democratic norms and values 
delegitimize corrupt practices. It also speaks to the fact that, "variations in the density of 
corruption depend more on variations in the willingness of people to be corrupted, and 
therefore what we would prefer to call the moral cost or participation, than on the 
structure of opportunities."85 
An analysis of TI's CPI indicates that countries generally perceived as least 
corrupt are those nations that are known to be democratic compared to authoritarian 
countries that are seen as more corrupt. Thus under functioning democratic institutions, 
government officials are more accountable to the public, and perhaps because the public 
has means of scrutinizing the conduct of public official s and punishing corruption 
behaviors. "Corruption erodes some of the core values of a democracy, namely, that 
collective decisions should emerge from public processes guided by known rules, and all 
84 Rose-Ackerman cited by Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle in Accounting for Corruption: 
Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade," International Studies Quarterly 44, (2000): 38. 
S:)Sandho!tz and Koetzle, 38. 
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citizens should have equal access to those processes."86 To some extent the data 
seemingly points to the fact that the level of corruption is a product of two primary 
factors: "the potential-economic structure of incentives and opportunities, and the cultural 
norms that shape people's perceptions, evaluations, and choices."87 
Consequently the work of Montinola and Jackman also point out that "the 
nonlinear relationship between political competitiveness and corruption underscores the 
importance of casting regime type in continuous rather than in dichotomous terms. The 
point might seem innocuous, were it not for recent suggestions that the latter approach is 
often preferable."88 Perhaps the most important conclusion for Montinola and Jackman 
is: 
Political competition matters, and there is an interesting threshold in this 
relationship. Corruption is typically a little higher in countries with intermediate 
levels of political competition than in their less democratic counterparts, but once 
past the threshold, higher levels of competition are associated with considerably 
less corruption. Stated differently, corruption is likely to be slightly lower in 
dictatorships than in countries that have partially democratized. (Montinola and 
Jackman 2002, 167) 
Thus, freed of the political constraints associated with direct taxation and the economic 
constraints imposed by more competitive markets, political leaders have every incentive 
to engage in the politics of patronage; an environment in which corruption flourishes. 
On the other hand, assessing the work of Gerring and Thacker, the authors found 
that "neoliberal hypotheses that market-oriented economic policies are associated with 
lower levels of political corruption, and state intervention in the economy with higher 
86 Ibid., 47. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Gabriel la R Montinola and Robert W. Jackman, "Sources of Corruption: A Cross Country 
Study," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, no. 1 (Jan., 2002): 167. 
levels."89 Additionally, "market oriented states may be less corrupt, but interventionist 
states, as measured by public spending, are not necessarily more corrupt."90 In assessing 
political corruption Gerring and Thacker postulated a few variables that might be relevant 
in understanding why some countries are more corrupt than others noting; "the 
recognition of its intrinsic importance and also because of its close relationship with 
economic growth, investment, the rule of law, political accountability, political 
institutions, and democratic governance."91 
This leads to another important question, what does corruption mean in a 
democracy? Does civil society that focuses on corruption effect changes in countries 
policies? As Mark Warren argues "corruption in a democracy involves duplicitous 
violations of the democratic norm of inclusion."92 It also speaks to the fact "that 
corruption in a democracy usual indicates a deficit of democracy."93 TI reiterates these 
amongst other reasons why it is key to focus on corruption, as transparency in countries 
policy is imperative to its growth and development. It falls further into the line of TI that 
corruption tends to thrive in societies that have weak institutions. With that said, 
corruption of democracy is a violation of the norm of equal inclusion of all affected by a 
collectivity. This leads one to ask what the harms to democracy are. It can be argued that 
corruption does harm democracy as it leads to corruption of the state, whether it is in 
89 John Gerring and Storm C. Thacker, "Do Neoliberal Policies Deter Political Corruption?" 
International Organization, Vol, 59, no. 1, (Winter, 2005): 233. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Summarized from John Gerring and Storm Thacker, "Do Neoliberal Policies Deter Political 
Corruption?" International Organization, Vol. 59, no. 1 (Winter, 2005): 233-234. 
92 Mark E. Warren, "What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy," American Journal of Political 
Science 48 (Apr., 2004): 329. 
93 Ibid. 
executive, legislative or judicial functions. Moreover a corrupt civil society only 
contributes to debilitating effects on the market. While the concept of corruption carries 
with it a moral accusation, Warren is possibly correct in noting "causes, locations, and 
meanings of corruption are consistently misidentified, often with the help of opportunistic 
political elites, so that remedies often miss and sometimes aggravate the problems. A 
democratic concept of corruption not only reveals the opportunities for domain slippage, 
but also the challenges for devising solutions that speak to each domain."94 
Conclusions 
My theoretical argument has several empirical and policy implications. It 
illustrates that civil society's prominence has grown over the last two decades. 
Globalization and the information revolution has not only compressed time and space, 
but it has essentially made us live in the global village; one in which human activity is 
less restrained than ever by national borders. The Internet especially facilitates greater 
travel, communication and trade than in previous decades. It also helps to bring more 
problems gradually to the international society. This phenomenon actually gives civil 
society such as TI the opportunity to show their functions in international relations. It can 
be said that TI functions as an agent of international comprehension, as well as a shaper 
of public opinion and as a pressure group. But its effect on policy development has not 
been proven. 
94 Ibid., 341. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In determining how he will behave, an actor must try to predict how others will 
act and how their actions will affect his values. The actor must therefore develop 
an image of others and of their intentions. This image may, however, turn out to 
be an inaccurate one; the actor may, for a number of reasons, misperceive both 
others' actions and their intentions. (Robert Jervis 1968, 454) 
The objective of this chapter is to test several predictions of the theoretical model. 
I developed an empirical framework to examine the extent to which Transparency 
International's Corruption Perceptions Index has an impact on behavioral change as it 
relates to policy development at either the domestic or international level. In particular, 
the empirical framework analyzes the CPI impact on the development policies of 
countries such as Jamaica. Theoretically, it has been argued that civil society is a primary 
prerequisite that can deliver better institutional performance and greater levels of 
horizontal accountability. Hypotheses formulated in this chapter will: (1) address the 
impacts of CPI on development policies; (2) address the impacts of Tl's CPI on foreign 
aid donors; (3) suggest any significant interaction effects between Tl's CPI and other 
variables. 
This chapter is organized in four sections. It begins with a justification for the 
mixed methodology approach being employed. In the second section, I offer a description 
of variables and data sources used in the empirical analysis. The empirical methodology 
is described in the third section. In section four, I present the main set of hypotheses 
testing existence of the impact of Tl's CPI. 
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Overview 
At this stage, it is important to recognize that the nature and the limitation of the 
data available does not allow me to derive the testable empirical hypotheses entirely from 
the theoretical model presented in the previous chapter; therefore attenuating the 
connection between theory and empirics in this dissertation. However, one could draw 
from the theoretical model several predictions readily testable empirically and complete 
them with testable hypotheses derived from the global civil society literature reviewed in 
chapter two. Next, the chapter will then discuss the sources of data and statistical 
methods used to test the hypotheses. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine whether or not TI's CP1 matters within domestic or international development 
policies. Does the publishing of the index influence behavior change? My approach in 
attempting to gauge the impact of TI's CPI on behavioral change would be to identify if 
and when policy changes occur and if there is any correlation to TI's index. 
The analysis of the impact of the CPI on aid donation is less straightforward. An 
ideal model specification would be one in which there is a relationship between a 
measure of aid donation as a dependent variable and a measure of the CPI as an 
explanatory variable plus a set of other control variables. For example, at the aid 
institution level, one would analyze the extent to which the effects, if any, of the CPI is 
present when there is project commitment and disbursement levels and then analyze how 
it affects the amount of aid given one year to the next. 
Nicolas van de Walle postulates, "the IMF and World Bank have a long history of 
withholding assistance from highly corrupt countries."1 To a large extent, this seems to 
make sense as cornjpt officials could easily channel the assistance to their offshore bank 
accounts. This has numerous negative consequences. In that "contributors of aid might be 
reluctant to provide assistance in the future. The aid might be a completely wasted effort, 
as the real target of the aid, the people, might not benefit from it."2 A controlled test will 
be done to test whether there is a change in the level of aid Jamaica receives when the 
ranking on corruption changes. 
None of the studies I have cited in the review of the existing literature considered 
longitudinal relationships. All were cross-sectional analyses; even in instances where 
longitudinal data was available. One of the dangers of cross-sectional analysis is the 
heightened possibility of ecological fallacies, also known as aggregation bias. None of 
the studies actually examined the effects of TI's CPI on policy developments. And how 
much of a consideration is given to TI's index when policies' regarding corruption is at 
the fore. 
'Nicolas van de Walle, 2001 being quoted by Levente Littvay, "Corruption and Democratic 
Performance." Political Science Department — Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. Paper 1. 
(2006): 13. httpV/digitalcommons.unI.edu/poliscitheses/l (accessed December 05, 2011). 
2Levente Littvay, "Corruption and Democratic Performance," Political Science Department --
Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship.Paper I. (2006): 13-14. 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edU/poliscitheses/l (accessed December 05, 2011). 
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METHODOLOGY 
This study was conducted using a mixed method research matrix. Mixed methods 
research has come of age. Thus to include only quantitative or qualitative methods falls 
short of the major approaches being used today in the social sciences. As John Creswell 
and Piano Clark1 puts it: 
Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as 
well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it invol ves philosophical 
assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in the research 
process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both 
quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central 
premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination 
provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone. 
(Creswell and Piano Clark 2007, 5) 
Using a mixed methods approach will complement the study, as one will seek to enliance 
areas where the analysis might be deficient. The data assessed will focus on the period 
from 1995-2011. This represents the time the CPI has been in existence. A large-N 
analysis will be presented; this will offer a broad and cross regional analysis on TI's 
Index, in addition to the focus oil Jamaica as a case study with reference to other 
countries for analysis. 
The ultimate goal of any research project is to answer the questions that were set 
forth at the project's beginning. Mixed methods approach for this study is useful because 
it provides better opportunities for answering the research questions. Johnson and Turner, 
in making a stronger case for mixed methods providing stronger inferences noted, 
"methods should be mixed in a way that has complementary strengths and non-
'John W. Creswell and Vicki Piano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research 
2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2011), 5. 
overlapping weaknesses,"2 this they referred to this as the fundamental principle of mixed 
methods research. For which Tashakkori and Teddlie point out a classic case involves 
using case studies in conjunction with mailed surveys.3 One method gives greater depth, 
while the other givers greater breadth; hopefully together they give results from which 
researchers can make better, i.e., more accurate inferences. 
Additionally, as Tashakkori and Teddlie, note, "mixed methods are useful if they 
help the researcher to meet the criteria for evaluating the goodness of their answers."4 
The topic, in and of itself, requires one to examine it through different lenses and mixed 
methods are superior to single approach designs. In the case of assessing whether TI's 
CPI has an impact on changing behavior, and hence does TI matter, mixed methods 
research can answer research questions that the other methodologies cannot. Secondly, 
this method provides better and to some extent stronger inferences. And this method 
provides the researcher with the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of 
divergent views. One dimension on which quantitative and qualitative research is said to 
vary is the type of question answered by each approach. Some authors have suggested 
that qualitative research questions are exploratory, while quantitative research questions 
are confirmatory. This dichotomization of research questions has been the source of 
2Burke Johnson and Lisa Turner, "Data Collection Strategies in Mixed Methods Research," 
Chapter 11 in Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie, Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral 
Research (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2003). 229. 
3Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie, Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral 
Research (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2003), 14. 
4  Ibid 
disagreement of many social scientists. Keith Punch5 in his disagreement with this 
dichotomization notes: 
Quantitative research has typically been more directed at theory verification, 
while qualitative research has typically been more concerned with theory 
generation. While that correlation is historically valid, it is by no means perfect, 
and there is no necessary connection between purpose and approach. That is, 
quantitative research can be used for theory generation (as well as verification), 
and qualitative research can be used for theory verification (as well as 
generation). (Punch 1998, 16-17) 
Mixed methods undoubtedly seem to be the better approach to use in this topic as 
quantitative and qualitative analysis will be useful in understanding TI's CPI on 
development policies. Nonetheless, one of the arguments against mixed methods is 
directly related to the conclusions or inferences. In that, what happens if the quantitative 
and qualitative components lead to contradictory conclusions? Maybe the ultimate 
advantage of using mixed methods is in the quality of inferences that are made at the end 
of the study. As such, one would differentiate the "results" of the research from the 
"inferences" that are made from that research. Inference as defined by Tashakkori and 
Teddlie is "an umbrella term to refer to a final outcome of a study. The outcome may 
consist of a conclusion about, an understanding of, or an explanation for an event, (a) 
behavior, (b) relationship, or a case (e.g. in qualitative research)."6 
3Keith Punch, Introduction to Social Research : Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (London 
; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1998). 
6Tashakkori and Teddlie. 35 
RATIONALE FOR JAMAICA AS A CASE STUDY 
Jamaica, according to UNDP is a country with a high Human Development Index 
(HDI). Its HDI value for 2011 is 0.727 positioning the country at 79 out of 187 countries 
and territories. Between the years of 1980 and 2011, Jamaica's HDI value increased from 
0.607 to 0.727, an increase of 20.0 percent or average annual increase of about 0.6 
percent.7 Jamaica, according to TI's CPI is ranked as a highly corrupt country seeing an 
increase in the perceptions of corruption over the years. Jamaica is selected as case study 
for a number of reasons. Jamaica is a former British colony; receiving independence in 
1962. A small island economy referred to as an upper middle-income country, yet still 
there are many challenges to its development. Corruption remains one of the most serious 
and seemingly intractable problems for Jamaica. Corruption is cited as the biggest 
problem to Jamaica's development. Jamaica is known as a trans-shipment port for drug 
smuggling from South America to North America and Europe. Alfred Powell et a/argues 
that "associated closely with the illicit drug trade is the importation and trade of illegal 
weapons that facilitate the criminal enterprise."8 Income from the trade helps to sustain 
criminal networks and may be used to corrupt key institutions such as the police force 
and public officials. Jamaica has made efforts to reduce corruption. It has passed several 
bills, which makes transparency and accessibility to information more readily available. 
The Jamaica Constabulary Force has also seen changes with a revamp new branches 
being formed and new ways to tackle corruption. 
7UNDP, Human Development Index (HDI) 2011 Rankings (201 1). 
8 Lawrence Alfred Powell, Balford A. Lewis and Mitchell A. Seligson. The Political Culture of 
Democracy in Jamaica, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times. (LAPOP, 2011), 
76. 
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Jamaica, when compared to its neighbors Barbados and Trinidad—all with similar 
institutions, is ranked higher in terms of corruption perceptions, except for Trinidad in 
2011 (see Table 3.1. below). All are former colonies that inherited almost identical 
political, economic, and legal intuitions such as a Westminster Parliamentary democracy, 
constitutional protection of property rights, and legal systems rooted in English Common 
Law. However, Jamaica's corruption level is significantly higher. 
Table 3.1. TI's CPI Rank of Jamaica & other Caribbean States 
Year Barbados Jamaica Trinidad # of countries 
1995 41 
1996 
1997 52 
1998 49 85 
1999 50 99 
2000 90 
2001 31 91 
2002 45 33 102 
2003 57 43 133 
2004 21 74 51 146 
2005 24 64 59 159 
2006 24 61 79 163 
2007 23 84 79 180 
2008 22 96 72 180 
2009 20 99 79 180 
2010 17 87 73 178 
2011 16 86 91 183 
Source: Transparency International (note: high rank means high corruption) 
These English islands essentially have mirrored institutions of their former 
colonizer. This has been attributed to a number of reasons: according to (Payne, 1993) as 
sovereign nations both organized their governments as parliamentary democracies in the 
Westminster-Whitehall tradition.9 Moreover as Henry and Miller argued since 
independence, Barbados and Jamaica have maintained two-party political systems and 
consistently held free and fair elections with no unconstitutional transfers of power. 
Additionally, the constitutions of both countries explicitly protect private property and 
adopted legal systems based on English Common Law. 
Acknowledging the institutional similarities between Jamaica and its neighbors, 
the significant difference as it regards corruption ranking, GDP levels, crime and 
investments within the different Caribbean countries. Jamaica is selected for a case study 
based on its regional situation, the high perceptions pertaining to corruption but also to 
decipher whether or not the corruption perceptions influences policymakers decisions 
regarding the country. 
CoiTuption is not a new phenomenon and in many emerging and developing 
economies it has proven even harder to reduce reform and stem. This continues to have 
negative effects on the economy and the society of developing nations. In the case of 
Jamaica, as with other countries, corruption in the public sector increases the cost of 
public transactions, which, in turn, is borne by the taxpayers. This is especially critical in 
the situation of scarce resources that require a higher optimization of public spending. 
Corruption cases generate a decline in confidence in public institutions, which are fuelled 
by well-publicized scandals. The corruption cases of Former Junior Minister of Energy 
Kern Spencer—The Cuban Light Bulb case and Joseph Hibbert, Former State Minister of 
Works—The Mabey and Johnson Case will be discussed in a later chapter. Furthermore, 
corruption affects other sectors, and in the long nan undermines trust in government. 
9 Anthony Payne "Westminster Adapted: The Political Order of the Commonwealth Caribbean." 
in Dominguez, Pastor, and Worrell (eds). Democracy in the Caribbean: Political Economic, and Social 
Perspectives (Baltimore: MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
Therefore, efficient and effective public services with an inherent culture of integrity are 
the key pillars of sustained social and economic development. Fighting corruption is 
essential to ensure the good functioning of public services and to provide best value for 
money. 
It is often said knowledge is power, and transparency is the remedy to the 
darkness under which corruption thrives. For the first 10 years after Jamaica gained 
independence the GDP per capita grew at a rate of 5.4 percent per year. The majority 
share of growth stemmed from two principal sources: 1) strong US growth in the 1960s 
created a robust export market for Jamaican bauxite; and 2) rising incomes in North 
America boosted growth in Jamaica's tourism industry. The growth in Jamaica's 
economy at the onset of independence, as Henry and Miller10 argue, can be viewed to be 
classic Dutch Disease fashion, as in, growth in the bauxite sector drove up the relative 
price of non-tradeables, reducing the competitiveness of Jamaica's agricultural sector and 
precipitating an exodus of workers from the countryside to the cities. During the first 
decade of independence Jamaica experienced what seemed to be an odd combination of 
strong growth coupled with "an unemployment rate that rose from 13 percent in 1962 to 
23.2 percent in 1972."11 The 1970s was a period of social change. Government spending 
rose from "23 percent of GDP in 1972 to 45 percent of GDP in 1978."12 Not surprisingly 
revenue did not keep pace with the rise in expenditure. The fiscal deficit of the country 
grew expediently over the years and much of the deficit was financed either through 
10 Peter Blair Henry and Conrad Miller. "Institutions vs. Policies: A Tale of Two 
Islands",American Economic Association, vol. 99. no. 2 (2009): 261-67. 
" Peter Blair Henry and Conrad Miller, "Institutions vs. Policies: A Tale of Two Islands", NBER 
Working Paper 14604, (2008): 7. 
12 Ibid., 
direct borrowing from the Bank of Jamaica or international financial institutions such as 
the IMF and World Bank. 
Today, Jamaica's economy still lags behind many of its Caribbean neighbors. In 
fact it performs below average when compared to Latin America and Caribbean 
countries. Jamaica, when compared to its Caribbean neighbors, continues to decline on 
TI's CPI. If high levels of corruption are also associated with low levels of GDP, this is 
often interpreted as causation, i.e., high corruption will cause low growth or low growth 
will cause high corruption. It is also implicitly interpreted longitudinally, i.e., a decrease 
in corruption levels will lead to an increase in GDP. Neither inference is correct based on 
a cross-sectional analysis. In this case, the only correct inference to be made is that high 
GDP countries have low corruption levels. Anything beyond this is untested speculation. 
TI's index illustrates that countries with high GDP have lower corruption rates and these 
countries are also ranked higher as it relates to democracy, trade and participation in 
international institutions. 
The question then is: why is Jamaica's corruption perception that high? 
Furthermore, does TI's CPI affect development policies of the country? Not surprisingly 
today Jamaica, like many other developing countries, will attribute some of the deficits in 
their countries economy to the policies instituted in the 1970s with the Oil Price Shock. 
Many developing economies are still reeling from the policies instituted during those 
periods. When compared to its Caribbean neighbors—Barbados for example, a marked 
difference between Barbados and Jamaica is, seems to be government policies regarding 
economic reform. Noting that, where Barbados avoided nationalization and kept state 
ownership to a minimum and adopted an outward-looking growth strategy, Jamaica did 
not. Moreover, in comparison to Jamaica, the policymakers in Barbados kept government 
spending under control. Barbados, whose currency has been pegged to the US since 1975, 
has refused to devalue its currency. They held firm to this decision even when they had to 
negotiate with the IMF. Unlike Barbados, Jamaica devalued its currency several times 
between 1975 and 2010. With this, many observe a spurious correlation that the 
difference in exchange rate policy accounts for Barbados' superior economic 
performance may not be so. When both countries are assessed closely, the case can be 
made better that Barbados' performance can be attributed to a set of growth-facilitating 
policies, monetary restraint, fiscal discipline, openness to trade, and ultimately wage cuts 
to restore competitive unit labor costs. Compare this scenario to Jamaica where the 
policies were never consistent with maintaining commitment to any parity the 
government might have wanted to adopt. In all of this what role, if any, does TI's CPI 
play in this disparity between Jamaica and Barbados? 
TI's impact of policymakers as it relates to foreign aid and foreign direct 
investments is an important area. In that, Jamaica is reliant on both of foreign aid and FD1 
for its economic development and job creation. Therefore if TI influences policymakers 
in these areas it would be of greater importance to Jamaica to pay attention to TPs CPI. 
The annual U.S. Department of State "International Narcotics Strategy Report," from 
1996-2012, in its country report on Jamaica generally starts with the same or similar 
wording: "Jamaica continues to be largest Caribbean supplier of marijuana to the United 
States. Although cocaine and synthetic drugs are not produced locally, Jamaica is a 
transit point for drugs trafficked from South America to North America."13 The reports in 
several years in more or less the same language have went on future to note, "corruption 
l3United States. Dept. of State, International'Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2012. Vol. I. 277. 
of public officials continues to be a major concern to the Jamaican and U.S. governments 
as well as most Jamaicans. The law penalizes official corruption; however, corruption is 
entrenched, widespread, and compounded by a judicial system that is poorly equipped to 
handle complex criminal prosecutions in a timely manner."14 
In terms of international ratings and risk groups, Standard and Poor's, Moody's, 
Fitch, PRS, etc., Barbados has consistently been ranked as more favorable and stable 
when compared to Jamaica. In regards to Transparency International's Index, Barbados 
has consistently placed in the top 25 of countries where the perceptions of corruption is 
low while Jamaica's ranking has fluctuated and the perceptions of corruption in Jamaica 
has steadily taken a turn for the worse. The case of Barbados and Jamaica will provide 
good analytical material since there are strong similarities between both historical 
background and institutions, but development and perceptions are resoundingly different. 
With the CPI ranking the study will assess to see what impact if any does the Index have 
on policies in either or both countries. 
Research Questions 
1. Does the TI corruption score, and hence TI matter? How can any value or 
significance be placed on TI's CPI when TI itself reiterates that its yearly CPI 
cannot be compared? Therefore, if one cannot compare past scores how can it be 
determined that a country has improved or not on the index? 
2. Does change in CPI lead to change in behavior? Do policymakers react when TI's 
CPI is published yearly? To what extent do policymakers changes their behavior 
to improve their CPI rank. Are Policymakers in fact reacting to the CPI when it is 
l4Ibid. 
published and a country's perception of being corruption takes a turn for the 
worse? 
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that countries change their behavior to try to 
change their CPI? What evidence is there to suggest that Jamaica is actively 
trying to improve its corruption perceptions? 
4. Is the CPI accepted by countries as an authority on corruption? Or, do countries 
try to dispute the CPI measure? Do they try to game the system? Is there any 
evidence that Jamaica disputes the CPI measure? Or Does Jamaica try to make 
cosmetic changes to its perception on corruption? 
5. Economic development and growth is the center and vital issue for many 
developing economies. There is a constant competition to attract foreign investors 
and other means by which to enhance economic growth, sustainability and 
development of the economy. Therefore, while developing countries are 
struggling to find ways to develop their economies are economic actors taking 
note of the CPI and does a shift in TI's CPI change their behavior? 
HYPOTHESES 
As indicated in the previous chapters, evidence of the impact of transparency 
International's Corruption Perceptions Index on development policies is not conclusive. 
Further, previous corruption studies do not analyze the impact of TI's CPI on trade, 
foreign direct investment, credit rating, market impact, as in, exchange rate, and foreign 
aid variables, or those variables in combination with the policies taken within Jamaica 
itself or other developing countries. Drawing upon the theoretical bases of previous 
research, and building upon studies which do test the impact of at least one or more of 
these variables, I would expect that TI's CPI impact on development policies are highly 
integrated in the world economy, and I expect that TI's CPI effect matters as it regards 
development policies, at both the local and international level. 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in Jamaica's CPI rank leads to less investments. 
Hypothesis 2: TI's CPI ranking of Jamaica's level of corruption is inversely correlated 
with the world's political responses. 
Hypothesis 3: The Jamaican government pays attention to TI's CPI and actively takes 
steps to improve the perceptions that Jamaica is trying to reduce its corruption level. 
One of the primary purposes of this study is to estimate the interactive effects of 
the impact of TI's CPI on the behavior of policymakers. The government and or 
opposition acknowledge Jamaica's ranking and proposes new measures to reduce the 
perceptions of corruption in the country. Thus, the following summary hypothesis 
proposes that the Jamaican government pays attention to TI's CPI annual publication as it 
endeavors to attract more foreign investors in addition to fostering the perception 
domestically that it is fighting corruption. 
Integration variables and data sources 
Three measures explore the impact of TI's CP! on development: Jamaica's 
response—one will explore the government's policies and speeches regarding corruption 
and Jamaica's ranking. World's political responses—do foreign aid donors react to TI's 
CPI? Additionally, the world's economic response to TI's CPI—does the CP! affect or 
influence trade, exchange rates, and credit ratings of Jamaica. What is the correlation 
between the yearly publication of TI and economic changes as it regard Jamaica? 
World's Political Responses 
Studies suggest that there are often inadequate controls and monitoring of foreign 
aid. Outright grants and loans with a large percentage of grant elements create more rent-
seeking opportunities, feed corrupt political behavior, and consequently further erode the 
quality of governance. But there is very little evidence to suggest that donors pay 
particular attention to a country's corruption score or TI's index directly. Thus, is there a 
correlation between the foreign aid Jamaica receives and changes in TI's CPI and does 
foreign aid donors refer to TI's CPI as a measure when they determine aid for countries? 
Foreign assistance is defined as total development assistance per capita, and it includes 
grants and loans. The source for foreign aid data is The World Bank's World Bank 
Indicators and OECD database. In this model World Bank reports, US Department of 
State reports, EU development reports will be examined. 
Jamaica, like other Caribbean nations and more broadly, many developing 
economies, rely on foreign aid, and foreign direct investment to develop their economies. 
Some economist will argue that corruption is the cost of doing business. But in a highly 
competitive global economy—can and have the high corruption rates in Jamaica affected 
its economy compared to its neighbors? The aid effectiveness literature, as William 
Easterly argues, is largely ineffective. There is much waste and there does not seem to be 
much accountability or at least guidance as to where the aid is being spent. The model on 
aid donation will encompass: assessing the correlation with foreign aid to Jamaica noting 
which donors pay attention to corruption as a factor in giving aid and what is the lagged 
effect between aid donation and TI's CPI. With this said, I expect that if TI's CPI has any 
effect on donors' decisions to give aid there would be a lagged effect, as in, less aid will 
be given the year following a poor ranking on the index. It has already been seen that 
agencies such as the U.S. Department of State cites TI's CPI in referring to the corruption 
levels of different countries in its INCSR. Hence, does the acknowledgment of TI's CPI 
lead to less aid given to countries ranked as corrupt? 
World's Economic Responses 
Development for many developing countries is often linked to their ability to 
attract foreign investors and the confidence of these investors in investing in Jamaica and 
other developing economies. Thus, it would be interesting to assess whether credit rating 
agencies pay attention to TI's CPI and whether or not this has any impact on the credit 
rating. Standard and Poor's CreditWeek will be used. The premise is that one will control 
other variables and examine the Credit Weekly ratings of Jamaica one to two weeks 
before and after the publication of TI's CPI. Since the CPI is published at different times 
yearly this would give a broad snapshot from which one can determine if TI's index 
changes or influences the credit rating of Jamaica. After careful assessment, Standard and 
Poor's credit weekly was selected; it is the pre-eminent global provider of financial 
intelligence and is still delivering on that original mission. Standard & Poor's is a leading 
provider of financial market intelligence. As the world's foremost source of independent 
credit ratings, indices risk evaluation, investment research and data, Standard & Poor's is 
an essential part of the world's financial infrastructure. 
The exchange rate of the Jamaican dollar is used as a measure to test and see 
whether TI's CPI on corruption of Jamaica is producing anything new or if the corruption 
factor is already known by the market and already calculated into the transactional cost as 
a part of doing business. Thus TI's CPI would not have any impact as the market has 
already priced the transactional cost of corruption into its business. 
Jamaican Government Responses 
The model focuses on Jamaican government responses to TI's CPI. It examines 
government speeches and documents and what activities and changes the government 
makes yearly, if at all, to address corruption and whether it cites TI's ranking of Jamaica 
on its index. In this chapter I will examine police patterns of police arrest to determine 
whether there is increased police arrest after the publication of TI's CPI. The legislations 
created to combat corruption and whether the government cites the low ranking of the 
country as a precursor for enacting new legislations. The level and periods of arrests of 
individuals charged with corruption and finally whether these arrests materialize into 
prosecution by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Corruption is very difficult to measure and by extension the impact of TI's CPI is 
probably even harder to measure. While a government and or policymakers might look at 
TI's CPI it might not necessarily impact that policymakers' behavior. It, however, might 
provide good rhetoric for political campaigns on which party is tougher 011 corruption. 
But does acknowledging TI's CPI alone sufficient? Probably one of the most challenging 
tasks for this study was compiling an appropriate dataset from which to test and measure 
TI's impact on policymakers of development policies. Evaluating TI's impact of 
policymakers has been a task, TI's CPI, the most widely used corruption rating 
organization only started reporting countries corruption scores in 1995. Thus assessing 
how serious TI's index is a factor for policymakers regarding Jamaica's development 
policy is important. If international risk assessment groups coupled with credit rating 
agencies, along with U.S. Department of State, World Bank, amongst others, heed to TI's 
CPI when it comes on to their policies be it political or risk ranking it would imply that 
Jamaica ought to pay closer attention to TI's index and address the perception issues of 
corruption. 
The data was compiled from Transparency International's CPI, The Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP), the Bank of Jamaica, the Jamaica Constabulary Force, 
Newspaper reports, official Jamaican Government Speeches, S&P Credit Weekly, U.S. 
Department of State, Annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, and World 
Bank yearly report. For aid donation the OECD database was used. 
There are many limitations to corruption indicators due to the methodologies used 
in aggregating or averaging, the reliability of the sources on which they are based and the 
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varying definitions of corruption utilized. Transparency International's CPI is a 
composite of various corruption indicators. TI has noted that their CPI should not be used 
as time series data. But I am doing just that, i.e., using TPs CPI as a times series dataset. 
My reasons for doing this are: previous studies have done so, the mere fact that TI will 
say a country has increased or decreased its CPI score indicate that there was something 
to compare it with. Thus based on previous studies and practice I have used TPs CPI as a 
time series dataset. The number of sources used in the index tends to change from year to 
year, as well as the number of countries scored (see Table 3.2. below). 
Table 3. 2. No. of Countries & Indicators 1995-2011 
Year # of Countries Included # of indicators 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
41 
54 
52 
85 
99 
90 
91 
102 
133 
146 
159 
163 
180 
180 
180 
178 
183 
14 
10 
1 1  
10 
13 
13 
17 
14 
16 
17 
12 
7 
10 
7 
15 
17 
11 
Source: Various documents available on Transparency International's website 
(http://www.transparency.org/) 
Standard and Poor's credit weekly report is another factor. It is then hypothesized 
that if Jamaica's credit rating on S&P's index changes once TPs CPI is released then it 
can be argued that there is a correlation. To measure whether there is a correlation one 
will compare Jamaica's rating one and two weeks prior to the publication to TI's index 
and one and two weeks after the publication. This is more of an inference in the possible 
change if any in Jamaica's credit ratings and whether S&P's pay attention to TI's CPI. 
Subsequently, do the World Bank and or International Monetary Fund pay 
attention to TI's CPI? If the World Bank and or the Internationa] Monetary Fund give 
weight to TI's CPI when enacting policies with Jamaica the correlation can then be made 
that in these instances TI's CPI has an effect on development policies. Hence these 
policymakers are paying attention to the CPI. 
Exchange rates sourced from the Bank of Jamaica will assess if there is a 
correlation with the movement of the Jamaican dollar once TI's CPI is published. 
Therefore, when TI publishes its index is there any change in the Jamaican dollar? 
Controlling for other factors, which leads to the dollar going up or down, this particular 
test, is to assess whether a release of corruption ranking correlates with changes in the 
exchange rate. It is with the premise that players in development pay attention to TPs 
CPI. Thus if there's a marked increase in TI's ranking of Jamaica does it correlates with 
changes in the exchange rate. Corruption, it is said, has caused many a government to 
collapse; it has also led to lack of confidence in governments around the world. Lack of 
confidence in the political leadership of a country can lead to a collapse and or have a 
negative impact on the confidence in the economy. Hence, what correlation is there to 
suggest TI's CPI might possible impact the exchange rates of a country? 
This study, as explained, employs mixed methods analysis. It is important to 
assess not only Credit Ratings and Risk assessment of Jamaica, but it is also prudent to 
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analyze policy reports on Jamaica and whether or not TI's CPI ranking of Jamaica is a 
factor. Thus, the US Department of State Annual Narcotics report will be used to assess 
whether or not the State Department pays attention to TI's CPI when it publishes its 
yearly report on Jamaica. The importance of this report is two-fold. The US is Jamaica's 
primary trading partner; additionally Jamaica relies on the US for aid assistance. Thus, 
does the US Department of State pay attention to TI's CPI? Additionally does the CPI 
ranking of Jamaica affect the aid given to Jamaica? 
To measure Jamaica's government response, and to assess whether or not the 
government and/or opposition pays attention to TI's CPI, I will evaluate Jamaican 
government speeches and policies. Does the government take note of TI's ranking 
yearly? Does the government pass new laws to combat corruption? Are there increased 
arrests and prosecution of corrupt officials? Does the Jamaican government receive more 
or less multilateral and bilateral aid, after controlling for other detenninants of aid flows? 
Most analysis of foreign aid faces an almost insurmountable problem of reverse 
causality. The fact that poorer countries receive more aid does not mean that aid causes 
poverty, but those donors target poor countries. Jamaica, like other developing countries 
with poorly developed institutions, receiving more aid might indicate that donors are 
trying to help build institutions, not that aid is bad for good governance or that TI's 
ranking affects donors' decisions. It is somewhat hard to argue that aid should go to more 
corrupt countries to help reduce corruption. Therefore, if one finds that Jamaica receive 
more foreign aid when TI's ranking shows an increase in the level of corruption one 
could safely interpret this findings as a failure in the decision process allocating aid 
amongst developing countries or it might be that donors do pay attention to TI's CPI but 
overlooks the index. Additionally, one will assess whether some donors manage to 
discriminate against measured corruption even though they might give aid to poor 
countries. 
A secondary question is whether there is a difference between donors; namely, 
whether there are significant differences among donor countries if they pay more 
attention to corruption and or whether there are significant differences among multilateral 
donors such as international organizations. Do they factor in corruption and or TI's CPI 
when making donations? 
Conclusions 
In the subsequent chapters I will used both simple univariate and bivariate 
analysis along with qualitative analysis to measure for TI's CPI effects on Jamaica's 
development policies. Thus controlling for credit rating and exchange rate one will test to 
see whether or not TI's CPI has any impact of behaviors. If so how does it affect the 
market if at all? Which countries give more aid to Jamaica? Is corruption an important 
variable for aid granting? Additionally, which countries pay attention to corruption 
perception and is Jamaica losing out on receiving aid for those countries because of the 
perceived high perceptions score for corruption? With all of this said if the study finds 
that TI actually has no impact on policymakers the secondary question would be whose 
interest does TI serve and does TI matter in the end? 
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CHAPTER IV 
WORLD'S POLITICAL RESPONSES 
If you spend your own money on yourself, you are very concerned about how 
much is spent and how it is spent. If you spend your own money on someone else, 
you are still very much concerned about how much is spent, but somewhat less 
concerned about how it is spent. If you spend someone else's money on yourself, 
you are not too concerned about how much is spent, but you are very concerned 
about how it is spent. However, if you spend someone else's money on someone 
else, you are not very concerned about how much is spent or how it is spent. 
Friedman, White House ceremony in his honor May 9, 20021 
This chapter will examine the data gathered to determine the world's political 
responses to TI's CPI as it relates to Jamaica. These political responses originate with 
policymakers in an aiTay of sectors such as the U.S. Department of State, the World 
Bank, the European Union, China, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
The data will illuminate which ones, if any, acknowledges and or gives heed to TI's CPI 
in relations to their development policies with Jamaica, and whether or not it impacts the 
development policies of Jamaica. 
CoiTuption is presumed to weaken progressively the institutional foundation on 
which economic growth and social justice depends; often causing institutional 
inefficiency and, in turn, the distortion of development priorities and outcomes. Within 
the World Bank fighting corruption has become a policy priority for the development 
community.2 Over the past two decades extensive reform efforts have been launched. 
These reforms build on the idea that corruption is a dysfunction of public administration 
'Nara Francoise KamoMonkam, "Money Moving Syndrome and the Effectiveness of Foreign 
Aid," (PhD diss., Georgia State University, 2008), 1. 
2David Dollar and Victoria Levin, "Sowing and Reaping: Institutional Quality and Project 
Outcomes in Developing Countries." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3524, (2005): 11. 
that emerges in the presence of monopoly and discretion, which in turn can be curbed by 
promoting accountability and transparency. Corruption undermines policies and 
programs that aim to reduce poverty; so attacking corruption is critical to the 
achievement of the Bank's overarching mission of poverty reduction.3 
Table 4.1. DAC Aid flow into Jamaica from 1995-2010 and Jamaica's CPI 
Year DAC 
Countries 
Total 
Multilateral. 
Total 
DAC EU 
Members, 
T otal 
United 
States 
EU 
Institutions 
CPI 
1995 67.58 40.47 23.5 28 32.44 
1996 4.08 53.98 -5.49 -7 53.16 
1997 -4.84 76.35 -1.23 -23 74.73 
1998 3.54 15.1 1 -0.71 -11.66 18.42 3.8 
1999 -22.6 -0.68 -4.81 -15.3 5.08 3.8 
2000 -26.33 28.53 6.14 -26.15 32.81 
2001 -0.93 44.17 1.09 -1.7.84 41.04 
2002 -3.77 28.28 6.23 -10.99 15.62 4 
2003 1.13 3.45 2.17 1.18 1.54 3.8 
2004 13.39 66.73 7.95 11.64 58.13 3.3 
2005 11.4 24.8 3.48 17.77 16.22 3.6 
2006 -0.49 38.3 2.37 9.38 32.85 3.7 
2007 -16.86 46.45 -10.46 -5.54 39.49 3.3 
2008 -4.17 90.78 -4.5 -0.89 80.75 3.1 
2009 6.38 143.47 6.33 -2.05 105.9 3 
2010 -1.9 144.57 -1 -3.56 106.43 3.3 
Source: OECD & Transparency International 
Jamaica, like many other developing economies, relies on foreign aid to enhance 
and supplement its development. Statistics illustrate that the level of foreign aid Jamaica 
has received over the last two decades has doubled in some instances and has fallen short 
in others. Table 4.1 above shows the level of aid that has been disbursed to Jamaica for 
3World Bank, "Transparency, Accountability and Anti-Corruption" 
http://go.worldbank.org/H2CA3GVUW0 (accessed March 15, 2012 2012). 
the years 1995-2010 and indicates Jamaica's corresponding CPI scores. The rows that are 
blank on the CPI are years in which Jamaica did not have a CPI score on TPs index. 
Based on Table 4.1.above there does not seem to be a correlation between the aid 
given by multilateral donors and Jamaica's CPI. Noting that changes in aid flow go up 
and down in spite of the CPI score, when one examine aid flow by EU Institutions per se, 
in 1998 when Jamaica's CPI was 3.8 and EU Institutions aid totaled 18.42 million. The 
following year (1999) the aid given was 5.08 million. Since there is no CPI for 1997 one 
cannot accurately say that this is a lagged effect. Some years there is a lagged effect in 
the correlation between the aid Jamaica receives and its CPI score. But in the years 2000 
and 2001 where CPI scores for Jamaica are missing the aid flow from EU institutions 
increased significantly to 32.81 and 41.04 respectively. Based on Table 4.1 above there is 
a subsequent decline in the level of aid given in 2002 and 2003 significantly noting 15.62 
and 1.54 respectively. But in the year 2004 the aid flow increased to 58.13 and Jamaica's 
CPI slipped by .02 point to 3.8 from 4. 
FOREIGN AID AND CORRUPTION 
An important manifestation of this will and commitment is the coiTecting of 
structural flaws in the bureaucracy of host countries and the filling of the administrative 
void that hampers assistance efforts. The role of recipient governments is pivotal in 
effectively and productively enhancing aid programs and policy developments, hi terms 
of project effectiveness, existing research does provide evidence that national governance 
quality affects the implementation of internationally financed projects. For instance, 
Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and Lant Pritchett "find that the quality of civil 
liberties in a country affects the economic rate of return on World Bank-financed 
projects."4 Later, David Dollar and Victoria Levin similarly found that "the existence of 
high-quality institutions in a recipient country raises the probability that a World Bank 
project will receive a satisfactory rating."5 They conclude in strong terms; "The success 
of aid-sponsored projects depends primarily on the quality of the institutions in the 
recipient country."6 To which one argues that this is not shocking news. But while in 
theory grand ideas sound good, in practice many of the policies have been flawed and 
personal greed and corruption have wreaked havoc in many economies of the developing 
world. And the effects on development have proven to be controversial. 
Borrowing former World Bank President James Wolfensohn's words "The 
"cancer of corruption" is inimical to development."7 Or as then U.N. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan commented; "Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor 
in eradicating poverty and promoting development."8 Also, as the World Bank itself 
acknowledged; "In many countries, donors underestimated the importance of governance 
and institutional reforms.... As a result, weak governance and institutions reduced the 
amount of productivity growth and poverty reduction that could result from the 
4 Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and Lant Pritchett, "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the 
Performance of Government Projects. World Bank Economic Review 11 no. 2 (1997): 223. 
3 David Dollar and Victoria Levin, "Sowing and Reaping: Institutional Quality and Project 
Outcomes in Developing Countries." Work!Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3524, (2005): 11. 
6 Ibid., 12. 
' James Wolfensohn cited in Stephen Fidler, "Who's Minding the Bank? Foreign Policy, No. 126 
(Sep.-Oct.,) (2001): 45. 
8 Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, quoted by VedP.Nanda, "The "Good Governance" 
Concept Revisited," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 603, Law, 
Society, and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, (2006): 270. 
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macroeconomic reforms."9 And a 2005 joint report by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank said, "Broad consensus has emerged that development assistance is 
particularly effective in poor countries with sound economic policy and institutional 
environments."10 
Therefore, and not surprisingly, there has been for quite some time a stated desire 
to channel aid to recipient countries with good economic policies. This has been a goal 
that found significant justification in Assessing Aid with its claim (this was based on the 
research reported in Burnside and Dollar)11 that aid leads to economic growth only in the 
context of good macroeconomic policies. More recently however, there has been a new 
emphasis on providing aid to countries with good institutions, specifically good 
governance institutions. A number of researchers have contributed to the claims that 
causal priority for rule-of-law institutions in bringing about economic growth.12 
The effects of foreign aid on recipient countries' macroeconomic performance, 
and especially growth, are ambiguous. In many cases, despite earlier optimistic 
expectations, aid has failed to boost growth. As William Easterly succinctly puts it, 
The West spent $2.3 trillion on foreign aid over the last five decades and still had 
not managed to get twelve-cent medicines to children to prevent half of all 
malaria deaths. The West spent $2.3 trillion and still had not managed to get four-
9 World Bank. A Case for Aid: Building a Consensus for Development Assistance. (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 31. 
, (I1MF and World Bank Report, cited by William Easterly. "Are Aid Agencies Improving?" 
Economic Policy 27, no. 52 (2007): 637. 
" Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies and Growth, " World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, # 1777, (June, 2000); 847-868. 
12 For example see authors such as: DaronAcemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robertson, "The 
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An empirical Investigation." American Economic Review 
91 no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401. Also, DaniRodrick, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi. "Institutions 
Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development." Journal of 
Economic Growth 9 (2004): 131-165. And, Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth." 
American Economic Review 90, no. 4, (2000): 847-868. 
dollar bed nets to poor families. The West spent $2.3 trillion and still had not 
managed to get three dollars to each new mother to prevent five million child 
deaths. (Easterly 2006, 4) 
Aid dependence can potentially undermine the quality of governance and public 
sector institutions by weakening accountability, thereby encouraging rent-seeking and 
corruption. While not limited to these effects, aid dependence has the prospective of 
fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, siphoning off scarce talent from the 
bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions. The 
concept of good governance, in the form of institutions that establish a foreseeable, 
evenhanded, and consistently enforced set of rales for investors, is undoubtedly 
fundamental for the sustained and rapid growth in per capita incomes in poor countries. 
The World Bank was pointed when it stated, "giving development assistance to 
countries with weak institutional frameworks, low capacity and often poor law 
enforcement poses substantial risks."13 In that, "Aid is less effective in a weak 
governance environment where funds leak due to corruption. Evidence even suggests that 
aid inflows can contribute to a decrease in public spending, weaken accountability and 
governance while providing ample opportunities for corruption."14 The World Bank also 
raised an interesting point in regards to corruption and aid by stating, "Ironically, the 
donor community has been lending to undemocratic, corrupt and poor governance 
countries more than to well-managed countries."15 Undoubtedly, aid can have a positive 
impact on economic and social development if given to countries with good governance 
l j  World Bank, "Corruption & Development Assistance."http://go.worldba11k.0rg/l AXCYRA5F0 
(accessed April 10. 2012). 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
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systems. As donors become increasingly aware of the linkages between aid effectiveness, 
governance and corruption, more aid should be directed to where it has the most 
impact. Assisting countries in combating corruption as well as aid aimed at improving 
governance combined with efforts to reduce corruption in projects are essential in 
tackling the challenge corruption poses to development aid. 
In understanding the political economy of foreign aid and how corruption 
undermines aid effectiveness, one can argue that, "the effectiveness of aid revealed that 
aid can be 'highly effective, totally ineffective, and everything in between,' depending on 
the quality of policy-making and institutions."16 Moreover, the Bank argues, "In 
countries with poor management, the amounts of aid have not affected the levels of 
economic growth. There are several channels through which the effectiveness of aid is 
undermined."17 
The most direct effect is plainly the leakage of funds in development 
projects. And this the World Bank18 highlights as: 
The distorting effects of corruption on projects takes effect as early as the project 
design phase where project requirements are overstated or tailored to fit one 
specific company, they reach into the bidding process where collusion amongst 
firms or between public officials and bidders renders competition ineffective, 
leading to assigning of contracts to underperforming firms at inflated prices. 
(World Bank, "Corruption and Development Assistance") 
IMot surprisingly, bribes are needed to release funds. 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid 
18 World Bank, "Corruption & Development Assistance," http://go.worldbank.org/lAXCYRA5F0 
(accessed April 10, 20)2). See also Paul McCarthy 2001, who uses the case of Indonesia for how 
corruption in aid projects works and why it persists. "Corruption in Indonesia's Foreign Aid Programs: 
Naivety, Complacency and Complicity within Donor Agencies", in: Stealing from the People, Partnership 
for Governance Reform. Indonesia. 2002. 
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"Kick-backs further persuade government officials to turn a blind eye to 
sluggishly implemented projects, staying behind contract requirements, leaving 
roads unfinished and aid not delivered. Bribes also help to smoothen financial 
and technical audits and to falsify bills and payrolls. Corruption at the village 
level includes disappearing aid deliveries or mistargeting, where not the poorest 
but the best connected and those willing to pay receive aid. (World Bank, 
"Corruption and Development Assistance") 
Subsequently in assessing the work of some researchers that examine aid flows with the 
aim of determining whether donors give more aid to countries that have better 
governance ratings, the literature indicates that "some donors, but not all donors, do 
consider democracy, governance and rule-of-law issues when making their lending 
decisions."19 Authors such as Steven Radelet are convinced that donors can improve the 
performance of foreign aid. He argues, "Aid delivery mechanisms should differ 
significantly between well-governed and poorly governed countries."20 On this premise it 
would seem to indicate that well-governed countries should receive programmatic aid 
and budgetary support since they have a well-functioning government that can efficiently 
allocate this money to appropriate and proper areas of development. Therefore, Radelet's 
position is critical and to some extent makes logical sense; 
Providing recipients with more flexibility, greater latitude, and more ownership is 
precisely the right way for donors to move in well- governed countries, but not 
necessarily in poorly governed countries. In weak, failing, and poorly governed 
countries, donors should retain a strong role in setting priorities and designing 
programs. (Radelet 2004, 11) 
Consequently, "countries with high levels of corruption, opaque budget 
procedures, and poor monitoring and auditing, to provide budget support... where there is 
19 See for instance Jean-Claude Berthelemy and ArianeTichit, "Bilateral Donors' Aid Allocation 
Decisions—A Three-Dimensional Panel Analysis," International Review of Economics and Finance, 1 3 
(2004):253-274; David Dollar and Victoria Levin, "The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, World 
Development 34, no.2, (2006):2034-2046; William Easterly, "Are Aid Agencies Improving?" Economic 
Policy 22, no. 52 (2007) 633-678. 
20 Steven Radelet, "Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals." Centre for Global 
Development. Working Paper no.39, (2004): 11. 
little confidence that funds will be used appropriately, would be irresponsible."21 But this 
also raises the issue of trust, given that the premise would seemingly lead to the 
correlation that in well governed countries the national government can be trusted by 
international donors to spend money in a way that best meets the needs of its citizens. 
Therefore, if governments were presumed to be rational actors, impartial, and corruption 
wasn't a cause for concern, a donor could then expect that aid funds would be used to 
build and maintain schools, health centers, roads, and more efficiently allocate the 
resources than an international donor could. This stands in stark contrast to a country that 
is poorly governed where the likelihood of the aid going towards the specified and 
intended project would be significantly lower. In poorly governed countries, more often 
than not in it is found that a large portion of aid wound up in the pockets of political 
allies, and the President or Prime Minister's personal bank accounts. 
Theoretically, it sounds polished to argue that countries which are well-governed 
and have less corruption should receive more aid compared to countries which are seen as 
more corrupt but, based on Alesina and Weder's work, there is no evidence that less 
corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. As they stated: "our vast exploration of 
the data never uncovered any even weak evidence of a negative effect of corruption on 
received foreign aid. The same result applies to debt relief program, an additional form of 
aid."22 But as it regards individual donor countries, Alesina and Weder found "significant 
differences across donors. Scandinavian donors (the most generous in per capita terms) 
do reward less corrupt receivers. On the other hand, the United States appears to favor 
21 Ibid., 12-13. 
22 Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weber, "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?" 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (Sept., 2002): 1136. 
democracies, but seems to pay no attention to quality of government of receiving 
countries."23 Easterly's work also supports this point, in that while "there is some 
evidence that aid flows have become more sensitive to the extent of corruption in 
recipient countries, and perhaps more sensitive to political rights, but these tendencies are 
far from uniform."24 
Subsequently, it is worth mentioning that the literature on foreign aid and growth 
points to the importance of good governance. Stephen Kosack's research has shown that 
"foreign aid leads to higher human development index growth rates in more democratic 
countries, whereas it might be harmful to human development in autocratic 
countries."25Rajkumar and Swaroop, in examining the impact of public spending on 
health and education outcomes, found that "increased public spending leads to improved 
development outcomes only in countries with good governance."26 Additionally, while 
Burnside and Dollar's hypothesis, "that the impact of aid is conditional on policy."27 It is 
important to note that in subsequent research the authors have revisited their original 
findings and have shifted the focus from policies to institutions and argue that aid results 
in economic growth conditional on good governance institutions. 
23 Ibid. 
24Easterly, 673. 
25 Stephen Kosack, "Effective Aid: How Democracy Allows Development Aid to Improve the 
Quality of Life." World Development 31, no.l, (2003): 20. 
26Andrew Sunil Rajkumar and Vinaya Swaroop. "Public Spending and Outcomes: Does 
Governance Matter?" Journal of Development Economics 86 (2008): 110. 
27 Burnside and Dollar, 849. 
Development Agencies 
Undoubtedly, a major achievement of the past decade has been the adoption of 
several international treaties devised to fill gaps in existing national anticorruption laws. 
These include but are not limited to an OECD convention that applies to industrialized 
countries; three regional conventions covering Europe, the Americas, and Africa; and, 
most recently, the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Therefore, ensuring 
compliance with these treaties is critical. Of significance is that the bodies overseeing the 
conventions have no enforcement powers. Therefore follow-up monitoring programs are 
essential to determine whether governments fully enact and implement the conventions' 
provisions. Such monitoring, which would involve disclosing governments' failures and 
calling for corrective action, creating publicity and peer pressure is the only tool available 
to hold member states to their undertakings. This could be conducted with small staffs 
and modest budgets. 
Arguably, "fighting corruption is not only about signing international agreements. 
It is also about the daily struggle of ordinary citizens who face major obstacles to expose 
wrongdoing and bring about change."28 The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) is a large provider of multilateral aid donation to Jamaica. The 
scope of the OECD convention—which criminalizes the bribery of foreign public 
officials—is narrow, but the document is essential nonetheless because the 36 states that 
have signed it are home to most of the world's major multinational corporations (MNCs). 
This is important as Jamaica, like other developing economies, is constantly trying to 
attract foreign direct investments to enable economic growth. Thus, if the OECD 
28 TL Annual Report (2001): 3. 
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members pay attention to corruption, and furthermore if the OECD pays attention to TTs 
CP1, then it is in Jamaica's interest to make an effort to improve its CPI score. 
The OECD in a number of instances uses Tl's CPI when making comparative 
analysis as it relates to corruption perceptions in member states. In its Public Sector 
Transparency and International Investor29 booklet the OECD brings together the results 
of work conducted in 2003 by the OECD Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (C1ME) on the issue of public sector transparency in 
international investment policy. The OECD regulatory reform project has provided a 
detailed look at transparency practices and problems within the OECD area. Tl's CPI was 
one of the three indices used to arrive at these findings. The other two were Freedom 
House Index for political and civil rights, and Opacity Index.30 This shows that 
policymakers are incorporating into their decisions Tl's CPI. 
The role of the OECD members in aiding developing countries is significant. 
Subsequently Tl's partnership with OECD could undoubtedly have some impact and or 
influences on its policies towards developing countries. The OECD has jointly held 
forums with TI to promote transparency in aid effectiveness and reducing corruption. The 
Development Partnership Forum: Improving Donor Effectiveness in combating 
Corruption is an example.31 The Forum, which was hosted by the French Ministry of 
29 OECD, "Public Sector Transparency and International Investor" (2003). 
30OECD, 28. 
j i  The Development Partnership Forum on Improving Donor Effectiveness in Combating 
Corruption, organized jointly by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and Transparency 
International took place at the Pierre Mendes France Conference Centre at the French Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (Bercy) on 9-10 December 2004. Aimed to improve donor effectiveness in combating 
corruption and was built around three specific themes: improving donor action in supporting anti-
corruption programmes in partner countries; assessing donor practices and aid modalities in a corruption 
perspective; taking concerted action. 
Finance "brought together political leaders and senior officials from governments, civil 
society, bilateral donors, multilateral organizations, international NGOs, national anti-
corruption organizations and the private sector in OECD countries and non-OECD 
countries."32 The OECD pays attention to Tl's and its work on corruption but there is no 
clear evidence that the OECD actually gives less to Jamaica based on any correlation 
with Tl's CPI score.33 
The OECD forum is important as it shows that TI is a respected organization and 
the OCED pays attention to TI. The final report from the forum states, 
Corruption is a major impediment to development and growth. It is a universal 
threat to social cohesion and political stability, undermining public confidence 
and good governance in all countries. It directly impedes progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goals and hampers long-term growth and job creation. 
Increasingly, donor agencies, partner country governments and institutions, 
international and intergovernmental organizations, civil society and the private 
sector understand the serious negative impact of corruption on their programs, 
projects and populations. In response, many have intensified their work to combat 
corruption. (OECD 2004, 2) 
The forum brought together political leaders and senior officials from governments, civil 
society and the private sector in OECD countries and non-OECD countries, bilateral 
donors, multilateral organizations, international NGOs, and national anti-corruption 
32 Ibid. 
j3 For a more in-depth analysis see "International Cooperation to fight Corruption in South Eastern 
Europe: Achievements, lessons learned and future challenges," Paris, 2005. Jamaica and other developing 
countries should take note of a study commissioned by the Anti -Corruption Network for Transition 
Economies based at the OECD "International Cooperation to fight corruption in South Eastern Europe: 
Achievements, Lessons Learned and Future Challenges." In this study of countries in South Eastern 
Europe, Tl's CPI for each country was referred to in making analysis of corruption and what was needed to 
reform these countries' economies. This confirms that policymakers are paying attention to Tl's CPI as the 
253 pages document was presented to "representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the FYROM, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia; donor countries and international organizations including the 
OECD, the Council of Europe, the World Bank, Norway, Switzerland and the United States were also 
represented. 
organizations. This can be considered to be another milestone for TI in jointly hosting 
forums on development policies. 
The World Bank and International Monetary Funds are crucial International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the development policies of Jamaica and other developing 
countries. The World Bank, especially in the 1990s, started incorporating a strong anti-
corruption stance. "World Bank Group President James D. Wolfensohn welcomed the 
release of Transparency International's amiual report on March 16, 2005 and described it 
as an important contribution to fighting corruption."34 In his remarks Wolfensohn went 
on further to state, "TI has once again shown its ability to combine research and policy 
analysis not just to shine a light on the deeply embedded problems of corruption in the 
international construction industry, but to propose progressive solutions to safeguard 
public monies and public trust."35 The World Bank President's accolade is probably as 
profound of an endorsement TI would ever need or receive. In reference to Tl's 2005 
Annual Report Wolfensohn noted, "the publication today by Transparency International 
of its annual report on global 'corruption is an important contribution toward curbing 
corruption The report has again shown the vital role TI plays the international debate 
about how to clean up public procurement projects."36 
The diversion of funds from publicly financed projects represents an unacceptable 
tax on the poor, in the construction sector, it represents a deplorable opportunity 
lost for the delivery of essential services, and it undermines citizen trust in 
government. The information in this report should be widely read and discussed. 
We will certainly be examining how the findings and recommendations can be 
j4 World Bank, Press Release, "World Bank Hails Transparency International's Annual Report" 
http://go.worldbank.org/WA8OXX5JX0Caccessed March 18, 2012). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
applied in the World Bank's work in development lending and post-conflict 
reconstruction. These are issues of deep concern to us. (Wolfensohn, 2005) 
The World Bank's President, by referring to Tl's Annual Report, indicated that Jamaica 
and other countries ranked as highly corrupt should pay closer attention to their CPI 
ranking as influential policymakers such as the head of the World Bank pays attention to 
Tl's report and CPI. Wolfensohn, in commending TI chairman Peter Eigen's 
acknowledgment of the World Bank's adoption of an integrity clause for all companies 
bidding on large World Bank financed projects, called a 'major breakthrough.' This 
integrity clause requires companies to certify that they "have taken steps to ensure that no 
person acting for [them] or on [their] behalf will engage in bribery."37 The report also 
notes the Bank's leadership in the use of investigations and debarments as tools in anti-
corruption work. Wolfensohn further stated, "In the report, Transparency International 
also proposes Minimum Standards for Public Contracting and makes recommendations 
for compliance systems and codes of conduct for business, governments, international 
lenders, shareholders and auditors, among others."38 This is important as it helps to 
solidify the fact that policymakers are paying attention to Tl's CPI. While there is no 
direct evidence to show that the World Bank uses Tl's CPI directly as it relates to 
development policies with Jamaica, it would be foolish of Jamaica to not pay attention to 
Tl's ranking. It is clearly obvious that the World Bank pays attention to Tl 's reports and 
CPI. 
Subsequently, at the Opening Plenary of the 14,h International Anti-Corruption 
Conference, November 2010, the World Bank's Managing Director Sri Mulyani 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
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Indrawati, in his opening remarks, highlighted a number of important points that resonate 
with development policies and the importance of Transparency International in 
development policies. In extrapolating on the role of the private sector, Indrawati 
articulated ways in which businesses have a role to play in curbing corruption. From the 
point of view of businesses, "combating corruption is about leveling the playing field, 
seeing fair competition and, above all, about managing costs - specifically, individual 
costs and company level costs. Every bribe taken is a bribe paid, and more often than not 
it is a company official delivering the envelope."39 Moreover Indrawati cites some of the 
effects of corruption noting that, 
While corruption may benefit individual companies in the short run, over time it 
becomes a real barrier to development, innovation and business growth. Because 
sometimes the corruption is in the form of counterfeit drugs, so people don't get 
better, or they die. Sometimes corruption is a building that collapses in the face of 
a natural disaster, because the quality inspector took a payment from the 
construction contractor to falsify an inspection. Corruption can kill. (Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati, World Bank Managing Director, Bangkok, Thailand: 2010) 
Probably a key insight into whether policymakers pay attention to Tl's CPI is the four 
points by Indrawati highlighted below with his emphasis on TI: 
By putting in place company-level anti-corruption programs; By committing 
collectively to a statement of commitment to a set of ethical principles; (for 
example the World Economic Forum's Collective Action Against Corruption 
Initiative), with enforcement honor-based; By agreeing to participate in integrity 
pacts - where bidding and implementation processes are observed by an 
independent monitor (Transparency International sponsored Integrity Pacts have 
shown the way globally here); and By establishing certifying business coalitions, 
with collective enforcement of compliance with these commitments by the 
coalition as a whole. (Sri Mulyani Indrawati, World Bank Managing Director, 
Bangkok, Thailand: 2010) 
39 Sri Mulyanilndrawati, "Remarks for Opening Plenary of the 14 lh Internationa] Anti-Corruption 
Conference," (paper presented 14 lh International Anti-Corruption Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, 
November 2010-). http://go.worldbank.org/3S2S7396J0 (accessed March 15,2012). 
TI sponsored Integrity Pacts are particularly important as they illustrate that firms would 
be willing to have an NGO be the monitor of their activities. Nonetheless, that said, the 
World Bank and other institutions are well aware of the fact that many of these initiatives 
lack the teeth of enforcement. The Bank, in assessing corruption from different angles, 
also stressed the demand side approach to the debate. 
THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL RESPONSE TO TI'S CPI 
The relationship between the United States and Jamaica cannot be overstated. The 
United States is Jamaica's largest trading partner with annual two-way trade totaling $1.9 
billion in 2009. U.S. goods exports to Jamaica totaled $1.4 billion.40Jamaica relies on the 
US for not only trade but also economic assistance. It is of particular importance to note 
the make-up of different policy advisory boards and whether Transparency International 
has a member as a board representative. This is particularly important, as it would 
address the argument as to whether or not TI influences policy developments. In the case 
of Jamaica, and or other developing countries, that rely on the US for trade, it is 
significant if TI as a NGO has a representative on a government board and what this 
might mean for policy decisions. 
The Office of the United States Trade Representative41 (USTR) reiterates the 
known fact, "the United States is the world's largest economy and the largest exporter 
40 Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Ambassador Kirk Meets with Jamaican 
Ambassador Audrey Marks"http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/20l O/july/ambassador-kirk-
meets-jamaican-ambassador-audrey-marks (accessed March 31, 2012). 
41 The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is an agency of more than 200 
committed professionals with decades of specialized experience in trade issues and regions of the world. 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President. "About Us" 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us (accessed March 31,2012). 
and importer of goods and services."42 Extrapolating further, "Trade is critical to 
America's prosperity fueling economic growth, supporting good jobs at home, raising 
living standards and helping Americans provide for their families with affordable goods 
and services."43 Taking into consideration, the U.S. is the world's largest trading nation, 
with "exports of goods and services of nearly $1.6 trillion in 2009. For the first half of 
2010, it was $890 billion,"44 it would be prudent of other countries, especially developing 
countries, to pay attention to the different organizations that forms board membership. 
"The Office of the USTR office negotiates "directly with foreign governments to create 
trade agreements, to resolve disputes, and to participate in global trade policy 
organizations. We also meet with governments, with business groups, with legislators and 
with public interest groups to gather input on trade issues and to discuss the President's 
trade policy positions."45 
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is a crucial area of trade relations with the 
US and the Caribbean. The trade programs known collectively as the CBI remain "vital 
elements in U.S. economic relations with our neighbors in Central America and in the 
Caribbean. The CBI is intended to facilitate the economic development and export 
diversification of the Caribbean Basin economies."46 Having stated the significance of 
420ffice of the United States Trade Representative. "Benefits of Trade." 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/benefits-trade (accessed March 31, 2012). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 A brief background analysis on the CBI would surmise that it was initially launched in 1983, 
through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), and substantially expanded in 2000 
through the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the CBI currently provides beneficiary 
countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods. Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Executive Office of the President, "Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)", 
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the trade relationship between the US and Jamaica and the region, it is prudent to assess 
the composition of policy boards and to ascertain whether TI matters in the policy 
development of Jamaica and the region. 
The Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC) whose duties, 
functions and administrative provisions entail being "designated as the Trade and 
Environment Policy Advisory Committee."47 With a committee of such importance and 
its connections as it pertains to trade, it should be highlighted that Transparency 
International representative Nancy Zucker Boswell48is a member of this committee. Ms. 
Boswell serves on the Board of Directors of Transparency International (TI) and has been 
the Managing Director of the U.S. chapter, TI-USA, since its inception in 1994.49 With 
this said, and the level of importance of the Office of the USTR, and referring to the 
duties and scope of the board it is indeed evidence that US government pays attention to 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi 
(accessed March 31, 2012). 
47 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, "Trade and 
Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC)," http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/intergovernmental-affairs/advisory-committees/trad e-and-en vironment-policv-ad visorv-
committ (accessed March 31, 2012). The Committees' objectives and the scope of its activity are as 
follows: The Committee will provide the U.S. Trade Representative with policy advice on issues involving 
trade and the environment. It is anticipated that the U.S. Trade Representative will share the advice 
received with other relevant agencies interested in the subject matter. The Committee shall at the 
conclusion of negotiations for each trade agreement referred to in Section 102 of the Act, provide to the 
President, to Congress, and to the U.S. Trade Representative a report on such agreement which shall 
include an advisory opinion on whether and to what extent the agreement promotes the interests of the 
United States. 
48 According to her Organization of American States biography, previously, Ms. Boswell practiced 
law at Steptoe & Johnson in Washington, D.C., where she focused on international legal and regulatory 
matters, including extraterritorial jurisdiction, export controls, and customs and trade disputes. She has also 
acted as director for congressional liaison at the American Association of University Women and was in 
the International Division at Citibank. Additionally, "Ms. Boswell is a member of the Executive Council of 
the Securities Law Committee of the Federal Bar Association and a member of the board of directors of 
PACT. She is also a director on the board of the International Senior Lawyers Project. Organization of 
American States, "Lecture Series of the Americas," Nancy Zucker Bowell 
http://www.oas.org/catedra/english/bio NANCY ZUCKER.asp (accessed April 01, 2012). 
49Organization of American States, "Lecture Series of the Americas," Nancy Zucker Bowell 
http://www.oas.org/catedra/english/bio NANCY ZUCKER.asp (accessed April 01,2012). 
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TI and it further indicates that TI is in the position to influence development policies for 
Jamaica and or other countries. While one board member cannot solely make a decision, 
the mere fact that a TI representative is on the board is clear that policymakers 
acknowledge and pay attention to the Global Civil Society on corruption—Transparency 
International. 
Additional evidence to suggest that the US pays attention to Tl's CPI is the 
Annual International Narcotics Control Strategy) Report (INCSR) published yearly by the 
Department of State. The INCSR's annual reports refer to Tl's CPI not only as it relates 
to the corruption score of Jamaica but it also cites Tl's CPI in relations to other countries. 
With this said it could be argued that TI matters and developing countries like Jamaica 
should aim to at least improve the perceptions of corruption. 
The Department of State's acknowledgement of Tl's CPI is important as it 
indicates policymakers are paying attention to countries' CPI score but whether Tl's CPI 
translates to affecting policymakers' decisions is yet to be determined. In 1999 with a 
CPI score of 3.8 and 50th rank, the INSCR notes "Transparency International and other 
organizations have reported that corruption is viewed as a grave problem in Jamaica; 
drug trafficking adds to the problem."50 Again in 2001, the INCSR notes, corruption 
continues to undermine law enforcement and judicial efforts against drug-related crime in 
Jamaica.51 Subsequent yearly reports by the INCSR have cited efforts Jamaica has made 
50United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999. 
51 The 2001 INCSR assessed some of the legal provisions in Jamaica as it relates to corruption. 
"On May 1, 2001, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) brought into force the Corruption Prevention Act and 
a bill strengthening the Parliament (Integrity of Members) Act. The Corruption Prevention Act defines acts 
of corruption by public servants, mandates asset declarations, and establishes a commission to investigate 
corruption charges. Implementing regulations, however, have not yet been drafted. In March 2001, the GOJ 
ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and, in 2001, signed the consensus agreement on 
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to address corruption. The INCSR in its reports on Jamaica pays attention not only to Tl's 
CPI but also what measures if any the government of Jamaica is taking to address the 
issue of corruption. Acknowledging corruption as a grave problem compounded by drug 
trafficking 1 will test assess whether Jamaica's CPI ranking correlates with the aid the 
country receives from the US. Hence 1 hypothesize: there is an inverse relationship 
between Tl's CPI score of Jamaica and U.S. Department of State aid to Jamaica. 
In assessing relevant analytical documents and third-party assessment of country 
performance and conditions in its Country Assistance Strategy 2010 - 2014 of Jamaica 
USAID cites Tl's CPI, as it relates to Jamaica's corruption score, by stating "According 
to Transparency .International's 2008 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Jamaica's rank 
continues to fall, placing 96th out of 180 countries with a 3.1 score compared to 86th 
position in 2006."52 The report also points out that, "In highlighting the priority goals, 
Priority Goal 1 was listed as "increasing Peace and Security by Reducing Crime and 
Corruption."53 
establishing a mechanism to evaluate compliance with the Convention." United States Department of State, 
INCSR, 2001, p.40. 
32 USAID, Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014, (2009): 2. 
53ln situating corruption and its effects within Jamaica's context the USAID report notes, In September 
2007, the island's political landscape changed dramatically when Prime Minister (PM) Bruce Golding's 
Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) won national elections after 18 years in opposition. The Government of Jamaica 
(GOJ) is constrained by a lack of resources, anemic economic growth, high unemployment and inflation, 
and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 126%. Progress on debt repayment and modest budgetary efficiencies is 
stymied by recent recurrent natural disasters as well as catastrophic increases in global food and fuel prices. 
With over 1,400 murders committed since January 2008 (including 77 children), the high levels of violent 
crime compounded by deep and entrenched corruption also pose severe threats to stability in Jamaica. 
USAID, Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014, (2009): 2-3. 
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Table 4.2. ODA from the US to Jamaica 1995-2011 
Year United States CPI 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
32.042933 
19.333618 
24.406588 
33.608929 
28.812 
7.811 
21.031 
17.849 
23.662 
21.922 
24.816 
20.892 
22.859 
37.26 
34.369 
31.192 
3 
3.3 
4 
3.8 
3.3 
3.6 
3.7 
3.3 
3.8 
3.8 
3.1 
Source: OECD 
Based on the Table 4.2 above it would appear that in 2004 Jamaica received, in 
terms of official development assistance (ODA) from the U.S. a significant increase from 
the previous year 22.86 in 2003 to 36.26 million. In 2003 Jamaica's CPI was 3.8 and 
2004 it was 3.3. 
In 2007 with a new party elected to government, and a party which campaigned 
heavily on reducing corruption, there were high hopes not just locally but also 
internationally for the Bruce Golding led administration.54 The Country Assistance 
Strategy 2010 - 2014 using Tl's CPI score as an indication of Jamaica's perceived 
corruption level, goes on further to argue "there is concern that as security is tightened in 
Mexico and Central America that narcotics traffickers will view the Caribbean as an 
M Emphasizing that the new government "has appointed energetic reformers to key positions and 
placed critical champions of national integrity in important agencies. With the help of foreign experts and 
public opinion increasingly intolerant of high-level corruption, these reformers are beginning to use their 
legislative and statutory authority to act as change agents in a country long accustomed to "business as 
usual". USAID, Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014, (2009): 1. 
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exploitable weak link in the drug and larger governance enforcement chain in the 
Americas."55 Ln making the connection and link between crime and corruption further, 
the report made reference to "efforts to clean up ghost employee and sub rosa 
procurement mechanisms have resulted in at least one well-publicized assassination."56 
The report nonetheless did not name the official who was, in its terms, "assassinated". 
The US is paying attention to Tl's CPI and Jamaica because of its key geographic 
location—and the potential role in the transshipment of drugs from South America. It 
would be in Jamaica's interest to increase actively its efforts to reduce the perception of 
corruption within the country. Growth and maturity in any society is important. 
State and society appear to be reaching a new tipping point: either they go 
forward with new energy not seen thus far or continue to tolerate the presence of 
rogue elements within the state, which will inevitably lead to criminal networks 
penetrating and weakening the justice system, government and the political 
process; a condition that could eventually lead to the demise of the state. (USAID 
2009, 2) 
In addressing how the government of Jamaica responds to corruption and crime, the 
Country Assistance Strategy highlights that this is "critical for Jamaica's economic 
recovery."57 With no changes to the political status quo "a high proportion of economic 
activity will remain outside the formal sector."58 Poor social and economic issues are 
contributors to the high level of violent crime and increase the scope and vulnerability to 
transnational criminal activity. Thus increasing peace and security by reducing crime and 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 2 
58 Ibid. 
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corruption work in the interest of both the US and Jamaica.59 To which it has stated its 
commitment: 
It will facilitate the capture, extradition, and prosecution of major criminals 
engaged in organized crime. Resources will be used to further institutionalize 
community policing within the Jamaica Constabulary Force and expedite its 
expansion island-wide. As part of community policing efforts, U.S. assistance will 
strengthen civil society's role in community transformation and in fostering 
partnerships with the police, with the ultimate goal of managing conflict and 
crime at the community level. (USAID 2010, 4) 
USAID's reference to Tl's CPI pertaining to its country assistance strategy for 
Jamaica adds support for the hypothesis that policymakers are paying attention to Tl's 
CPI. It is also important to highlight that USAID is one of TPs longest benefactors. As 
Tl's Annual Report indicates the USAID has been one of its earliest donors and a repeat 
donor. In fact, from the 1999 - 2011 report, the USAID has been an annual donor. The 
US acknowledges Tl's yearly CPI and it is thus prudent that Jamaica and other countries, 
especially countries reliant on the US for aid, demonstrate that they are actively trying to 
improve the perceptions of corruption within their countries. While the US talks about the 
CPI for Jamaica and other countries, there is no evidence of absolute change as it regards 
the level of foreign aid from the US to Jamaica. 
39 The USAID Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014 emphasized that the US assistance, through 
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), Military Liaison Office 
(MLO) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), will strengthen Jamaica's 
capability to fight domestic and transnational crime and corruption and counter terrorism by focusing on 
programs that build institutional capacity and support security sector within the ministry of National 
Security and the Jamaica Constabulary Force. 
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THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The delegation of the European Union was first established in Jamaica in April 
1976 as the European Commission but the Lisbon Treaty on lsl December 2009 led to a 
name change.60 Amongst the areas of development the programs of the EU delegation to 
Jamaica are diverse and tailored to meet the priorities of the different countries. The 
assistance of the delegation is focused on key development issues such as "debt 
reduction, crime fighting, corruption, reform of the justice sector, human rights, 
migration and asylum, agricultural diversification, private sector development, 
infrastructure as well as social and rural development."61 
A partnership for over 35 years, the European Union highlights that it "is not only 
a key political and trade partner for Jamaica, but through its external cooperation 
programmes is also the country's largest grant partner for development."62 Jamaica and 
the EU's relations is imbedded in several legal documents: the four Lome Conventions, 
first signed in Togo, Western Africa in 1975; the African, Caribbean Pacific ACP-EU 
partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou, Benin, Western Africa on 23 June 2000; and 
the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement EPA signed on October 15, 
60 The European Union is a key development partner in the Caribbean. Through its programmes, 
the EU assists not only the government of the respective territories but offers aid to non-governmental 
organizations and social upliftment entities. Paola Amadei, "Welcome, Delegation of the European Union 
to Jamaica. Belize, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Carman Islands" 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iamaica/about us/welcome/index en.htm (accessed March 25 2012). 
61 Paola Amadei, "Welcome, Delegation of the European Union to Jamaica, Belize, the Bahamas, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and Carman Islands" 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jamaica/about_us/welcome/index_en.htm (accessed March 25 2012). 
62European Union, "Political & Economic Relations" (Delegation of the European Union to 
Jamaica, Belize, The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands) 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jamaica/eu_jamaica/political_relations/index_en.htm (accessed March 25 
2 0 1 2 ) .  
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2 0 08.63 These documents along with the Paris Declaration determine the disposition and 
substance of cooperation between Jamaica and the EU. 
The EU cites corruption as one of the priorities areas regarding Jamaica, with Tl's 
CPI being the leading corruption watchdog group. Therefore, if the EU pays attention to 
Tl's CPI it is within Jamaica's interest to improve its score. Bilateral trade between 
Jamaica and the EU has not been consistent. According to the EU's mission to the 
Jamaica, "the value of trade in goods between Jamaica and the EU has seen a decline 
between 2005 and 2009 with the exception of 2008."64 Adding that, 
In terms of total import of goods to the EU Jamaica ranked 110 in 2009, as an 
export partner the equivalent number was 130. The value of trade in goods 
between EU and Jamaica amounted to €396 in 2009 down from €862 million in 
2008. Whereas the value of Jamaican goods export to the EU grew from €470 in 
2006 to €576 2008 million subsequently declining to €206 in 2009, goods imports 
from the EU to Jamaica have declined from €407 million in 2005 to €190 million 
in 2009.65 
Tl's CPI for Jamaica from the period 2005 to 2010 showed a .1 point improvement 
between 2005 and 2006. A significant decline the next two years and modest 
improvement in 2010 CPI score. This pattern on Tl's CPI score also reflects a pattern in 
the value of trade in goods between Jamaica and the EU. While there is a correlation with 
the trends in decline in the value of trade in goods between Jamaican and the EU in the 
said period it might not necessarily be solely attributed to Tl's CPI, if anything it can be 
argued that Tl's CPI correlates with the decline in trade with Jamaica. While corruption 
within across affects its market ability and in many cases it slows the wheel of the 
631 bid. 
^European Union, "Bilateral Trade" 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jamaica/euJamaica/trade_relation/bilateral_trade/index_en.htm (accessed 
March 25 2012). 
65Ibid. 
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development, the decline in goods and trade also coincide with the global slowdown in 
world and Europe's economies. 
The EU's delegation to Jamaica indicates that it is focused on key development 
issues of which corruption is highlighted among the indicated areas. There is no 
indication however, that the EU pays attention to Tl's CPi as it relates to Jamaica's 
ranking. But it behooves a country such as Jamaica, who relies on aid and solicit foreign 
direct investments to take the necessary steps to improve its CPI score. 
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT 
China's political differences can be considered as a factor as to why China differs 
from western donors, in that, there is no expressed statement concerning political and or 
economic policies of the countries the Chinese government invest in. The Chinese 
government in the last decade or so has been heavily investing in Jamaica. Jamaica is 
China's biggest trading partner amongst English-speaking Caribbean countries. The 
major products China imports from Jamaica are cane sugar and bauxite.66 The major 
products China exports to Jamaica are textiles, clothing and light industrial products. 
According to statistics of China General Administration of Customs, bilateral 
trade volume in 2004 totaled US$395.98 million, a 90.8% increase compared with 
the previous year. The Chinese export volume accounted for US$126.13 million, 
a 23.6% increase as compared with the previous year; and the Chinese import 
volume was US$269.85 million, a 155.9% increase as compared with the previous 
year. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China to Jamaica) 
Over the last decade especially, China's level of investment in Jamaica has 
increased significantly. The level of bilateral aid with China and Jamaica and the 
66Embassy of the People's Republic of China to Jamaica."Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations, 
Economic and Technical Cooperation."http://im.china-embassv.org/eng/zygx/imhz/t211230.htm (accessed 
March 20, 2012). 
subsequent lack of transparency in many instances have led to cause for concern. The 
Jamaica Development Infrastructure Programme (JDIP)67, created in 2010 is of 
importance. JDIP has been fraught with controversy from the onset. Many assertions of 
corruption have been levied at the agency." JDIP is the result of an innovative partnership 
between the GOJ and Government of China and is singly the largest, most comprehensive 
infrastructural programme to be implemented in Jamaica."68 
There is no evidence to suggest that China pays attention to Tl's CPI in dealing 
with Jamaica. China has been criticized by a lot of scholars and policymakers for not 
taking corruption and human rights issues seriously when investing and or dealing with 
developing economies. But it comes as no surprise that the Chinese government did not 
mention Tl's CPI and or corruption. Neither is there any indication that it would have an 
impact on China's policymakers' relations with Jamaica as China, generally does not pay 
attention to indexes regarding human rights and corruption ranking per se. China, ranked 
as a low-income country, but with a steady and growing economy and internal 
development within the country, continues to establish new external relationships to 
source raw materials amongst other goods. Therefore, in addition to no evidence of the 
Chinese Government paying attention to Tl's CPI, there is no mention of corruption 
being a factor in affecting development policies between Jamaica and China. 
67 The Jamaica Development Infrastructure Programme (JDIP) represents a major undertaking by 
the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) to significantly improve the island's road network in order to enhance 
the quality of life of the citizens of Jamaica, and to stimulate economic development. Jamaica Development 
Infrastructure Programme http://www.nwa.gov.im/content/idip.asDx (accessed March 20, 2012). 
68 Ibid. 
United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime (UNODC) 
In its resolution 55/61 of 4 December 2000, the UN General Assembly recognized 
that an effective international legal instrument against corruption, independent of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (resolution 55/25, 
annex I) was desirable and the UN decided to establish an ad hoc committee for the 
negotiation of such an instrument in Vienna at the headquarters of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime. Jamaica became a signature to the UN Convention against 
Corruption on 16 September 2005 and ratified it on 5 March 2008. The UNODC69 has 
launched a number of initiates to deal with the issue of corruption and reduce its 
aggravating effects and acknowledges that corruption is a complex social, political and 
economic phenomenon that affects all countries. Furthermore, 
CoiTuption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and 
contributes to governmental instability. Corruption attacks the foundation of 
democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law 
and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing is the 
soliciting of bribes. Economic development is stunted because foreign direct 
investment is discouraged and small businesses within the country often find it 
impossible to overcome the 'start-up costs' required because of corruption. 
(UNODC 2008) 
But ascertaining whether TPs CPI impacts development policies of the UNODC is yet to 
be deciphered. From my research, as it relates to TPs CPI, I have observed that the 
UNODC, on its "awareness-raising and outreach" page, lists Transparency International 
as one of the international organizations against corruption.70 
69 UNODC, "UNODC's Action against Corruption and Economic Crime" 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruDtion/index.html7ref-menuside ("accessed March 12, 2012). 
70 For information on other international organizations cited by the UNODC please see "Anti-
Corruption Links", http://www.unodc.org/voiirnocounts/en/resources/index.html (accessed March 12, 
2012). 
Subsequently the UNODC refers to Tl's CPI scores in its Trafficking in Persons 
Global Patterns, April 2006 report71 as it relates to the profile of countries. The UNODC 
bestow attention to Tl's CPI, in that Tl's CPI was the authority referred to pertaining to 
different countries corruption scores. While there is no outright development policy 
stated as it relates to Jamaica in the said report there is analysis provided for other 
countries and how the policies instituted enabled a particular country to improve its CPI 
score. 
The UNODC, in its 2007 Annual Report, referred to the case of Nigeria in which 
it was implementing a project funded by the European Commission to combat corruption. 
In Nigeria's case the UNODC notes that it is implementing a project funded by the 
European Commission to combat corruption in Nigeria and recover assets stolen from the 
country by supporting the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
Since the inception of the EFCC in 2004, the Commission has prosecuted more 
than 400 cases; recovered or restrained assets valued at more than $5 billion and 
helped Nigeria reach the 147th position in Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index from last in 2003 and third to last in 2005.(UNODC, Annual 
Report, (2008): 44) 
This example of Nigeria is evidence that the UNODC gives credence to Tl's CPI 
and how its policies were formulated to assist Nigeria reform in some instances and to at 
least improve its CPI score. 
Another instance of the UNODC paying attention to TI, one could extrapolate on 
the following example and illustrate that TI matters. The UNODC, along with the United 
Nations Office for Internal Oversight Service, the Asian Development Bank and 
71 The appendices to the report, "Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns". The United Nations 
Office for Drugs and Crime, (April 2006): 132. 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/trafficking persons report 2006-04 appendices.pdf (accessed March 15. 
2012). 
Transparency International jointly organized The Seventh Meeting of the International 
Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination (IGAC) in Bangkok, Thailand on 21-22 April 
2005. Chief among the meetings' aims was to discuss ways and means to prevent and 
detect fraud and corruption in disaster and emergency relief operations. Amongst the 
recommendations coming out of the meeting were Recommendation 12: under the 
section United Nations Convention against Corruption notes: "UNODC, UNDP, 
UNDESA, UNICRI and TI to explore and report to next IGAC meeting on ways to 
coordinate and enhance technical assistance in relation to ratification and implementation 
of UNCAC, including effective review mechanisms."72 This case shows that TI plays a 
role in development policies and being the leading civil society group on corruption Tl's 
involvement in the development and reconstruction policies showed that as a civil society 
group TI matters. 
Another key area in which TI seemed to matter was in the corruption prevention 
in the tsunami relief. TI as being the leading organization on corruption its input is not 
only taken into consideration by development policymakers, but also, TI was a joint 
coordinator of the workshop on reconstruction policies for Indonesia after the tsunami. 
This is especially significant; hence Jamaica and other developing countries should pay 
attention to Tl's position and influence. In the aftermath of such a natural tragedy TI, 
because of its prestige on corruption, was a part of the policy recommendation efforts in 
the reconstruction development policies of Indonesia. Following one of the most tragic 
natural disasters in the 21s' century, the Tsunami, TI had a role in the development 
policies being crafted. Point 14 of the report states: 
12 UNODC and Asian Development Bank, "Report on the Seventh Meeting of the International 
Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination (IGAC)" (Bangkok, Thailand April, 2005): 15-16. 
http://www.unodc.ors/pdf/corruption/7th interagency meeting.pdf (accessed March 28, 2012). 
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Mr. Peter Rooke of Transparency international (TI) and Mr. Patrick Moulette 
(OECD) informed participants about the outcomes of the Expert Meeting on 
Corruption Prevention in Tsunami Relief, held on 7-8 April 2005 in Jakarta, 
Indonesia (Annex 3). The workshop, which was jointly organized by the 
ADB/OECD Anticorruption Initiative and TI, was designed to bring together 
affected Governments, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, donors 
and international governmental organizations with a view to designing general 
principles for action to ensure that aid delivery and reconstruction efforts are not 
tainted by corruption. (UNODC and Asian Development Bank Report 2005, 6) 
The above-mentioned report reiterates with the statement; 
Humanitarian relief and reconstruction following natural disasters is particularly 
vulnerable to corruption. Sudden flows of large amounts of money, goods, and 
services, pressure to deliver aid quickly, as well as the substantial economic 
opportunities that arise from large-scale reconstruction, all contribute to 
increasing the risk of corruption, waste and mismanagement. (UNODC and Asian 
Development Bank Report 2005, 26) 
It is evident that TI matters and it plays a role in development policies in some instance. 
The framework for action embraced some key measures that main stakeholders should 
take to assist affected countries in humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts.73 With 
TI being a joint organizer and participant in the policies, this tragic incident should be a 
signal to developing countries to pay closer attention to Tl's CPI as policymakers are 
paying attention to TI. 
Given the scale and scope of the relief and reconstruction required following the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004, the Asian Development Bank 
(ABD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Transparency International (TI) and the Indonesian Government jointly hosted a 
two-day meeting on preventing corruption in tsunami relief. (UNODC and Asian 
Development Bank Report 2005, 26) 
It is particularly important that Jamaica, not only because it is a developing country, pays 
attention to Tl's CPI, but also it is prudent as Jamaica is prone to natural disasters and 
73 The meeting, held in Jakarta on 7-8 April 2005, was attended by representatives of six tsunami 
affected countries (India. Indonesia. Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand), bilateral and 
international donor organizations and civil society, who discussed risks of misuse of funds and identified 
concrete ways to mitigate these risks. 
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relies heavily on the international community for aid relief whenever hurricanes and or 
heavy flooding occurs. Hence, in the event of an unfortunate episode such as the tsunami 
were to befall Jamaica and based on past experience with TI being a key player in the 
corruption prevention in the tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia, it is highly likely that TI 
would play a role in the reconstruction and development policies of Jamaica. Emerging 
out of the report, "ADB, OECD and TI were considering the development of a set of 
operational guidelines that can be used for planning, tracking, monitoring and evaluating 
aid flows with a view to preventing corruption in humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction."74 This is further evidence that policymakers pay attention to TI. 
Consequently, given the role of TI along with key and influential development 
policymakers such as OECD, ADB, World Bank and all the other players75 who were at 
the jointly organized meeting, it behooves countries like Jamaica to pay closer attention 
to Tl's CPI and how, in the future, TI might influence development policies in the event 
that such tragedy were to occur in Jamaica. 
International Narcotics Control Board 
The International Narcotics Control Board has expressed its deep concerns about 
the many ways in which the illicit drug trade is facilitated by violence and corruption. In 
addressing how widespread corruption is the report of the INCB acknowledges that 
"Corruption is secretive; the persons affected by corruption may be unaware that they 
74 United Nations. International Narcotics Control Board 2010 Report. 
http://vvvvw.unodc.org/documents/eastasiaandpacific/Publications/2011/INCB 2010 Repoit.pdf p 1 
(accessed March 28, 2012). 
75 See appendix ! for a list of all the participants in the meeting. 
118 
have been victimized. For that reason, the problem is extremely hard to quantify. It has 
been argued that it is not possible to accurately measure the prevalence of corruption, as 
most methods used to measure it are inherently flawed."76 In its comments on drugs and 
corruption The International Narcotics Control Board 2010 Report reaffirms, 
Nothing has a more debilitating effect on efforts to curtail the illicit drug trade 
than the successful attempts of criminal organizations to intimidate and corrupt 
public officials. Nothing undermines international drug control efforts as much as 
the numerous cases of corrupt officials who facilitate or participate in drug 
trafficking. Yet violence and corruption are integral parts of illicit drug markets. 
(United Nations, International Narcotics Control Board 2010 Report, 1) 
The report highlights that surveys are often used to measure or estimate the 
prevalence corruption based on the experiences and/or perceptions of respondents. It also 
emphasized, 
Those indicators are often aggregated into composite indices, such as the annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index, published by Transparency International, the 
World Bank's governance indicators, which also measure the ability of countries 
to control corruption, and the indices prepared by the World Economic Forum to 
identify obstacles to business. (United Nations, International Narcotics Control 
Board 2010 Report, 4) 
Tl's CPI is acknowledged as a tool for assessing corruption. As it relates to 
Jamaica and more broadly, Central America and the Caribbean, the report of INCB states, 
"despite the considerable efforts made by governments in the region, the drug problem 
facing Central America and the Caribbean has been exacerbated by endemic corruption, 
widespread poverty and high unemployment."77 The intricate links between corruption, 
poverty, unemployment and high crime rates, and drug-related violence as debilitating 
factors in the development of many developing cannot be overlooked. The report of the 
INCB highlights, 
76 Ibid., 4. 
77Ibid, 56. 
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It is estimated that the street value of all drugs transiting through the Caribbean 
alone exceeds that of the legal economy. Proceeds of drug trafficking have been 
used to bribe public officials, increasing corruption within government, law 
enforcement agencies and the judiciary and further undermining already weak 
institutions. (United Nations International Narcotics Control Board 2010 Report, 
56) 
To date, probably Jamaica's biggest incident of the impact of drug-related crime is the 
apprehension of Mr. Christopher Coke in 2010. As the INCB report states, 
Jamaica has also been affected by significant drug-related violence. In the 
summer of 2010, a police operation aimed at arresting the alleged head of a drug 
trafficking ring led to a stand-off between heavily armed gang members and 
police. The gravity of the ensuing violence, which caused over 70 deaths, 
prompted the Government of Jamaica to declare a state of emergency in Kingston 
and mobilize the largest contingent of armed forces in the history of the country. 
The suspect was eventually arrested by police and extradited to the United States 
to face drug trafficking charges. (United Nations International Narcotics Control 
Board 2010 Report, 56) 
The INCB report also reiterates similar points highlighted by the US Department 
of State Annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999-2011. Both use 
Tl's CPI as the source for corruption rating of Jamaica and other countries. The effects of 
the INCB 2010 report as it regards Tl's CPI and policymakers' decisions regarding 
Jamaica show that TPs CPI is used to assess countries corruption score. 
Conclusions 
The world's political responses to Tl's CPI show that policymakers give credence 
to TI. Governments and intemational institutions cite the index. Nonetheless, while TI is 
referred to as the authority on corruption perceptions, there is a lack of evidence to prove 
whether or not acknowledgment of the CPI actually leads to changes in policies with 
relations to Jamaica. The political responses to Tl's CPI seemed to have moved from lip 
service to policies in the tsunami relief efforts and also the case of Nigeria where Tl 's 
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recommendations were implemented as policies. The Department of State's International 
Narcotics Control Strategy report, along with the USAID Country Assistance Strategy 
gives credence to TI. USAID, over an extended period, is also another major donor to TI, 
which suggests that they pay attention to TI. 
Tl's representative, Deborah Hardoon position on whether international aid 
donors should pay attention to Tl's CPI when donating to developing countries is 
significant. As Hardoon notes, 
The CPI is a relative index, that is, it compares perceptions of corruption in each 
country relative to the other countries scored and ranked. It can be a powerful 
general indication of the extent, of the problem in developing countries. It draws 
attention to the fact that aid donors should consider the governance issues 
throughout the supply chain of aid, the CPI effectively highlights countries where 
corruption risks may be particularly high and therefore where further risk 
assessment and analysis would be necessary. (.Emphasis added Hardoon, 2011) 
This developing countries need to pay attention to. Hardoon argues further that, "as the 
CPI does not measure absolute levels of corruption, it should not be used as a benchmark 
to decide whether or not a particular country should receive aid."78 Another point which 
Hardoon illustrates that which domestic and international policymakers needs to pay 
attention to is that, 
It (the CPI) also cannot be used to identify exactly where the corruption risks for 
development assistance are and where anti-corruption efforts should be targeted." 
For this a much more in depth analysis is needed and for this you need tools other 
than the CPI. Transparency International conduct public opinion surveys, the 
Global Corruption Barometer, which amongst other things asks the general public 
to which institutions they have paid bribes in the past 12 months, and National 
Integrity Systems (NIS) assessments go into even more qualitative detail in terms 
of the integrity mechanisms in a country's institutions. So yes, international aid 
donors should pay attention to the CPI, but as a trigger to investigating the 
particular in country corruption dynamics in more detail, rather than as a stand­
alone diagnosis on which to act. (Emphasis added Hardoon, 2011) 
78 Deborah Hardoon, Senior Research Coordinator, Transparency International, email to the 
author, March 13, 2012. 
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Subsequently, the political responses to Tl's CPI indicate that in this case the 
global civil society group matters. The EU highlights corruption as a priority area in 
Jamaica's development but there is no direct evidence that the European Commission 
pays attention to Tl's CPI rating of Jamaica. But it can possibly be deduced that the EU 
rely upon TI, as the European Commission is one of the most generous donors to TI. The 
International Narcotics Board 2010 report79refers to Tl's CPI. It also makes the important 
linkage between corruption and other crimes. Intimidation and corruption are the most 
effective tools used by organized criminal groups to counter the drug control efforts of 
law enforcement agencies. They are two sides of the same coin. 
Corruption, whether it is curbing and or eliminating it, is not an easy task for 
policymakers. Hence, the Managing Director of the World Bank, Bangkok, Thailand 
recognition that "The Bank and the development community more generally, still have a 
lot to learn in this area,"80 is prudent. Consequently, in looking ahead, the commitment 
that, "we will continue to investigate more systematically what works when and under 
what conditions to enable us to better design and implement such interventions."81 In 
addition, the challenge postulated offers resounding news for civil society groups such as 
79 An organized criminal group can purchase the complicity of a public official just as easily as it 
can pay for his or her assassination. The intimidation or corruption of public officials is ultimately what 
empowers criminal organizations, often placing the organizations beyond the reach of the law. Corruption 
is a pernicious phenomenon that has a deep and detrimental effect on people, societies and social 
institutions. It is frequently responsible for the disappointing results (or outright failure) of drug control 
efforts. 
80 Sri Mulyanilndrawati, "Remarks for Opening Plenary of the 14 lh International Anti-Corruption 
Conference," November 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/3S2S7396J0 (accessed March 15, 2012). 
81 Ibid 
TI to continue its consorted efforts to fight corruption and demands for transparency and 
accountability. To which the World Bank's Managing Director extrapolate: 
On this note, I would like to offer a challenge to my civil society friends. Help us. 
Bring us practical solutions. Not to have a victory against corruption, but to find 
the next steps to solve some of the difficult problems we all face. And I don't just 
mean in prevention - though prevention is important. But prevention must be 
additional to enforcement. (Indrawati, 2010) 
Overall, having assessed the world's political responses to Tl's CPI, it is clear that 
political policymakers are aware of the CPI, they refer to it and to some degree the CPI is 
used as the authority when referring to countries corruption perceptions. However, while 
the rhetoric about the importance of CPI is high, there is not really much concrete 
evidence that it matters. Political policymakers considers it, but the evidence to show that 
yes, policymakers penalize Jamaica per se because its CPI is not favorable, the evidence 
did not show that. 
Having assessed the world's political responses to Tl's CPI here, the following 
chapter will assess the economic responses and measure whether the CPI has any 
economic effects. Hence what is the correlation, between the CPI and Jamaica's bond 
rating; additionally, Jamaica's Standard and Poor's credit rating? Does the publication of 
the index lead to a reaction from the S&P? On the other hand does the CPI correlate with 
existing economic trends rather than causing an effects? 
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CHAPTER V 
WORLD'S ECONOMIC RESPONSES 
The World Bank calls corruption "the single greatest obstacle to economic and 
social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and 
weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends."1 The 
economics literature as well as popular press has begun to focus on the central role of 
corruption in economic development and financial market performance. Corruption has 
been shown to be associated with less foreign direct investment,2 lower levels of 
investment and growth3 lower stock values,4 and the overall decline in some productive 
sectors of local economies. Other studies have analyzed the consequences or causes of 
corruption in a cross section of countries.5 
One of the aims of businesses is to secure investments. However, adding corrupt 
rent-seeking bureaucrats may not be effective in securing the political conditions; 
investors would simply prefer a non-corrupt environment in which to invest. With this 
said, and since Tl's CPI is the most noted corruption index, estimating the impact of the 
'World Bank, "Fraud & Corruption: What is the World Bank doing to fight corruption?" 
httr>://go.worldbank.ora/JF93SZ5CU0faccessed March 12,2012). 
2 Shang-Jin Wei, "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?" Review of 
Economics and Statistics.82, no. 1. (2000): I. 
3 Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth." Quarterly .Journal of Economics, 110 (1995): 681. 
4Charles M.C. Lee and David T. Ng. "Corruption and International Valuation: Does Virtue Pay?" 
Cornell University, Working Paper. Nov., (2002). 
5 See Mauro ;  1995; also Alberto Ades and Rafael di Telia. "The Causes and Consequences of 
Corruption: A Review of Recent Empirical Contributions." IDS Bulletin, 27, no. 2 (1996): 6-1 1; and 
Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei. "Does 'Grease Money' Speed up the Wheels of Commerce?" NBER 
Working Paper, no. 7093 (1999). 
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world's economic responses to XL's CPI is important. Therefore, there is yet to be a study 
to assess whether Tl's CPI affects the market. Do investors and policymakers react to 
Tl 's CPI when it is published yearly? If so, what impact does the CPI have, if any, on the 
behavior of economic policymakers? In order to determine the world's economic 
responses to Tl's CPI the following will be examined. 1). Does an increase in Tl's CPI 
ranking correlate with less foreign direct investment to Jamaica? 2). Does the publication 
of Tl's CPI impact the credit rating of Jamaica on Standard & Poor's credit weekly one to 
two weeks before and or after the release of the CPI? 3). Does an increase in Tl's CPI 
ranking correlate with an increase in Jamaica's market bond spread? 4). Does the 
publication of Tl's CPI affect the exchange rate of the Jamaican dollar? 
In many instances, corruption negatively affects businesses in a number of ways. 
Assessing from the investment perspective, corruption converts into high transaction 
costs for the business.6 This ultimately reduces investors' competitiveness within the host 
country. The extra payment that corruption adds to business transactions creates an 
unfriendly atmosphere for investors to operate in. this has the potential to affect 
performance, and as Richard Jerram note, "performance has diverged sharply over the 
past few years, in line with the divergence of corruption perceptions."7 Furthermore, 
"academic research generally fails to show a link between economic growth and equity 
market performance; hence the corruption perception index might offer the missing 
5 John Hongxin Zhao. Seung H. Kim and Jainjun Du. "The impact of corruption and transparency 
on foreign direct investment: An Empirical Analysis," Management International Review, 43, no. 1, 
(2003): 42. 
' For more see Richard Jerram, Chief Economist, Bank of Singapore, "Economics Research 
Honesty, Growth and Markets," 1 3 February 2012, Bank of Singapore. The Bank of Singapore was voted 
Outstanding Private Bank—Asia Pacific 201 1 by Private Banker International. Additionally, a subsidiary 
ofOCBC Bank voted World's Strongest Bank 2011-2012 by Bloomberg Markets. 
ingredient."8 Adding that, "The general literature shows corporate governance is worse 
under corrupt governments and firms from more corrupt countries trade at lower market 
multiples (such as price-to-earnings or price-to-book)."9 This is because higher 
corruption results in lower expected cash flows. This adds to Mauro's work, which 
demonstrated through empirical evidence that high levels of corruption are associated 
with lower levels of investment and GDP. Corruption may be interpreted to act as a tax, 
which correspondingly reduces incentives to invest.10 
There are a few fundamental statistical issues with this chapter. The number of 
observations is relatively few and this increases the chance of type II error. TI only 
started publishing the CPI in 1995; Jamaica first appeared on the index in 1998 and for 
the years 2000 and 2001 there was no ranking. In addition to the increased likelihood of 
type II error because of the limited number of observations it also makes it difficult to 
potentially control for competing factors. With this said correlation analysis instead of 
regression analysis is used. With regression analysis and fewer observations there is a 
greater risk of using variables, which would be measuring the same factors. Con-elation is 
preferable to regression analysis because correlation analysis makes no a priori 
assumption as to whether one variable is dependent on the other and it is not concerned 
with the relationship between the variables. It gives an estimate as to the degree of 
association between the variables. On the other hand, regression analysis attempts to 
describe the dependence of a variable on one or more explanatory variables. The 
•
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Paolo Mauro. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government 
Expenditure," IMF Working Paper, September, (1996): 17. 
126 
assumption that there is a one way casual effect from the explanatory variable(s) to the 
response variable, regardless of whether the path of effect is direct or indirect. The few 
observations might lead to some deficiencies of the data. 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS 
The determinants and motivations of foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows into 
a country often vary. But quite often it is related to growth and development of an 
economy, the ability to make a profit on an investment and other factors associated with 
potential new markets. Thus a competitive advantage within the global marketplace is 
important. Corruption, it is often said, increases the cost of doing business. Therefore, 
since Tl's CPI is the most widely used corruption ranking index, ascertaining the 
relationship between Tl's CPI and FDI to Jamaica to assess whether there is a correlation 
with Tl's CPI. 
According to World Development Indicators (WDI) estimates, the net inflows of 
FDI to Jamaica over the period of 1995-2011 have been close to USD 9 billion dollars 
(8,949,081,680).11 Nonetheless, in a globally competitive environment there are a 
number of factors, which might prove advantageous to one country's economy compared 
to another. Since corruption is said to increase the cost of business—my expectations are 
that when Jamaica's CPI increases it becomes less attractive to foreign investors and thus 
there should be a lagged effect in terms of FDI the following year. As Habib and 
Zurawicki elaborate, "understanding the role of corruption on FDI is important since 
"Calculated from World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance 
corruption produces bottlenecks, heightens uncertainty, and raises costs."12 FDI inflows 
can contribute to economic development. It can also boost domestic investment, and add 
to investible resources and capital formation. Another factor of why FDI is important for 
developing countries is that it also leads to transferring production technology, innovative 
capacity, and organizational and managerial practices between locations. 
HQ: A change in Tl's CPI of Jamaica correlates with changes in Foreign Direct 
Investment in the following year. 
Probably the best way to determine if the CPI has any impact would be to 
examine the effects the year after the CPI is published. In that, give or take a few months, 
the year later would be a better measure than the current year in affecting investors' 
decisions. However Table 5.1. shows that the Pearson's r of -.041 is not statistically 
significant, (p = .904). One of the issues with this findings is the very small number of 
observations n= 12. 
Table 5.1 Correlations between CPI and FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 
Correlations 
CPI Foreign direct investment, 
Score net inflows (% of GDP) 
CPI Score Pearson 1 -.041 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .904 
N 12 11 
Foreign direct investment, Pearson -.041 1 
net inflows (% of GDP) Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .904 
12Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki, "Corruption and foreign direct investment," Journal of 
International Business Studies, 33, no. 2, (2002): 295. 
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Additionally, with this small number of observations, the statistical tests have 
large standard errors as shown in Table 5.2 below. The limited number of observations 
can possibly lead to a type II error, as in; to find no effects when in fact there might be 
some. Another issue with this test is that due to the relatively small number of 
observations there is the increased possibility that it misrepresents the relationship. In 
that, a higher score on Tl's CPI implies less corruption, and a negative correlation would 
indicate less corruption reduces FDI inflows. 
Table 5.2 CPI and FDI Standard Error 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
CPI Score 12 3.5000 .09293 .32193 .104 
Foreign 16 559317 82002268.73787 328009074.9514 10758995325 
direct 604.982 7 0521968.000 
investment, 2 
net inflows 
(BoP, current 
USS) 
Valid N 12 
(listwise) 
Additionally, Figure 5.1 below demonstrates that there is no significant 
correlation between CPI score and FDI. Hence, there is a possibility that Jamaica has the 
capacity to attract FDI whether or not it has a favorable CPI score. The higher the CPI 
score indicates a lower perception of corruption in the country. On Tl's CPI 1 to 10 with 
ten indicating less corruption perceptions and one signifying high levels of corruption 
perceptions. Jamaica's FDI changed over the years but the net inflow of FDI is not 
significantly correlated with the country's CPI score thus indicating that potentially other 
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factors drive investors to invest in Jamaica. Noting especially that in spite of declining 
CPI scores, particularly over the period 2004 to 2009 with improvements in 2006, the 
FDI net flow % of GDP saw increases during the period despite the drastic fall in 2009 
and 2010. 
Figure 5.1 Jamaica's CPI score and FDI, net inflows (% of GDP 1995-2010 
4.00-
-6.00 
-2.00 
-.03 
2000 2002 2Q06 2008 2010 1998 2004 
Year 
In 2007 Jamaica's CPI was 3.3 and ranked 84th in the world. But the FDI as a % 
of GDP to Jamaica in the following year, 10.08%, was the highest over the period of 
focus for this study. There are a number of possible analyses that can be used to explain 
this significant change in FDI into Jamaica. The changes in the global economic market, 
competitiveness of the country to other economies, and or the change in political 
leadership in the September 2007 general election might provide some context to the 
change. A change in political leadership quite often has the possibility to influence 
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confidence in a market. The September 2007 election was important, in that, "the island's 
political landscape changed dramatically when Prime Minister (PM) Bruce Golding's 
Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) won national elections after 18 years in opposition."13 
The perceptions of change in domestic politics might have been a casual factor in 
impacting investors' decisions. The previous government, the PIMP, in addition to being 
in power for 18.5 years, was rocked by numerous corruption scandals. There were 
general sentiments that change was needed and the Bruce Golding led JLP campaigned 
strongly on corruption reform, attracting foreign investment and cutting the bureaucratic 
processes and making the country more attractive to foreign investors. Hence the 
perceived impending improvement in business conditions from the newly elected 
government could have boosted investment and helped to put Jamaica on a stronger 
growth path. As the USAID "Jamaica Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014" notes, 
The new government has appointed energetic reformers to key positions and 
placed critical champions of national integrity in important agencies. With the 
help of foreign experts and public opinion increasingly intolerant of high-level 
corruption, these reformers are beginning to use their legislative and statutory 
authority to act as change agents in a country long accustomed to 'business as 
usual'.14 
The changes in CPI scores do not correlate with the level of FDI into Jamaica. This 
suggests that the CPI might not be impacting an investor's decision to invest in Jamaica. 
But due to the limited observations, which lead to statistical issues, the no correlation 
between CPI score and FDI net inflows, the standard errors makes it unlikely to find 
significant effects. 
'•'USAID, "Jamaica Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014," (2009), 1. 
14 Ibid 
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CREDIT RATING—STANDARD & POOR'S 
"In today's financial marketplace, information moves fast. Those who fail to do 
their homework may not realize their full investment potential."15 Credit risk analysis 
provides a valuable business tool. It informs investors and the markets alike. As 
Standard& Poor's16 boasts "Behind every sound investment lies careful analysis."17 
Ideally an 'AAA' rating is the best a country could score. The AAA ratings indicate the 
obligator's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely 
strong. Obligations rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC' and 'C' are regarded as having significant 
speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'C' the 
highest.18 
Additionally, for short term issue credit ratings 'A-l' the obligor's capacity to 
meet its financial commitment on the obligation; 'B' is regarded as having speculative 
characteristics; 'C' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent upon 
favorable business, financial, and economic conditions; and 'D' which indicate the short-
term obligation rated 'D' is in payment default.19 As it relates to outlook assessments, 
l5Standard & Poor's "Rating Research" Standard & Poor's CreditWeek Issue. 
16A Standard & Poor's credit rating is a current opinion of the creditworthiness of an obligator 
with respect to a specific financial obligation, a specific class of financial obligations, or a specific financial 
program (including ratings on medium term note programs and commercial papers programs). For more 
reading see any Standard & Poor's CreditWeek Issue, "Issue Credit Rating Definitions." 
17 For more see Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, Issue credit ratings are based, in varying 
degrees, on conditions such as: 1. Likelihood of payment—capacity and willingness of the obligor to meet 
its financial commitment on an obligation in accordance with the terms of its obligations; 2.Nature of and 
provisions of the obligation; 3. Protection afforded by, and relative position of, the obligation in the event 
of bankruptcy, reorganization or other arrangement under the laws of bankruptcy and other laws affecting 
creditors" rights. 
lsFor a more detailed analysis on the ratings definitions please see any issue of S&P 
CreditWeek particularly sections "Issue Credit Ratings Definitions" and "Issuer Credit Rating 
Definitions" 
"ibid. 
positive denotes that a rating may be raised; negative signifies that a rating may be 
lowered; stable symbolizes that a rating is not likely to change; developing indicates a 
rating may be raised or lowered and N.M. represents not meaningful.20 
On 9th November 1999, for the first time, Standard & Poor's assigned long-term 
local and foreign currency sovereign credit ratings to Jamaica. Standard & Poor's also 
assigned a foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to the country. As the S&P 
explains, 
The higher local currency rating is based on the sovereign's powers of taxation 
and control over its financial system, in addition to Jamaica's progress in reducing 
inflation and its track record of managing the maturity structure of domestic debt. 
Inflation likely will average 6% in 1999, while the five-year average maturity of 
the general government's local currency debt compares quite favorably with the 
debt structure of similarly rated sovereigns. (S&P, CreditWeek, (Nov., 17, 1999): 
84) 
For the first year on the S&P Jamaica's credit ratings were: "local currency B+/Stable, 
foreign currency: B/Stable."21 Amongst the factors given for this rating were: "a very 
high public sector debt, 'high fiscal imbalances', 'a challenging monetary stance' and 
'modest economic growth prospects'."22 
Jamaica aims to encourage foreign investors as a means for economic 
development and growth. Hence with S&P being the global leader in credit-risk analysis 
assessing whether there is a correlation between Jamaica's CPI and S&P's index is 
important. It would address the question of: what effects, if any, does Tl's CPI have on 
risk rating agencies? Do they pay attention to Tl's CPI? And if so, when TI publishes its 
CPI is there any change in the weekly credit rating? 
20 Ibid. 
21 Standard & Poor's, CreditWeek, (Nov., 17, 1999): 84. 
22 Summarized from S&P, CreditWeek, (Nov.. 17, 1999): 84-85. 
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Hn: There is no relationship between Tl's CPI and S&P Credit Rating. 
Ha: There is a strong positive relationship between Tl's CPI and S&P Credit Rating. 
The aim of this measure is to assess whether there is any impact of Tl's CPI on 
the S&P index that could impact and or affect the credit rating of Jamaica. Here the 
movements in the S&P index before and after the CPI is published will be examined. The 
premise for this observation is simply that, the CPI is published at different times each 
year, thus if publication of the CPI were to have any major impact on Jamaica's credit 
rating there would be a shift after the index has been published. Thus the S&P will be 
examined one to two weeks prior to Tl's CPI publication and one to two weeks after. 
Therefore, if Tl's CPI were to impact the S&P, I expect a change in the credit rating one 
to two weeks after the publication of the CPI. 
Table 5.3., below demonstrates that when TPs CPI is published it has no impact 
on the S&P rating. The credit rating of Jamaica is the same one to two weeks prior to the 
CPI's publication and it holds the same value one and two weeks after the publication. 
Hence the hypothesis has to be accepted that there is no relationship between Tl's CPI 
and the S&P's credit rating. As my expectations before state, if Tl's CPI had an impact 
on the S&P, a change would occur either in the immediate or subsequent week after the 
publication of the CPI. This finding is significant as the CPI is not published on the same 
date yearly, hence the variation in the publication dates would be of greater importance in 
effecting change as it pertains to credit rating. 
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Table 5.3. Jamaica's CPI Rank and S&P's Credit Rating 2 weeks before and after CPI release dates 
^ear Date of 
Release 
CP 
I 
Ra 
nk 
2 wks prior 1 vvk prior vvk of release 1 vvk a fter 2 wks after 
Local c Foreign C Local C Foreign C Local C Foreign C Local C Foreign C Local C Foreign C 
L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S- L-TR/O/S-
TR TR TR TR TR TR TR TR TR TR. 
2000 09/13/00 B+/S table B+/S table B+/Stable B+/S table B+/Stable B+/Stable B+/Stable B+/Stable B+/Stable B+/Stable 
2001 06/26/01 BB-/Stable/B B+/Stable/B BB- B+/Stable/B BB- B+/Stable/B BB- B+/Stable/B BB- B+/Stable/ 
/Stable/B /Stable/B /Stable/B /Stable/B B 
2002 08/28/02 45 BB-/Stable/B B+/Stable/B BB- B+/Stable/B BB- B+/Stable/B BB- B+/Stable/B BB- B+/S table/ 
/Stable/B /Stable/B /Stable/B /Stable/B B 
2003 10/07/03 57 B+/Stable/B B/Stable/B B+/Stable/B B/Stable/B B+/Stable/B B/Stable/B B+/Stable/B B/Stable/B B+/Stable/B B/Stable/B 
2004 10/19/04 74 B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negative/ B/Negativ 
B B B B B B B B B e/B 
2005 10/17/05 64 B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B 
2006 11/06/06 61 B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B 
2007 09/11/07 84 B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B 
2008 09/28/08 96 B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B B/Stable/B 
2009 11/17/09 99 CCC+/Negat CCC+/Negat CCC+/Nega CCC+/Negat CCC+/Nega CCC+/Negat CCC+/Nega CCC+/Negat CCC+/Nega CCC+/Neg 
ive/C ive/C tive/C ive/C tive/C ive/C tive/C ive/C tive/C ative/C 
2010 10/26/10 87 B-/Stable/C B-/Stable/C B-/Stable/C B-/Stable/C B-/Stable/C B-/Stab!e/C B-/Stable/C B-/Stable/C B-/Stable/C B-
/Stable/C 
2011 1 1/24/11 86 B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B-
/Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/C /Negative/ 
*Local C= Local Currency; Foreign C= Foreign Currency; 
*L-TR/0/S-TR=Long-Term Rate/Outlook/Short-Term Rate 
* Jamaica first appeared in S&P's rating 1999. But ratings to coincide with Tl's release date did not start until 2000. 
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Since there is no impact on the S&P by Tl's CPI it can be argued that Tl's CPI might 
simply be reflective and not causative of factors in this aspect of the global market. In 
that, it reflects what the global market already seemingly knows about Jamaica. When 
comparing the trends in Tl's CPI and the credit rating during the period of publication it 
shows that from 2002-2004 when Jamaica declined on Tl's CPI there was also a decline 
in those years on the S&P. However, from 2005-2008 the S&P rating remained constant 
while Jamaica's CPI varied between 64, 61, 84 and 96 position. Nonetheless, in 2009 
when Jamaica received its worse rating on the S&P (CCC+/Negative/C) it coincides with 
the worse ranking on Tl's CPI (99). Additionally, in 2010 when Jamaica's CPI improved 
to 87 its S&P improved to B-/Stable/C. 
Table 5.4. Tl's CPI and S&P Global Equity Indices (annual % change) 
Correlations 
S&P Global Equity CPI Score 
Indices (annual % 
change) 
S&P Global Equity Indices Pearson 1 .022 
(annual % change) Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .946 
N 15 12 
CPI Score Pearson .022 1 
Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) .946 
N 12 12 
The S&P's rating just before and just after Tl's CPI is released shows no change in the 
credit rating of Jamaica. To extrapolate and assess further the use of S&P's Global Equity 
Indices (annual % change)1 was used to see if, overall, on a yearly basis whether TPs CPI 
have any correlation with the change in credit ratings. Largely, using Table 5.4. above, 
1S&P Global Equity Indices measure the U.S. dollar price change in the stock markets covered by 
the S&P/IFC1 and S&P/Frontier BMI country indices. 
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the S&P's Global Equity Indices variable indicate that the correlation is not statistically 
significant p = .964; the small number of observations n = 12 indicates the statistical tests 
will have very large standard errors which make it unlikely to find significant effects. 
Figure 5.2 Trends between TPs CPI score and S&P's Global Equity Indices 
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Subsequently, Figure 5.2 above illustrates the trends in CPI score and S&P's 
Global Equity Indices annual % change. Bearing in mind that the lower the CPI score the 
more corrupt Jamaica is perceived to be, the highest CPI the country has ever scored is 
4,below the median on a scale of 1 to 10. The outlier in the chart is in seen in the years 
2003 to 2005 noting a drastic difference when the CPI scores and S&P's equity indices is 
observed. 
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The conclusion which can be drawn from die relationship between Tl's CPI and 
the S&P seems to indicate that the CPI does not have any impact as it relates to the 
publication of the CPI and the S&P's credit rating of J amaica one to two weeks prior or 
after the CPI is released. Furthermore, when the S&P's Global Equity Indices and Tl's 
CPI are assessed there is no significant correlation, hi this instance it cannot be inferred 
that Tl's CPI might have an impact on the S&P's Global Equity Indices. 
TI'S CPI AND BOND SPREADS 
Bonds are securities issued with a fixed rate of interest for a period of more than 
one year. They include net flows through cross-border public and publicly guaranteed 
and private nonguaranteed bond issues. Data are in current U.S. dollars.2 In simple terms, 
a bond, is an 'I owe you' in which an investor agrees to loan money to a company or 
government in exchange for a predetermined interest rate. "A bond spread is a direct 
measure of the cost of risk." Also explained as the difference between yield to maturity 
on a zero-coupon corporate bond (corporate spot rate) and the yield to maturity on a zero-
coupon government bond of the same maturity (government spot rate).4 The spread of 
bonds, especially in some developing countries, above those issued in developed 
countries reflects the higher default probability associated with many developing and or 
emerging market debt. For a developed economy other factors might be more important 
for investment. However, for developing countries like Jamaica, corruption perceptions 
2World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance 
3Fank K. Reilly et at, "An Analysis of Credit Risk Spreads for High Yield Bonds," Springer 
Science + Business Media, LLC (2010): 179. 
4Edwin J. Elton, et al "Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds," The Journal of Finance, 
Vol LVI.no. 1,(2001): 251. 
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might have a significant impact on the perceptions of an investment. Thus assessing the 
relationship between corruption perceptions and the perceived likelihood that a firm or 
government will default on its debt is relevant. Does TPs CP1 correlates with bond 
spreads for countries such as Jamaica who are perceived to be highly corrupt? Citing 
Ciocchini et al. 's argument that countries that are perceived as more corrupt must pay a 
higher risk premium when issuing bonds is relevant. Adding further, the global bond 
market ascribes a significant cost to corruption.3 
It is especially important in understanding how corruption affects bond spreads 
for reasons such as: first, "it contributes to one's understanding of what determines 
default probability in developing and emerging markets, a vital question in development 
finance."6 Most research on this question has generally focused on which macroeconomic 
factors contribute to the likelihood of sovereign default; with the crucial question being 
whether default risk arises from liquidity problems or insolvency. Thus, how important of 
a factor to default risk is corruption as measured through TI's CP! ranking in addition to 
those macroeconomic factors that have been identified? 
Second, "looking at corruption and spreads improves one's understanding of how 
corruption matters for economic growth."7 Does higher corruption increase borrowing 
costs on the international market for both the government and businesses in Jamaica? Is 
there any channel through which corruption lowers investment in Jamaica's market? And 
how does it help us to understand more about the costs of corruption? 
5 Fancisco Ciocchini. Erik Durbin, and David T.C. Ng. "Does corruption increase emerging 
market bond spreads?" Journal of Economics <£ Business 55 (2003): 504. 
f
'lbid. 
'Ibid. 
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Corruption can take many forms. Following TI's and other literature it has been 
defined broadly as the misuse of public office for private gain.8 Undoubtedly there are 
various ways that higher levels of corruption might lead to a higher likelihood of default. 
In the case of government debt, the impact of corruption is quite direct, in that, corrupt 
officials may confiscate loaned funds or other sources of government income and thereby 
limit the government's ability to meet debt obligations. Notwithstanding from direct 
theft, several researchers have shown that higher levels of corruption are associated with 
lower tax revenue, which would in turn lower the government's ability to repay loans.9 
Public corruption can harm the economy in a variety of ways. Using Gunnar Myrdal and 
Mauro's analyses it can be assessed from the view that bureaucrats may over-regulate to 
increase the opportunities to collect bribes, thereby reducing the incentive to invest and 
diminishing overall economic performance.10 
Subsequently, debt would be more costly for corrupt governments as the cost of 
government project(s) may be inflated if public corruption takes the form of kickbacks to 
the bureaucrat who awards the contract(s). Thus the more corrupt the government, the 
riskier is the debt it issues and the higher the premium the government must pay to 
borrow. As government debt is ultimately serviced through taxation, higher net interest 
8 See Transparency International; Susan Rose-Ackerman, "The Political Economy of Corruption," 
Chapter in Corruption and the Global Economy, 3 1-60, Institute for International Economics; Andrei 
Shleifer and Robert Vishney. "Corruption" Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 434 (August) 1993: 
599-617. 
9Nadeem UI Haque and RatnaSahay, "Do Government Wages Cuts Close Budget Deficits? The 
Cost of Corruption", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 43, no 4. (Jan., 1996): 754-778; Simon Johnson, Daniel 
Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," Presented at 
the 110 ,h Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, January 3-5 (1998); Also Vito Tanzi and 
Hamid Davoodi. "Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth," IMF Working Paper WP/97/139 (1997). 
10 Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1968); Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 681-
712. 
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costs impose an extra burden on a government's constituents, i.e.. a negative pecuniary 
externality is created by public corruption. 
For corporations, corruption may increase the likelihood of arbitrary government 
actions that reduce profits and leave the firm unable to repay loans. In the late 1990s 
when Jamaica had its financial crisis the government intervened and established 
FINSAC. In many instances private firms were taken over by the state and many resold 
when the owners could not repay their loans. Higher levels of corruption are also 
suggested as a correlating factor, which may lower the effectiveness of government 
services, making it even more difficult for firms to realize profits. In other cases 
corruption may reduce legal protection of bondholders. 
HQ: There is no correlation between TI's CPl and Jamaica bond spreads. 
HA: There is a strong positive correlation between TI's CPI and Jamaica's bond spreads. 
The model will assess the correlation between TI's CPI and bonds. For bonds, the 
variable 'portfolio investment, bonds (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US$)' will be used. 
Bonds are securities issued with a fixed rate of interest for a period of more than one 
year. They include net flows through cross-border public and publicly guaranteed and 
private nonguaranteed bond issues. This variable was selected over PPG bonds11, as it is 
more inclusive and it addresses both PPG and PNG type of bonds. Holding TI's CPI 
constant, 1 expect that when the CPI indicated increased corruption perceptions the 
'portfolio investment, bonds' would increase likewise. 
11 Public and publicly guaranteed debt from bonds that are either publicly issued or privately 
placed. Interest payments are actual amounts of interest paid by the borrower in foreign currency, goods, or 
services in the year specified. Data are in current U.S. dollars. World Development Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
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Table 5.5 R square of CPI and Portfolio Investments, bonds 
R" of CPI and Portfolio Investments, bonds 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
I ,597a .356 .195 522076016.137 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year, CPI Score 
With the CPI score and year held constant, as shown in Table 5.5 above, the adjusted R 
square of .195 indicates that TI's CPI accounts for 20% of Portfolio investments in 
Jamaica. Using Pearson's correlation, Table 5.6., shows the CPI score and 'portfolio 
investment bonds' of-.494, and p is .122 indicating that it is not statistically significant. 
However with the very few observations, n = 11, indicates a deficit in the data, hence one 
cannot claim with certainty that the reported Pearson's r is statistically different than 
zero. Hence, there is no correlation between the CPI score and portfolio investment, 
insofar as the very small sample on which the correlation coefficient is calculated. 
Table 5.6. CPI Score and Portfolio Investment, bonds 
Correlations 
Y ear CPI 
Score 
Portfolio investment, 
bonds (PPG + PNG) 
(NFL, current USS) 
Year Pearson 
Correlation 
I -.775" .635** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .008 
N 17 12 16 
CPI Score Pearson 
Correlation .775** 
1 -.494 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .122 
N 12 12 11 
Portfolio investment, bonds Pearson .635" -.494 1 
(PPG + PNG) (NFL, current Correlation 
USS) Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .122 
N 16 11 16 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Due to this problem with the limited observation there is a probability that it 
might have affected the findings; noting that with a smaller number of observation the 
standard errors will be large and therefore what is presented might lead to a type 11 error, 
as in, to find no effect when there might be some. 
Figure 5.3 CPI Rank and Portfolio Investments bonds 
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Additionally, Figure 5.3 above indicates a pattern with the portfolio investment, 
bonds and TI's CPI over the years. The trend seems to indicate that changes in Jamaica's 
rank on TI's CP! reflect changes in bond spreads. Nonetheless, the change outlier in the 
model is between 2007 and 2008 and subsequently, 2009 changes. The 2007 to 2008 
change could possibly be explained within the context of political changes at the 
domestic level. Additionally it can also be situated within international events, which 
transpired in the financial markets. Moreover, there is no one factor that caused and or 
influence change in the price of bonds spreads. 
TPS CPI AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 
There are a number of factors that influence the exchange rate of a country. 
Jamaica operates on a flexible exchange rate and it is not pegged to the US dollar. Tornell 
and Velasco argue "flexible rates impose more fiscal discipline because fixed rates shift 
the costs of deficits into the future and thus induce reckless fiscal policy. Exchange rate 
instability deters international trade, and only central banks can offset this by stabilizing 
exchange rates."12 Here an attempt is being made to assess the correlation between 
Jamaica's CPI rank and the country's exchange rate. Does TI's CPI lead to panic 
amongst speculators about the country's dollar? Since there are several factors that could 
affect the exchange rate of a country, assessing the correlation between Jamaica's 
exchange rate and TI's ranking will provide further analysis to test whether there are 
correlations between the changes in TI's ranking and the value of the Jamaican dollar. 
12 Aaron Tornell and Andres Velasco. "Fixed versus flexible Exchange Rates: Which Provides 
More Fiscal Discipline?," NBER Working Paper no.5108 May (1995). 
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Ho: There is no correlation between Jamaica's exchange rate and TI's CPI Rank. 
Ha: There is a strong positive correlation between Jamaica's exchange rate and TI's CPI 
rank. 
One of the problems in assessing the correlation with Jamaica's exchange rate and 
TI's CPI rank is that it can reflect changes in other country's corruption and policing 
efforts as much as it reflects Jamaica's effort. In that, Jamaica might fall in ranking with 
no real change in corruption if other countries become better at reducing their corruption 
perceptions. Thus, the ranking does not represent the true picture of corruption 
perceptions changes in Jamaica overtime. For this purpose, 1 will use changes in rank to 
assess the correlation between TI's CPI and Jamaica's exchange rate. Hence a '-3 
position' in the country's ranking would indicate an improvement, and a '+3 position' 
would indicate it fell in ranking. Therefore, when the CPI is published yearly does it 
correlate with changes in the Jamaican dollar exchange rate? As in, when the country 
improves in the ranking is there a correlation with the JMD. The premise for the 
correlation is the level of interconnectedness in the world's market and economy where 
the potential for a negative projection in one area might have an effect on other areas. 
The findings presented in Table 5.7., above are intriguing. Bearing in mind that: 
1) a 'minus position' on TI's ranking is favorable and indicates improvement compared 
to the year before. 2). a minus in the value change in Jamaican dollar (JMD) indicates the 
JMD has strengthened compared to the previous year. Based on the data the only year 
where there is a corresponding improvement in the CPI ranking and value in the JMD is 
2010. The CPI ranking improved from 99th ranking to 87th and the JMD strengthened by 
$3.75. Additionally, in spite of other years in which the CPI rank improved (2002*, 2005, 
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2006 and 201) compared to the previous year, 2010 is the only year in which the JMD 
made any gains in strengthening against the USD. 
Table 5.1. Jamaica's Exchange rate and CPI Rank 
Year CPI release dates CPI Rank Rank position 1 
yr later +/-
Forex day 
of release 
Value change in 
Forex 1 yr later 
1998 9/21/1998 49 36.69 
1999 10/25/1999 50 1 40.14 3.45 
2002 8/28/2002 45 -5* 48.86 8.72 
2003 10/7/2003 57 12 59.84 10.98 
2004 10/19/2004 74 17 61.79 1.95 
2005 10/17/2005 64 -10 63.52 1.73 
2006 11/6/2006 61 -3 66.53 . 3.01 
2007 9/11/2007 84 23 70.16 3.63 
2008 9/29/2008 96 12 72.56 2.4 
2009 11/17/2009 99 3 89.31 16.75 
2010 10/26/2010 87 -12 85.56 -3.75 
2011 11/24/2011 86 -1 86.71 1.15 
13 
Subsequently, when using the -3 (improvement) and +3 (worsen) difference in CPI 
ranking and exchange rate, in the years where the most improvement is made in the rank 
the corresponding changes in exchange rate is not significantly different except in one 
case from 2009 to 2010. For the year 2002 to 2003 the CPI rank worsens by 4 aggregated 
positions and the JMD correspondingly worsened by $10.98. Additionally, for 2003 to 
2004 when the CPI rank fell by 5.67 aggregated positions, the JMD only fell by $1.95. In 
2004 to 2005 when the ranking improved by 3.33 aggregated positions, the JMD 
ljThe year 2002 has an * because it is reflecting the change between 1999 and 2002. There were 
no ranking on TI's CPI for Jamaica for the years 2000 and 2001. Additionally, the Table commence at 
1998 in spite of TI's CPI start date of 1995 because Jamaica only started receiving a ranking on the CPI in 
1998. 
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weakened by $1.73. In the following year, 2006, when the CPI ranking improved an 
additional 1 aggregated position, the JMD weakened even further by $3.01. 
On the other hand when 2006 to 2007 is taken into account, the CPI ranking 
worsens by 7.67 aggregated positions and the JMD only depreciated by $3.63. 
Subsequently, for 2007 to 2008 when the CPI ranking worsens even further by an 
additional 4 aggregated positions the JMD depreciated by $2.40. For 2008 to 2009 when 
the CPI rank worsen by 1 aggregated position the JMD weaken by $16.75; the highest 
change in a 1 year period. 
Overall the aggregated position in regards to changes in T1 CPI rank does not 
correlate with changes in the value of the JMD for the corresponding period. In that, 
whether the CPI rank improves or worsen it generally does not correlate with the degree 
of change in the JMD. In fact the only year where an improvement in the country's 
ranking on the CPI and the JMD strengthening was 2010. In other years it did not matter 
whether the CPI rank improved or fell, the trend in the JMD value continued to weaken. 
Subsequently, while the value of the JMD depreciated every year minus 2010, the value 
change was significantly higher in some years compared to others. 
Conclusions 
As one of the most highly indebted countries in the world, ranked 7th in the world 
in public debt % of GDP; 157lh/210 in terms of national government revenues and 
expenditures, as a % of GDP; 84th/203 for external debt. A country whose import bill in 
2011 stood at $6, 356, 000,000 and exports at $1,650,000,000 ranked 115lh/221 in terms 
of imports and 145th/222 for exports in the world. The GDP- real growth rate placed it at 
171 th/216 at 1.50% for 2011.14 Jamaica has been burdened by heavy debt servicing costs 
due to both the size of its debt and very high interest rates. Jamaica is a country with a 
history of indebtedness, hence it can be safely estimated that due to the country's 
trajectory the market will and has already factored in the changes in the economy. 
Based on FDI inflow, bond rating, S&P's Credit Rating, and Exchange rate 
con-elation with TI's CPI there seems to indications that there is no significant 
correlation. Additionally, one should be cautious of the statistical tests as the limited 
observations n = 12 might enhance a type II error as indicated in the large standard errors. 
The deficiencies in the data are compounded by several factors; the CPI started in 1995, 
Jamaica's debut was 1998 and even then, there was no CPI for two years 2000 and 2001. 
Thus the limited amount of data might have some effect on the statistical findings. In 
light of the deficits in the data, such as very few observations and the lack of any 
statistical significance findings, it does not mean there are no correlations. It could 
possibly be explained that the findings do not rise to the level of statistical significance. 
While the analyses on world's economic responses do not rise to the level of 
statistical significance, perceptions are a powerful tool. The lack of data could also mean 
that while statistically there is no significant correlation, economic policymakers could 
very well be paying attention to the CPI. Noting that corruption is often regarded as an 
added cost to business and the competitiveness of the global economy drives firms in 
ventures where it is more profitable. Thus, if a country is perceived to be highly corrupt 
when compared to another, which of the countries compared is more attractive to 
i4A11 figures were taken from CIA World Factbook estimates, 
https://www.eia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html (accessed June 10, 2012). 
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investors? It is likely that the investor will venture to where he will get more return on his 
investments. 
In the following chapter 1 will assess Jamaica's reaction to the CPI and the extent 
to which policymakers pay attention to the CPI. Examine whether or not policies are 
drafted with the aim of improving the CPI score of the country and the possible effects of 
having a low CPI score. These and other issues will be addressed in the next chapter as it 
deals with Jamaican policymakers' reactions to TI. 
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CHAPTER VI 
JAMAICA'S POLICY RESPONSES TO TI'S CPI 
"The most important ingredient in the development of a nation is neither the 
amount nor the nature of foreign assistance. It is the will and commitment of the 
Government and people directly involved."1 (President Johnson) 
This chapter assesses Jamaica's policy responses to TI's CPI and what impact, if 
any, does Tl have on influencing policymakers and or development policies. In this 
chapter I will look at a number of areas to determine whether the Jamaican government 
responds to TL It is therefore hypothesized that the Jamaican government changes its 
policies in responses to the CPI. It would be a surprise to many Jamaicans to learn that on 
paper, Jamaica has one of the most vigorous set of anti-corruption laws of any country in 
the western hemisphere. The perception of corruption in Jamaica hits at the core of the 
society and several studies2 show evidence that corruption is perceived by citizens to be 
the biggest problem in Jamaica even though the country is struggling and grappling with 
one of the world's highest murder rates per capita. Jamaica is also perceived by TI as 
being highly corrupt. 
The responses to TI's CPI, to some extent, seem to vary between different 
branches of government and it might also be related to the specific bureaucrat at the helm 
of a specific sector. The Office of the Contractor General, under Greg Christie, in 
addition to the Anti-Corruption Branch, under Assistant Commissioner of Police Justin 
1 President Johnson, cited by David Brown, "The Key to Self-Help: Improving the Administrative 
Capabilities of the Aid-Receiving Countries," Public Administrative Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1964): 
67. 
2 See Lawrence Powell. Balford Lewis and Mitchell A. Seligson, The Political Culture of 
Democracy in Jamaica, 20JO Democralic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times. Centre for 
Leadership & Governance, University of the West Indies, Mona and Vanderbilt University, January 2011. 
See also Don Anderson 2008 and 2010 polls. 
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Felice, Mr. Leighton McKnight Chairman of the Audit Commission amongst other 
government officials have all espouse policies to reduce the perceptions of corruption in 
relation to TI's CPI. 
Jamaica is the largest English-speaking Caribbean country with a population of 
2.7 million.3 Jamaica relies heavily on development assistance from the international 
community. Accordingly, "Net official development assistance (ODA) to Jamaica in 
2009 totaled USD 150 million.4 Since 2005, net ODA has averaged 1% of GNI and 3% 
of central government expense.5 The top five donors provided 60% of Jamaica's core 
ODA.6 As the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes, 
Despite its rich natural assets and a period of robust development in mining, 
manufacturing, construction and tourism, the economy has in recent times 
experienced a prolonged period of negative growth, with a poverty rate of 16.5% 
in 2009 and an unemployment rate of 12.4% in 2010 (between 2007-10 there was 
a cumulative decline of 5.1%). The country was recently classified as an upper-
middle income country, but it remains highly indebted with a debt to GDP ratio of 
128%. (OECD, 2011) 
In spite of its many problems and issues, 
The country has made good progress in eight out of the fourteen MDG targets for 
2012. Jamaica has already achieved the targeted reduction in absolute poverty, 
malnutrition, hunger and universal primary enrolment, and is on track for 
combating HIV/AIDS, halting and reversing the incidence of malaria and 
tuberculosis, providing access to reproductive health, and providing safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation. (OECD, 2011) 
In a 2008 Don Anderson Poll, one of the most respected pollsters in Jamaica, 
Anderson stated that Jamaicans ranked "Too much corruption" as the "Main Thing 
''World Development Indicator, 2011. 
^Organization for Economic Corporation and Development, 2011. 
5World Development Indicators, 2011. 
''Organization for Economic Corporation and Development, 2011. 
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Wrong with Jamaica;" this being second only to "Too much crime and violence."7 In 
2010, in a "Most Negative Thing about Jamaica"8 Don Anderson Poll, corruption was 
viewed as the main "thing wrong" with the country; this was higher than public concerns 
such as breakdown in law and order, bad examples set by leaders, dishonesty in general, 
and crime and violence. The Don Anderson Polls, to a large extent, captured the general 
sentiment of the country. In general, it is not surprising that corruption is seen as the 
"main thing wrong with Jamaica" because, quite often, corruption leads to the 
perpetuation of other crimes. 
Figure 6.1 Showing Jamaica's GDP per capita 1995 — 2011 
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Jamaica, a country whose average GDP per capita from 1995-2010 has been 
$3850.30, (See Figure 6.1 above) is behind many of its Cai'ibbean and Latin American 
7 2008 Don Anderson Poll, "Main thing wrong with Jamaica," 
8 2010 Don Anderson Poll, "Most Negative thing about Jamaica," 
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neighbors (See Figure 6.2 below). In 2008 Jamaica had its highest GDP to date of 
$5301.08; in 2010 its GDP was $5274.62, an increase from $4664.97 in the previous year 
2009.9 
Figure 6.2 GDP per capita Jamaica and its Neighbors 
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Over recent decades Jamaica's has experienced a trend of little to negative 
economic growth, high inflation rates, weaker dollar, increased poverty, an increase in 
gangs, higher murder rates and illegal drug transshipments. Probably more importantly, 
Jamaica falls behind the rest of its peers in the Caribbean in a number of key areas. The 
painfully slow processing of persons charged with a crime might also be a factor in why 
9 World Development Indicators (WDI) & Global Development Finance (GDF) 
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the corruption perception is so high. Although Jamaica made key legislative gains by 
passing a number of bills in parliament, the justice system continues to lag behind in 
terms of efficiency. 
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Jamaica's ranking on TI's CPI has been below average and Jamaica has never 
received a score higher than 4 on TI's CPI (see Figure 6.3. above). Jamaica, when 
compared to its regional counterparts Barbados for example, is consistently rated more 
corrupt. In 2011 Barbados received a CPI of 7.8 with a ranking of 16 out of 180 countries 
and 2nd in the Americas while Jamaica received a CPI score of 3.3, ranked 86,h in the 
world and 17th in the Americas (see Figure 6.4 below). 
Figure 6.3. Jamaica's CPI Ranking from 1995-2011 
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Figure 6.4 CPI rank for Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago 1995-20 
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Over the 15 years of the publication of TI's CPI, Jamaica has scored an average of 
3.1 on TI's CPI. Figure 6.4 illustrates Jamaica's increased negative ranking on the CPI 
when compared to neighbors such as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. When one 
compares the corruption level and GDP of the three countries. Trinidad & Tobago, in 
spite of its high CPI, still maintains a GDP per capita on par with Barbados and in some 
years its GDP per capita is higher than Barbados. Jamaica, as both Figure 6.2 and 6.4 
shows, has a high CPI and a low GDP per capita. While Jamaica has been represented on 
TI's index since 1998 and Trinidad & Tobago in 2001 Barbados only appeared on TI's 
CPI in 2004. But Barbados has consistently maintained a low corruption rank 16 - 24; 
whereas Jamaica has moved from 49 - 99 and Trinidad & Tobago 31 - 91. 
Over several years Jamaican government administrations and different leaders 
have reiterated their strong sentiments on being tough on corruption, or at least have 
espoused their views on how they will govern once elected to reduce the perceptions of 
corruption of the country. Minister of Justice, Senator Mark Golding, is the latest 
government official to emphasize strong anti-corruption measures and policies for the 
country. While addressing an anti-corruption forum held on March 19, 2012, Golding, in 
explaining the position of the current People's National Party led Government, stated that 
the government is looking to create a single anti-corruption body. He explained that the 
agency would provide "a concentrated focus on the problem."10 Senator Golding further 
stated, "Jamaica's track record in enforcing the law to bring corrupt public servants to 
justice is not impressive. Corruption is still rampant as evidenced in instances where 
apparent malfeasances in high places receive press coverage, but instances of effective 
corrective action have been few and far between."11 The Minister of Justice expresses 
strong views on corruption, elaborating that, "corruption is the antithesis of a secure, 
cohesive and just society; it will negate the country's ability to attain its most desirable 
goals."12 Given his statement against corruption, assessing whether the People's National 
Party (PNP) government pays attention to TI's CPI will be of significance. 
Legislatively, over the years, the Jamaican government has made significant steps 
to deal with corruption. But if one were to account for every new bill passed in 
parliament and compare the timeline with the perceptions of corruption, it would appear 
that Jamaica takes two steps backward for each step forward in regards to the perceptions 
of corruption by citizens. Past US President Jimmy Carter's foreword for Fostering 
l0Minister of Justice, Senator Mark Golding. being quoted by Jamaica Information Service, "Gov't 
looking to Create Single Anti-Corruption Body," http://www.jis.gov.jm/news/109-justice/30111-govt-
looking-to-create-single-anti-corruption-body (accessed April 07. 2012). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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Transparency and Preventing Corruption in Jamaica (2002) noted, "Jamaica is leading 
the way with legislation that requires declaration of assets by Members of Parliament and 
civil servants, with the establishment of an anti-corruption, commission, and with 
proposed legislation to provide citizens with access to information."13 The extensive 
institutional and legal framework for fighting corruption in Jamaica has spanned almost 
forty years. The legal framework for fighting corruption, inhibiting the unjust enrichment 
of public officials, embraces a significant body of statutory and constitutional law 
provisions. Some of these include: 
(1) The Parliament (Integrity of Members) Act (1973) provides for the establishment 
of an Integrity Commission to investigate the assets, liabilities and income of 
Parliamentarians to determine, among other things, if they are enjoying any 
unexplained income which could be attributable to corruption. 
(2) The Contractor General Act (1983)provides for the establishment of an 
independent Commission of Parliament, to monitor and to investigate the award 
and implementation of Government contracts, and the issue of Government 
licences, with a view to ensuring that contracts are awarded, and licences are 
issued, impartially and on merit and in circumstances which do not involve 
impropriety or irregularity. 
(3) The Contractor General Act (1999)provides for the establishment of an 
independent National Contracts Commission (NCC) to evaluate and to register 
government contractors and to endorse all recommendations for the award of 
Government contracts which are $10 Million and over in value. 
(4) The Finance Administration and Audit Act (1959) impose responsibilities upon 
the Financial Secretary, the Auditor General and the Accounting and Accountable 
Officers of Public Bodies, to secure public funds from irregular, improper and 
illegal expenditure. 
(5) The Representation of the Peoples Act (1944) seeks to prohibit corrupt and illegal 
practices in the conduct of political elections. 
(6) The Constitution of Jamaica (Sections 40, 41, 94 to 96) requires Members of 
Parliament to secure a Parliamentary exemption in respect of any interest which 
they have in a Government contract, failing which their seats are liable to be 
declared vacant. And make provision for the establishment of an Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, who is vested with the independent authority to 
commence and to terminate criminal prosecution proceedings at his or her own 
discretion. 
13 President Jimmy Carter. Foreword in Fostering Transparency and Preventing Corruption in 
Jamaica, edited by Laura Neuman, The Carter Center, February 2002. p5. 
157 
(7) The Access to information Act (2002) seeks to prohibit corruption in Government 
by facilitating access to certain Government documents, thereby ensuring 
transparency and accountability in Government. 
(8) The Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act (2001) seek to ensure 
minimum standards in the audits and reporting of accounts of certain Public 
Bodies and to impose upon the Boards of Directors of Statutory Corporations, 
certain fiduciary and statutory duties of care. 
(9) The Corruption (Prevention) Act (2001) gives effect to the 1996 Inter-American 
Convention against Corruption and seeks, among other things, to prohibit and 
criminalize corruption by public servants. Public servants, earning $2 Million or 
above per annum, are required by this Act to declare, each year their assets, 
income and liabilities, together with that of their spouses and children. The Act 
also provides for several definitions of an "act of corruption", inclusive of bribery, 
transnational bribery and "illicit enrichment". 
(10) Other Crime Related Anti-Corruption Laws and Institutions include: 
(a) The 2007 Proceeds of Crime Act - which deals with money laundering and 
makes provision for the forfeiture of assets and the proceeds of certain unlawful 
activities; 
(b) The Anti-Corruption Division of the Jamaica Constabulary Force; 
(c) The Financial Crimes Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Finance.14 
These legislations highlight that Jamaica has been doing significant work in regards to 
enacting laws to reform government sectors and reduce corruption in all sectors of 
government. Legislatively, these Acts seem to be created to combat corruption but quite 
i 
often when legislations are passed they come without the requisite tools and support 
granted to law enforcement agencies to effectively implement the legislations. Thus being 
strong on corruption at the legislative level without ample resources budgeted to enforce 
the laws can be interpreted as only addressing the perceptions of being strong on 
corruption reform but not being on enforcement. 
14 Greg Christie, "Corruption and its Threat to Value Creation in Jamaica: Creating Value through 
Vision, Human Capital and Innovation" (14 ,h Annual School of Business Administration, University of 
Technology, Jamaica, Students' Conference. Jamaica Conference Centre, April 6, 2009). 
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JAMAICAN POLICYMAKERS' REACTIONS TO TI 
Policymakers in Jamaica include government officials and civil servants in 
Ministries and agencies. This is not limited to merely elected officials, even though 
parliamentary bodies, i.e.. Members of Parliaments and Senators, will indeed be a focus. 
Additionally, attention will also be placed to senior officials within different government 
Ministries and some of the agencies whose officials are in charge of key sectors regarding 
the economic, poli tical and social development of the country. 
Yearly, when TPs index is published, many countries in various sections of the 
world react differently to the index. As it so happens there is evidence from as early as 
1999 when the Jamaica Gleaner, Jamaica's largest newspaper, ran as its 15th November 
1999 headline "Transparency International Lashed."15 The accompanying story reports 
that the Manchester Parish Council16 has criticized TI. Accordingly, Councillor Gentles 
referred to TI as, "the organization that recently tagged Jamaica as being high in the 
ranking among those countries which are perceived to be corrupt."17 The report indicates 
that "Supported by fellow Councillors, both PNP and JLP, Councillor Errol Gentles of 
the Walderston Division told the Council that Transparency International was damaging 
the good name of Jamaica without any evidence to support its claim."18 Gentles, who is 
also an Attorney-at-law. was quoted as saying, "It would be naive for anyone to think 
there was no corruption in the Jamaican communities, be it government or the private 
15 The Jamaica Gleaner , "Transparency International lashed", Jamaica Gleaner, November 15. 
1999 http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/19991115Zf2.html (accessed April 06, 2012). 
I6A Parish Council is an elected local government authority dealing with issues as it relates to a 
particular parish (state). 
17 The Jamaica Gleaner, November 15, 1999. 
18 Emphasis added, The Jamaica Gleaner, Transparency International lashed," Jamaica Gleaner 
November 15, 1999 http://iamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/19991115/f2.html (accessed April 06, 2012). 
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sector,"19 and "However, to label the country as high on the list of corrupt nations 
without any empirical evidence was not acceptable."20 In addition Gentles note, "The 
claim by Transparency International was offensive to the name and reputation of 
Jamaica, and questioned the 'motive' of the group."21 As stated by Gentles, "the fact that 
the government has enacted legislation to deal with corruption and is party to the 
international convention against corruption, it should be clear that it intends to enforce 
strong measures against improprieties in governance."22 
While Gentles was a government official at the local level of government, it 
should be noted that as early as 1999 in the rural parish of Manchester, its council 
members were paying attention to TFs CPI and the potential impact it will have on the 
country's image. After Gentles' presentation, the Jamaica Gleaner reports, "the Council 
passed a resolution calling on government to take all available legal measures to remove 
what it termed the 'perception' of corruption as the norm in the running of the country's 
affairs."23 In addition, "The Council, also by resolution, called on Prime Minister P.J. 
Patterson to revisit the contractual arrangement with highly paid officers of government 
who were 'perceived' by many to be receiving 'extravagant and unreasonable 
emoluments'."24 In a move to affect the seeming perception of corruption the Councillors 
proposed the following recommendation: "in light of the state of the country's economy 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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government should examine the terms and conditions of the engagement of each of the 
officers involved in a recently published salary figures with a view to negotiate the terms 
of their employment."25 It makes an interesting comparison that in 1999 Jamaica had a 
CPI of 3.8 and ranked at 50lh out of 99 countries compared to the 2011 CPI where 
Jamaica is ranked 86lh with a CPI of 3.3; a significant decline compared to when Gentles 
articulated his position. 
Notwithstanding, a decade later, on November 17, 2009, the Office of the 
Contractor-General (OCG) issued a media release, "Transparency International 
Downgrades Jamaica on Global Corruption Perceptions Index—News comes as no 
Surprise to the OCG."26 The OCG notes that for the third consecutive year Jamaica had 
been downgraded; 
Jamaica's consistent decline in TI's Annual Corruption Perceptions Index ratings 
over the past three years comes as no surprise to the Office of the Contractor 
General. It is the OCG's considered view that enough is not being done by the 
State and, in particular, by the Cabinet and the Parliament of Jamaica, to 
aggressively, proactively and decisively combat corruption within its borders. 
(Office of the Contractor General, Nov. 2009) 
Greg Christie's 2009 Media Release in reaction to Jamaica's ranking on the CPI suggests 
disagreement among actors in Jamaica as it regards combating corruption. To some 
extent this comes as no surprise as different government ministries and agencies are 
focused on different goals. The OCG for one has been praised and criticized equally for 
its heavy-handed approach when it comes on to allegations of corruption and 
25 Ibid. 
26 Office of the Contractor-General, Media Release, "Transparency International Downgrades 
Jamaica on Global Corruption Perceptions index—News Comes as no Surprise to the OCG" November 17, 
2009. 
investigating individuals for allegedly corrupt or irregular activities regarding 
government contracts. 
In Jamaica some government agencies; for instance the OCG, the Audit 
Commission and the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Jamaica Constabulary Force, pay 
closer attention to TI's CPI than others. There is no single cause why these agencies pay 
closer attention to TI's CPI than others. Nonetheless, some factors which can possibly 
account for this phenomenon are: the actual head of the agencies, the area of focus, and 
resources allocated to these agencies. 
In addressing one way in which to improve the perceptions score of the country, 
Chairman of the Audit Commission27 Leighton McKnight, has said, "Jamaica's ranking 
in the Corruption Perceptions Index for the 2006/07 fiscal year could improve, if all audit 
committees in state agencies became operational by year-end."28 Mr. McKnight in 
elaborating areas of improvement, made noted, "Eighty-five per cent of government 
ministries, departments and executive agencies have established audit committees, up 
from 25 per cent in September. To date, approximately 27 out of a possible 32 ministries, 
agencies and government departments have established audit committees."29 McKnight, 
in answering questions as it pertains to Jamaica's 2005 CPI ranking of 64th out of 158 
countries, was quoted as saying "many times, international bodies come to Jamaica to 
27 The Audit Commission operates as an oversight body for audit committees. When it was 
established in April 2005. it began to advise all government ministries, departments and executive agencies 
to take the necessary steps to ensure that audit committees were in place by April 2006 and that they were 
operating efficiently. 
Leighton McKnight, Chairman of the Audit Commission being quoted by Jamaica Information 
Service. "Govt. Puts Measures in Place to Fight Corruption," 04 November 2005, 
http://www.jis.gov.im/news/l 04-finance-public-service/7253-finance_plannin»-govt-puts-measures-in-
plaee-to-fight-corruption (accessed April 07, 2012). 
29 Ibid. 
evaluate and conduct interviews to assess what procedures we have or do not have in 
place."30 To which he elaborated more and maintained, "It is another thing to have 
effective committees. If these and other initiatives are implemented and monitored 
consistently, Jamaica's ranking ought to improve where corruption perception is 
concerned."31 It is evident that the Chairman of the Audit Commission is espousing ways 
and means by which Jamaica could improve its ranking on TI's CPI. It is also important 
to assess the ways in which he articulated steps the government can take to improve its 
CPI. 
On March 4, 2011, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) published a key 
strategy document titled, A Growth Inducement Strategy for Jamaica in the Short-and 
Medium-Term,32 This document establishes a strategic framework for robust economic 
growth aligned with Jamaica's National Development Plan, Vision 2030, and it does pay 
attention to Jamaica's ranking on TI's CPI. hi assessing Jamaica's overall competitive 
standing in the world economy, the Inducement Strategy used three sets of international 
indicators: Global Competitiveness Index (GC1), Doing Business Index (DBI) and 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI).33 In its presentation of Jamaica's competitiveness the 
strategy document notes: 
From these three indices, it appears that Jamaica ranks relatively far behind the 
leaders, both in the subgroup of selected economies and in the full group of 
economies. Within the full group, it falls well below the median, by 25 slots on 
GCI, and by 10 slots on the CPI. It does relatively better on the DBI (1.7 slots 
above the median); but still remains far behind at the 75th position. (PIOJ 2011, 
119) 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
j2 Planning Institute of Jamaica, A Growth Inducement Strategy for Jamaica in the Short-and 
Medium-Term. (Kingston: Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2011). 119. 
33 Ibid. 
163 
The strategy document also found that "these findings could be considered to raise an 
alert and cause concern regarding the current status of the Jamaican economy in the 
international arena. They have served to raise alarm in some quarters."34 Certainly, they 
must be taken to indicate that Jamaica still has a far way to go and a difficult road ahead 
if the national goal is "to reach development country status by the year 2030, as declared 
in the Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan."3;) This is significant as the 
PIOJ, which produces both short and long term development plans for Jamaica, uses TI's 
CP1 with other international rating agencies to create development policies for the 
country. 
Further examples illustrating that the Jamaican government pays attention to TI's 
CPI are: the reasons cited by the head of the Executive Agencies monitoring unit of the 
Public Expenditure Policy Division in the Ministry of Finance and Planning to host a 
corporate governance symposium on February 15, 2012. The Jamaica Information 
Service reports that, "Owen McKnight, head of the unit, explained that the event is being 
organized because of the emerging trends in the world and because of Jamaica's rating on 
Transparency International's list."36 The target group for the symposium includes chief 
executive officers, chief internal auditors, chairpersons and members of audit committees 
as well as directors of finance in executive agencies. McKnight was also quoted as 
saying, "What we have seen happening, for example in Liberia and in South Africa where 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Mr. Owen McKnight, Head of the Executive Agencies monitoring unit of the Public 
Expenditure Policy Division in the Ministry of Finance and Planning, quoted by Jamaica Information 
Service, "Finance Ministry to Host Corporate Governance Symposium February I 5" February 14, 2006, 
http://www.iis.gov.im/news/104-finance-public-service/8056-finance planning-finanee-ministrv-
to-host-corpora te-governance-symposium-feb-15 (accessed April 06, 2012). 
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the former Deputy President has been removed and also current happenings in Trinidad, 
we find that it is important to sensitize our personnel, especially those in Executive 
Agencies."37 
Not only does the Jamaican government respond to Tl, but different government 
executives have demonstrated a concerted effort to address the country's ranking on TI's 
index and how to address the perceptions of not only corruption within the country but 
also in light of how other countries are dealing with corruption. McKnight, in stressing 
the importance of the symposium indicated that, "Based on the recent Auditor General's 
report, participants need to be made more aware of their responsibilities to the citizens of 
Jamaica. They will benefit greatly as well from increased consciousness because often it 
is said that if there was not so much waste in the public sector, then the government 
would not need to borrow as much."38 With Jamaica's continued low ranking on TI's CPI 
McKnight's emphasis that, "We just want to bring it home to them, their responsibilities 
T Q 
to give citizens value for money," which is one of the key pillars of TI's quest for 
transparency and accountability within countries and especially in countries seen as 
highly corrupt. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39Mr. McKnight emphasized that the speakers will cover topics such as the role of corporate 
governance in ensuring the three Es - Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness - the responsibility of the 
Government sector in facilitating the way forward; and accountability, probity and transparency - principles 
and practices. Among the line-up of speakers to address the symposium are, State Minister in the Ministry 
of Finance and Planning, Fitz Jackson; Financial Secretary, Colin Bullock: Technical Advisor on Corporate 
Governance, Vindel Kerr; Chairman of the Audit Commission, Leighton McKnight; and Deputy Financial 
Secretary of the Public Enterprise Division, Ann-Marie Rhoden 
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On September 27, 2007 the Jamaica Gleaner, ran a headline, "Jamaica more 
coiTupts—Falls 23 places on International Perception Index."40 This has led to some 
speculation that "the Trafigura41 debacle, which engulfed the then People's National 
Party (PNP) administration, may have had an impact on the present status."42 Derrick 
Smith, Minister of National Security, in a response to the Gleaner report noted, "the new 
administration's promise to appoint a Prosecutor General to probe acts of corruption is 
still on track."43 Additionally, Minister Smith note, "We are now looking at it. 
formulating it, the Prime Minister has had discussions regarding it"... "It is a firm 
commitment from the government; it is firmly on the agenda."44 Beth Aub, former 
general secretary of the Jamaican Chapter of T1 noted, 
Trafigura was a big thing, Trafigura was an international thing ... it was not 
transparent; we still don't know what happened. If businessmen are reporting that 
they have to pay bribe money and they do, large companies will go to other 
countries where they know their expenses upfront and they don't have to pay for 
security because of a high crime rate, we keep going down every year because the 
government and elsewhere is not any more transparent.45 
40 Mark Beckford, "Jamaica more corrupt - Falls 23 places on International Perception Index." 
Jamaica Gleaner September 27, 2007. httD://iamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070927/lead/leadl .html 
(accessed April 06, 2012). 
4]  
Trafigura Beheer, the oil lifting company based in the Netherlands, caused outcry in Jamaica 
after it was discovered that they had given the PNP, then in government, a S31 million donation. The 
money was reportedly returned, several commentators had suggested the contribution gave a perception of 
corruption. 
42 Beckford, Jamaica Gleaner, Sept. 27, 2007. "Jamaica more corrupt - Falls 23 places on 
International Perception Index," September 27, 2007 http://iamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/2007Q927/lead/leadl .html 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Beth Aub, former general secretary of the Jamaican Chapter of TI being quoted Mark Beckford, 
"Jamaica more corrupt - Falls 23 places on International Perception Index," Jamaica Gleaner, September 
27, 2007 http://iamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20Q70927/lead/lead1 .html 
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It must be pointed out that the Special Prosecutor which, then, Minister of National 
Security Derrick Smith made mention of, is yet to be appointed. 
Transparency International is used to getting invitations from different 
government bodies and civil society groups from around the world to visit their countries. 
At the invitation of Professor and Former Senator, Trevor Munroe, Chair of the National 
Integrity Action Forum (NIAF) of Jamaica, two officials of TI Alejandro Salas, Director 
of the Americas department, and Zoe Reiter, Program Coordinator of the Americas 
Department, earned out a field mission to Kingston, Jamaica in September 15-20, 2009. 
In TI's report of the visit the two key components of the mission were stated as being: "1) 
a one-hour presentation by Alejandro Salas to the NIAF on September 1.7th, outlining 
both key corruption challenges in Latin America and 2) TI's bilateral meetings with key 
reformers in the country, private sector leaders, as well as international organizations 
working in the country."46 What is probably the most interesting aspect of TI's visit to 
Jamaica is that Tl representatives met with a broad cross-section of the Jamaican society; 
including individuals from the private and public sectors, as well as representatives from 
the civil society. 
In its Appendix A of the 2009 visit report it showed TI representatives met with 
the President of the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica, (PSOJ), Mr. Joseph Matalon, 
The Commissioner of Customs; Mr. Danville Walker, The Contractor General; Mr. Greg 
Christie, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Jamaica; Professor Errol Miller, 
Civil society group Jamaicans for Justice; Dr. Carolyn Gomes, the British High 
Commissioner for Jamaica; Jeremy Cresswell, US AID Deputy Director Sean Osner and 
46 Transparency International Department of the Americas, "Report on Visit to Jamaica," 
September 15-20, 2009. 
USAID/COMET Civil Society Specialist Sherine McKenzie. As TI states, "the meetings 
with key reformers in Jamaica consistently highlighted several key issues facing the 
country that weaken good governance."47 Of the issues, the two most urgent issues 
discussed were: "extensive drug and arms trading and associated gang operations which 
fuels corruption (through bribery, extortion, payoffs, etc.) and insecurity; and lack of 
transparency and accountability in political finance, which facilitates influence peddling 
by elites and corrupt economic interests."48 These conditions when combined, according 
to TI "suggest a clear and present danger of state capture49 in the country".... in addition 
"the extra burden of paying bribes, which amounts to a 'corruption tax,' affects major 
investment and hinders economic development."50 Significant is the meeting with the 
Contractor General Mr. Greg Christie whose office has repeatedly made reference to TI's 
CP1 as it regards Jamaica's rank but also ways in which Jamaica can improve its CP1 
score. The meetings and the different level of government and private officials who met 
with TI shows that TI matters as key policymakers are not only paying attention to 
Jamaica's ranking on TI's CPI but they are also indicating their willingness to 
incorporate TI's recommendations to improve Jamaica's CPI score. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 State capture, as defined by TI is a situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies 
or groups within or outside a country use corruption to shape a nation's policies, legal environment and 
economy to benefit their own private interests. 
50 Ibid 
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THE OFFICE OF THE CONTRACTOR GENERAL (OCG) 
The OCG, especially in the last six years, has shown a marked improvement in 
focusing on corruption and paying particular attention to perceptions of corruption in 
Jamaica. Of the government bodies, aside from the legislative, judiciary and executive 
arm of government, the office of the Contractor General is one of the most significant 
public sector offices in Jamaica. The mission statement of the OCG below gives some 
significance on the level of importance of this office: 
"The Mission of the Office of the Contractor General is to effectively discharge 
the requirements of the Contractor-General Act and, in so doing, to: 
1. Monitor and investigate the award and implementation of contracts, licences, 
permits, concessions and the divestment of government assets; 
2. Improve and make fair and equitable the system of awarding contracts, 
licences, permits, concessions and the divestment of government assets; 
3. Ensure that all public sector agencies give the widest possible opportunity to 
qualified persons to bid for contracts and divestments or to apply for licences 
and permits; 
4. Create a positive image of the public procurement process by promoting 
integrity, professionalism, transparency, efficiency and, in so doing, to thereby 
engender public confidence."51 
Since 2005 the significance of this office has improved; especially after Greg 
Christie was appointed Contractor General. Since then the visibility of the OCG has 
become more pronounced. This has resulted in more awareness of corruption in 
government entities. But it has also forced government offices, boards, businesses and 
individuals dealing with government contracts to be more diligent in their operations. The 
OCG under Christie's tenure has increased the transparency of government contract 
procurement procedures significantly more than what existed before. The level of media 
releases and reports from the OCG has increased tremendously. While many of the 
recommendations have not been implemented the shortfall can be attributed to the 
31 Office of the Contractor General Jamaica, "Mission Statement," 
http://www.ocg.gov.im/ocg/mission statement.php (accessed April 17, 2012) 
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tardiness of the legislative branch of government in addition to the perceived or perhaps 
inherent weaknesses in the judicial process. 
Perceptions are important and when the judicial system is perceived to be corrupt, 
incompetent, weak, or lacking resources it affects the integrity of the system. In Jamaica, 
there is a perception of a lack of justice. Even in the event that an individual is charged 
with corruption there is likelihood that the case will never reach the prosecution stage or 
that it will take a significant number of years to be either mentioned or resolved resulting 
in a lack of faith in the justice system. The Kern Spencer Light Bulb Case52 readily 
comes to mind. 
On February 26, 2008 Kern Spencer, a sitting member of Parliament, was arrested 
and charged with: three charges of conspiracy to defraud, one charge for 
breaching the Prevention of Corruption Act, and three charges for breaching the 
Money Laundering Act. This was as a result of the Special Investigation 
conducted by the OCG. The Office of the Contractor General (OCG) concluded 
its Special Investigation into the 4M Energy Saving and Light Bulb Distribution 
Project in February 2008. Pursuant to the provisions which are contained in 
Section 28 (2) and Section 21 of the Contractor General Act, hard copies of the 
Report were formally conveyed by the Contractor General to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate on February 4, 2008, 
with a request that they be tabled in both Houses of Parliament "as soon as 
possible" in keeping with the requirements of Section 28 (3) of the Act. (Office of 
the Contractor General, 4MLight Bulb Report, Feb., 2008) 
Four years later the case is seemingly no closer to being resolved than when it initially 
started. As I have described earlier, Jamaica's legislation in regards to corruption is one 
of the most vigorous in the Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, the practice has not caught 
up with the theory as the judicial system is in need of serious reform. The perceived 
tardiness or deficiencies that are obstructing the Office of the DPP need to be addressed. 
32 For more information on the 4M Kern Spencer Light Bulb Case, see Office of the Contractor 
General, "OCG Special Investigations" http://www.ocg.gov.im/ocg/contracts_investigated.php (accessed 
April 12, 2012). 
170 
To give credit to the Jamaican government, they have articulated that they are creating a 
Special Prosecutor Bill. "The OCG has also consistently expressed the view that the 
Special Prosecutor Bill, which was introduced before Parliament by the former Jamaica 
Labour Party (JLP) Administration, did not go far enough to seriously address Jamaica's 
corruption woes."53 A strong and pointed criticism why the OCG criticized the Special 
Prosecutor Bill as not going far enough is predicated on the fact that, "As conceptualized, 
the Bill excluded the OCG from its purview, despite the fact that it is universally 
recognized that the largest opportunity that exists, in monetary terms, for corruption in 
any country, lies in the illicit manipulation of the award of Government contracts and the 
divestment of lucrative State assets."54 
Subsequently the CG who actively pays attention to TI, has advocated, since 
March 2010, for the establishment of the Single Independent Anti-Corruption State 
Agency for Jamaica. This agency would consolidate the functions of the Integrity 
Commission, the Corruption Prevention Commission and the OCG, and to vest in that 
Agency the mandate, among other things, to criminally investigate and to independently 
prosecute all corruption and related criminal offences. Christie, again, reiterating that 
Jamaica has been consistently ranked by TI, as one of the most corruption countries in the 
world, welcomed the government's commitment, to pass legislation during the current 
legislative year to "rationalize Jamaica's institutional arrangements for fighting 
corruption, by consolidating them under a single anti-corruption agency having strong 
53 OCG, "OCG Welcomes Government's Commitment to Establish Single Anti-Corruption 
Agency in Current Legislative Year," Media Release, May 11, 2012. 
54 Ibid. 
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powers." Christie in commending the current government for its commitment to create 
the agency noted: 
Although the details of what the Agency will look like are yet to be disclosed, the 
OCG, nevertheless, believes that the Portia Simpson-Miller Administration must 
be commended for the bold and decisive step that it has taken to come to grips, 
once and for all, with Jamaica's pervasive problem. (Contractor General, Greg 
Christie, 2012) 
An important and much needed caveat, the explicit provisions to prevent the abuse of the 
authority of the Agency. "The Agency and its leadership should be subjected to certain 
institutional checks and balances, inclusive of appropriate recall mechanisms for the 
leadership of the Agency, to ensure the Agency's operational probity, accountability, 
efficiency and effectiveness."55 This caveat is pivotal as the personality of the leaders of 
other government agencies have been instrumental in the framework, level and quality of 
work produced by that institution. 
The OCG is tasked with a large mandate and Mr. Greg Christie, the Contractor 
General since 2005, is often revered as one of the most vocal public servants fighting 
corruption in Jamaica. Since taking office Christie has made a series of recommendations 
in reforming the procurement process and ways in which to reduce corruption in Jamaica. 
Based on numerous speeches, reports and presentations it is obvious that Christie pays 
attention to TI's CPI. The change in the OCG's yearly reports since Christie has been the 
Contractor General shows a clear difference in the presentation and reporting on 
corruption. A key difference is in the OCG's Annual Reports from 2008-2010 where 
reference is made to TI's CPI. These extensively detailed reports also published TI's CP! 
of Jamaica and Jamaica's rank relative to its neighbors. The changes in the format of the 
55 Ibid 
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OCG Annual Reports largely reflect a policy change in the increased focus on details 
under Christie's leadership compared to previous Contractor Generals. 
The OCG's 2009 Media Release56 explained Jamaica's downgrade and came as 
no surprise. In the OCG's 2008 Annual Report to the Parliament of Jamaica, which was 
tabled in the House of Representatives in September 2009, Christie spoke specifically to 
the issue: 
The great majority of the several recommendations which were made by the OCG 
during 2008, in its Special Reports to Parliament, together with those which have 
been repeatedly made over the preceding two and one-half years, have, for the 
most part, gathered dust. (OCG, Media Release, Nov. 2009) 
The release further extrapolated and presented that, 
If the OCG's many recommendations over the past two decades were given 
priority attention and speedily and comprehensively implemented, I daresay that 
much would have already been gained in combating, reducing and even 
eliminating corruption and the repeated breaches of the Government Procurement 
Rules, and related legislation, which have become so commonplace in the Public 
Sector and which continue to cost the Jamaican Taxpayers millions, if not 
billions, of dollars each year. (OCG, Media Release, Nov.2009) 
Additionally, 
Some of the referenced OCG Recommendations have been repeated ad infinitum 
and ad nauseam, but to no avail. In several investigations, whilst the fact 
circumstances and/or allegations may change, the same types of failures and/or 
breakdowns in compliance levels, probity, accountability and transparency in 
Government contracting are too often evident. (OCG, Media Release, Nov. 2009) 
Clearly, these positions postulated by the OCG demonstrate a few points; Jamaica pays 
attention to its rank on the CPI, but it also shows that while the OCG has been forward 
thinking, productive and recommending policies they are not being incorporated. Thus 
when Jamaica has been downgraded yet again by TI, it comes as no surprise to the OCG 
56 Office of the Contractor-General, Media Release, "Transparency International Downgrades 
Jamaica on Global Corruption Perceptions index—News Comes as no Surprise to the OCG" November 17, 
2009 
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as the Jamaican government has illustrated that it is dragging its feet. There are sufficient 
policy reforms being recommended to reduce the perceptions of corruption, but 
implementation has been slow. 
The OCG, in responding to TI's 2011 CPI issued a press release, "The Perception 
of Corruption in Jamaica Remains Unchanged—Transparency International Scores 
Jamaica at 3.3 out of 10 in its 2011 CPI Ratings."57 As Christie states, 
It should now be abundantly clear to all Jamaicans that unless they demand 
monumental changes in the country's existing moral, ethical and legal anti-
corruption codes, and in its approach to the con-joint issues of transparency, 
accountability and good governance in the administration of the affairs of the 
Jamaican State, ten (10) years from now we will still be at the same place, talking 
about the same things." (OCG Media Release, 2011) 
He added that, 
The time has long passed for those who aspire to lead the Jamaican State to go 
beyond making mere lip-service statements about their intention to fight 
corruption. They must publicly state in lucid and specific terms, the practical step-
changes that they are prepared to take to effectively bring an end to corruption in 
Jamaica, and the respective time-frames within which these steps will be 
implemented. The question of what is in the best interest of Jamaica as opposed to 
what is politically expedient, must be the common thread that defines all such 
proposed anti-corruption measures. (OCG, Media Release, 2011) 
Trinidad and Guyana were the only English speaking Caribbean countries that were 
ranked lower than Jamaica, Trinidad with a CPI of 3.2 and ranked 91 and Guyana 2.5 
with a ranking of 134. 
37 OCG, Media Release, "The Perception of Corruption in Jamaica Remains Unchanged— 
Transparency International Scores Jamaica at 3.3 out of 10 in its 2011 CPI Ratings. 
174 
The Global Ramifications of Corruption 
The OCG, which has been at the vanguard of corruption reform in the last few 
years, has made numerous recommendations to reduce corruption in Jamaica. By all 
accounts, corruption is one of the most frightening and ominous threats that Jamaica 
faces. Specifically, corruption impedes Jamaica from achieving sustained economic 
growth and development. But clarifying, 
Corruption is not a scourge that is confined to Jamaica, or to the Caribbean alone. 
It is a global concern if only because there is abundant evidence that it has the 
capacity to undermine democracy, stability and the rule of law, as well as to drive 
fragile countries towards state capture or state failure. Indeed, the cancerous and 
corrosive impact of corruption is alarmingly horrendous and devastating in its 
reach.58 
In the "Special Report of Investigation into the Mabey and Johnson Corruption 
Allegations,"59 which was tabled in Parliament in October 2009, the Contractor General 
directed the country's attention to the need for the State to act urgently and decisively in 
the matter. The Mabey and Johnson case is important, as it is two-fold as it relates to 
corruption perceptions. It address how a government official could be easily bribed by a 
foreign entity but it also speaks to the supply side of corruption which TI's CPI does not 
take into consideration when it rank countries corruption perceptions level. The supply 
side of corruption is important in that, while there are receivers of corrupt acts, the other 
player is just as important. It is probably more important as many international 
corporations which are embroiled in corruption scandals overseas, Jamaica and 
Greg Christie, Contractor General. "The Need for Political Will and Effective Law Enforcement 
in the Fight against Corruption in Regional Jurisdictions - Jamaica Case Study: Proposal for a Single 
Independent National Anti-Corruption Agency" March 23. 2011. 
59 The Mabey and Johnson Corruption allegation case involved Joseph Hibbert, junior transport 
and works minister, Hibbert was chief technical director in the Ministry of Transport and Works in the 
1990s, the period that the UK firm allegedly paid the bribe. 
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elsewhere, would not engage in the same business practices in their own countries as the 
repercussion would be severe. 
In 2009, Mabey and Johnson pleaded guilty to 10 charges of corruption relating to 
contracts in Jamaica, Ghana and Iraq and for breaching UN sanctions. The corruption 
charges were related to contracts obtained by the company in Jamaica and Ghana. The 
sanction charges related to accusations in the UN Volcker report that Mabey paid a 
US$200,000 kickback to the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq between 2001 and 2003 in 
return for a US$3.6-million bridge contract.60 
The OCG's 2009 media release in response to TI's CPI promoted three specific 
recommendations made in light of the Special Report of Investigation into the Mabey and 
Johnson Corruption Allegations: 
1. The OCG believes that the time has also come for the Parliament of Jamaica 
to urgently examine its current anti-corruption institutional and legislative 
framework with a view to (a) insulating the State's anti-corruption institutions 
from any possible interference, obstruction or direction from the Executive 
arm of the State and, (b) significantly strengthening the capacity of the 
institutional framework in a deliberate effort to substantially enhance its 
effectiveness in the fight against the scourge of corruption. 
2. The OCG also recommends that Parliament should review its anti-corruption 
legislation to ensure, inter alia, that the existing sanctions are adequate, 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive in nature. Where necessary, the 
implementation of new and more severe sanctions, which should include the 
seizure or confiscation of bribes and the proceeds of acts of corruption, in 
addition to other powerful punitive criminal sanctions, must be given strong 
consideration. 
3. Additionally, the OCG recommend that the Corruption Prevention 
Commission should take a more proactive and aggressive approach in (a) the 
investigation of matters involving alleged acts of corruption against the State 
and (b) its review and investigation of the Declaration of Assets, Income and 
Liability Statements that are required to be filed each year by Public Servants, 
pursuant to the provisions of the 2000 Corruption Prevention Act. To the 
extent that the Commission currently lacks adequate resources to effectively 
60 Jamaica Observer, "Hibbert Goes,'' July ] 5, 2009. 
htto://www.iamaicaobserver.com/news/155442 Hibbert-goes (accessed May 02, 2012) 
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discharge its mandate under the law, immediate steps should be taken by the 
State to address same, failing which the State's ability to win the fight against 
corruption will be significantly threatened and undermined."61 
The Joseph Hibbert case was one of 180 selected from around the world for a 
study by the World Bank group of experts to discuss 'The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles 
in Grand Corruption Cases'. As the OCG reports, "On February 22, 2010, the Bank had 
written to the Contractor General to advise him that it had already collected and carefully 
analyzed, from around the world, 180 different cases for the StAR Study and that one of 
the selected cases was "that of Mr. Joseph Hibbert, the (former) Minister of State in the 
Ministry of Transport and Works and his alleged involvement in the Mabey and Johnson 
scandal."62 The Bank, which said that it possesses a copy of the OCG's Investigation 
Report on the matter and that it had "found it to be very useful and informative," was also 
interested in knowing "if Mr. Hibbert himself has been formally prosecuted in Jamaica 
for his involvement in the case."63 
One of the important components of this case is that Mabey and Johnson, a 
British firm, was tried and pled guilty to the charges in a UK Court and in doing so 
named the Jamaican nationals who facilitated the award of contracts to the company. The 
OCG Special Investigations reports, "in referenced 2008 November 26 meeting, Mr. 
Sasi-Kanth Mallela, Investigative Lawyer for the Special Fraud Office (SFO), highlighted 
to the OCG certain details of the SFO's Investigation into the corruption case which was 
61 OCG, Media Release, "Transparency International Downgrades Jamaica on Global Corruption 
Perceptions index—News Comes as no Surprise to the OCG" November 17, 2009. 
62 OCG, Media Release 128, "OCG invited to be a member of a World Bank Group of Experts to 
Discuss "The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles in Grand Corruption Cases'—Joseph Hibbert Case one of 180 
Selected from Around the World for Study", April 23, 2010. 
63 OCG, Media Release 128, "OCG invited to be a member of a World Bank Group of Experts to 
Discuss "The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles in Grand Corruption Cases'—Joseph Hibbert Case one of 180 
Selected from Around the World for Study", April 23, 2010. 
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being brought against Mabey & Johnson."64 The World Bank's invitation to the OCG 
arises from a Policy Study, which it is currently conducting in collaboration with the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) under what is called the Stolen 
Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative. The StAR Initiative aims at developing and 
disseminating practical tools and policy papers to assist developing countries in 
recovering the proceeds of corruption from foreign jurisdictions. The Study also seeks to 
identify common trends in the misuse of corporate vehicles as a means of concealing the 
identity of corrupt public officials who are involved in transnational corruption schemes. 
For the Hibbert case to be selected, as one of the 180 around the world to be examined by 
the Bank's expert, is crucial as this case in many respects strengthen the argument of the 
perceptions of corruption amongst public officials in Jamaica. 
The Mabey and Johnson case is significant for a number of other reasons. One, 
this case involved a sitting government cabinet minister, Joseph Hibbert, an international 
firm, and most importantly the type of work the firm was undertaking in Jamaica—bridge 
building, an important infrastructural development. Jamaica is a country prone to natural 
disasters and experiences hurricanes, tropical storms and severe flooding regularly during 
64 See the OCG Special Investigation Report on the WTW/MB&J Ltd page 6-7. In a synopsis of 
the information the OCG highlighted: 1. That, in another couple of weeks, Mabey& Johnson would plead 
guilty to charges in the UK Court and, in doing so, would name the Jamaican nationals who facilitated the 
award of contracts to the company. 2. He explained that in the plea, Mabey& Johnson Ltd. Would be 
admitting to having procured contracts in Jamaica by making payments to IMr. Joseph Hibbert, MP, the 
then Chief Technical Director in the Ministry of Transport and Words (MTW) and Mr. Deryck Gibson, 
Deryck A. Gibson Ltd. 3. That, in the case of Mr. Joseph Hibbert, he had received cash and cheque 
payments during the period 1989 to 2001. The payments which were made during the period of 1993 
November to 2001 October amounted to 69, 000 pounds. 4. That, Deryck Gibson, on the other hand, was 
paid 7M pound for agency services, which involved introducing representatives of Mabey & Johnson to the 
right people in Jamaica. Mr. Mallela stated that the payments which were made to Mr. Gibson were 
commission payments. 5. That, because of the change in the UK laws, regarding remittances, it is believed 
that money was paid to Mr. Gibson for him to pay for travel and entertainment on behalf of Mr. Hibbert. 
According to the OCG, the second event, which influenced the OCG's decision to commence its 
Investigation, was the receipt of copies of certain documents, which were formally conveyed to the 
Contractor-General, by the JCF. under cover of a letter which was dated 2008 December 30. 
the rainy seasons. The contracting of firms, whether locally or internationally, especially 
as it relates to a vital part of a country's infrastructural development such as road 
networks, should be held to the highest form of integrity. Jamaica, a country that lacks 
resources to finance reconstruction of vital infrastructures when extensive damage occurs 
during natural disasters, cannot afford to have the integrity of the procurement process 
penetrated by corrupt individuals. Corruption in the procurement process can lead to 
severe consequences in the long run in terms of the quality the of infrastructure being 
built and opening the loophole for further bribes being paid to ignore shortfalls during the 
building process amongst a host of other maladies. This case is also important because 
Jamaica financed the bridges through loans from international institutions. Therefore, if 
and when the procurement process is corrupted and a Cabinet level government official is 
involved in the bribery process, it undoubtedly affects not only the integrity of the 
infrastructures being built but also the added cost in the long-term development of the 
country. Therefore, if the appropriate steps are not taken in the first place to rebuild 
infrastructure with high quality standards that meet domestic and international 
requirements, there is an increased likelihood that Jamaica will have to return to 
international institutions requesting additional loans and grants to rebuild roads and 
bridges. This added cost that the country will incur could have been invested in other 
areas such as education, health care, or security. In this respect, corruption also weakens 
and slows the development process. 
Jamaica, a country doing worse off economically than its neighbors, cannot afford 
these costly mistakes and or deliberate acts of corruption on the part of government 
officials. It presents a tremendous cost on the country overall and in more than one 
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sector, because the cost of the lack of a bridge to the people in the communities affected 
will be significant. The Hibbert case raised a lot of issues in regards to corruption at the 
government level but also that of the supply side of corruption as Mabey and Johnson 
willingly broke Jamaican laws and bribed government officials. 
THE JAMAICA CONSTABULARY FORCE (JCF) 
"We serve, we protect, we reassure with courtesy, integrity and proper respect for the 
rights of all'65 
The JCF is one of the most significant government agencies fighting corruption. It 
can be said that a society's laws are only as good as its enforcement agencies. The 
mission of the JCF and its auxiliaries is to serve, protect and reassure the people in 
Jamaica through the delivery of impartial and professional services aimed at: 
maintenance of law and order; protection of life and property; prevention and detection of 
crime and preservation of peace.66 It is the principal state agency tasked by the 
government for the maintenance of law and orders within Jamaica's boundaries. As the 
JCF website explains, "The main role of the JCF is to maintain the conditions of public 
order so that national development can be realized."67 
Former Prime Minister Bruce Golding stated, "If we can't rid the force of 
corruption, we will never be able to rid the country of the crime."68 Golding also 
63 
.Jamaica Constabulary Force, Mission Statement, http.VAvww.icf.gov.im/iTiission-statment 
(accessed April 20. 2012). 
66 Ibid. 
61 Jamaica Constabulary Force, 'History' http://www.icf.gov.im/history (accessed April 20, 2012). 
68 Prime Minister Bruce Golding, Jamaica Information Service, "Government/Opposition Discuss 
Changes to the Police Force," May 05, 2009 http:/Avww.iis.gov.im/news/122-parliament/19497-
parliament-government-opposition-discuss-changes-to-police-force (accessed May 10, 2012) 
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emphasized that fighting crime could not be the responsibility of the security forces 
alone. Financial and budgetary constraints also lead to fewer resources being allocated to 
the police force to enhance certain areas of development. To which, Golding noted that 
"The Government is providing as much resources as the budget can afford, to support the 
work of the security forces, whose forensic capabilities are being strengthened and 
specialized training, in the area of intelligence management, being accelerated."69 
Probably one of the more important points of Mr. Golding's presentation is his 
acknowledgement that "The fight is both internal and external. The effectiveness of the 
force is undermined by the presence of corrupt members within the force. It is more a 
sense of relief, than a sense of pride, to note that 56 policemen were arrested for 
corruption last year."70 
The JCF has long been viewed as one of the more corrupt public sector bodies 
with accusations of officers accepting bribes instead of writing traffic tickets to the more 
serious crimes of committing state sanctioned murder, and the destruction, fabrication 
and / or disappearance of evidence in criminal cases. The JCF has long been at odds with 
some members of the general public and some civil society groups, most notably The 
Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ). But while the JCF has faced accusations of corruption, it has 
shown that in the last three to four years some progress has been made. 
Reputational costs, perceptions of mistrust, and the view that the JCF is a corrupt 
agency have plagued the JCF. Commissioner Owen Ellington, while being mindful of 
some of the perceptions that taint the JCF, articulates "1 am very much aware that there is 
69 ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
an ever growing majority of staff that actively gives tangible support to rid our service of 
the minority who damage our reputation and destroy public trust and confidence."71 
Based on the proposition by the Commissioner, I will assess the level of progress the 
Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) has made since it has been established. In saying this, one 
is mindful that corruption is not something that changes overnight; in many established 
developed and industrial countries it has taken decades of strong reforms and the 
overhaul of the system in a coherent and systematic manner to achieve desired results. 
Thus, even if there have been improvements in the JCF as it pertains to corruption, if 
similar successes are not replicated or operate in tandem from the Director of Public 
Prosecution's (DPP's) office then the results will not meet desired expectations. 
Utilizing what has been termed a four-pronged strategy to confront coiTuption that 
includes; preventing corruption and improving standards; education; communication and 
training; detection and prosecution coupled with cross cutting issues, the JCF has made 
substantial progress in tackling corruption. Since its creation strides have been made 
within the JCF to tackle corruption. For the period of January to August 2010, it has been 
reported that over 150 members of the Police Force services were terminated due to 
involvement in corruption.72 
Commissioner Ellington stresses the importance and the level of commitment he 
has taken and/or has seen fit in the creation of the ACB. He states, "As a mark of the 
importance I personally attach to this Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) Anti-Corruption 
Strategy I sought to have prepared quickly, so it would be among the first significant 
' 'Jamaica Constabulary Force, Commissioner Ellington, "Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012-2015," 1. 
72 Major V. "Dave" Anderson, "Police Corruption-Successful approaches and Systems" 
(Presentation at the Inaugural staging of the Regional Law Enforcement Anti-Corruption Conference, 
Kingston, Jamaica, March 22 and 23, 2011). 
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Strategies, linked to my JCF Strategic Priorities."73 In further emphasizing that "Whilst 
the JCF have made significant impact on tackling corruption by arresting and charging 
JCF Staff and others who would corrupt our staff, the time has come to move up a 
gear."74 The significance of the strategic move of the JCF to create the ACB illustrates a 
move in the right direction as it regard fighting corruption. 
The Corruption Prevention Act of 2000 was enacted with a view of appropriately 
punishing members of the public service who put their office into disrepute by engaging 
in corrupt activities. The JCF, an entity of the public service, is by default governed by 
the Corruption Prevention Act of 2000. The Sections under which members of the JCF 
and its auxiliaries are usually charged are: 
SECTION 14 (1) (a) 
A public servant commits an act of corruption if he corruptly solicits or accepts, 
whether directly or indirectly, any article or money or other benefit, being a gift, 
favour, promise or advantage for himself or another person for doing any act or 
omitting to do any act in the performance of his public function. 
SECTION 14 (2) 
A person commits an act of corruption if he offers or grants, directly or indirectly, 
to a public servant any article, money or other benefit, being a gift, promise or 
advantage to the public servant or another person, for doing any act or omitting to 
do any act in the performance of the public servant's public function. 
SECTION 14 (2) 
A person commits an act of corruption if he instigates, aids, abets or is an 
accessory after the fact or participates in whatsoever manner in the commission or 
attempted commission of or conspires to commit any act of corruption referred to 
in subsection (1) or (2). 
It is to be noted that the maximum penalty given to a public servant and/ or 
member of the public who engage in corruption practices is two (2) years 
imprisonment. However, the intricacies of the case as also the judge's level of 
discretion will determine whether or not the maximum penalty is ordered. 
(Jamaica House, Corruption Prevention Act 2000) 
73 Commissioner Owen Ellington, "Commissioner's Foreword," 
http://www.acb.gov.im/html/index.php/about/commissioners-forword/ (accessed April 12, 2012). 
74 Ibid. 
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The JCF, in terms of policy development, has made noticeable advances in terms of 
attempts to reduce corruption in the JCF and the wider society as a whole. The JCF Anti-
Corruption Strategy 2012-20157i document states, 
Police corruption can lead to devastating and debilitating effects on the strategic 
and operational objectives of a police organization requiring significant effort to 
eradicate and reform. Equally important, is that police service delivery may be 
severely crippled where the public loses confidence and trust in the very 
organization that is mandated to keep them safe and secure. Corruption within the 
policing environment can be characterized into two groups, one that is 'internally-
networked' and the other 'individual'. (JCF, Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012-2015, 
1) 
The JCF has undertaken significant reform in a concerted effort to tackle and dismantle 
corruption within the rank and file of the JCF and proceed down a path of cultural 
change. It is important to point out that the JCF has highlighted that; 
Emphasis will be placed on senior management, middle management and 
supervisors to demonstrate and ensure systemic employee understanding, 
confidence, commitment and ownership that will contribute to effective 
implementation and progress of reform. Preventing corruption and unethical 
behaviour is not the sole responsibility of management but the entire workforce. 
Therefore all people must be made aware of the JCF's standards, values and 
commitment to eradicating corrupt and unethical behaviour on a daily basis 
through its Ethics and Integrity Policy. (JCF, Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012-
2015, 3) 
The government in showing that it is getting tough on corruption and has passed 
several pieces of legislations aimed at stemming corruption and prosecuting corrupt 
individuals. Law enforcement professionals, ministerial policymakers, civil society 
75 Jamaica Constabulary Force, th& JCF Anti-Corruption Strategy 2012-2015 defines 'internally— 
networked' and 'individual corruption' as the following. Internally-networked corruption usually involves 
specialist or closely formed groups working together and often cany out more organised and entrenched 
corrupt activities, and the forming of corrupt relationships with criminal or covert human intelligence 
sources that may lead to corrupt behaviour. Individual corruption is usually associated with individuals 
who work in isolation with limited interaction with other officers or peers, and limited supervision or 
accountability. This corruption will develop through social networks and other associations outside of work 
and lean heavily towards the leaking of confidential information to criminals regarded as a significant 
threat to police and intelligence organisations' activities. This is not limited to sworn members but also 
non-sworn members who are increasingly being placed into sensitive police administrative and operational 
areas. 
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members, advocacy groups and academia were in full attendance at the inaugural staging 
of the Regional Law Enforcement Anti-Corruption Conference, in 2011. The conference 
was hosted by Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) in collaboration with the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). The conference was a significant step 
forward for a number of reasons but most important it demonstrated to the citizens of 
Jamaica the government's awareness of the problem of corruption. Many Jamaicans see 
the police force as one of the more corrupt branches of government in the country. 
Legislation has been crafted and a special task force, the Anti-Corruption Branch of the 
JCF, has been established. Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Anti-Corruption 
Branch of the JCF, Justin Felice notes, "Jamaica has been achieving some success in 
respect to its anti-corruption efforts, which can be shared with other countries."76 
The Contractor General, Greg Christie, also in attendance at the conference and a 
guest speaker, emphasized and focused on corruption. This is pointed and significant. Not 
only does he reiterate the general public's sentiment in Jamaica towards corruption, but 
he also makes the connection in a global context. The above mentioned conference was 
significant not only because of the joint hosting by the JCF and the USAID but also 
notably the continued support of policy creations in Jamaica by the USAID. Christie, the 
most vocal public servant as it pertains to corruption reforms, as the keynote speaker was 
important. But the conference also brought together key government agencies in addition 
to its attempt for a broader and regional scope to address the issue of corruption. 
The head of the Anti-Corruption Branch of JCF paying attention to TI is 
significant. Mr. Felice was quoted as saying, 
76Jamaica Information Service, "Anti-Corruption Conference to be held from March 22-23," 
http://www.iis.gov.im/news/112-national-security/27Q89-anti-corruption-conference-to-be-held-
from-march-22-23 (Accessed April 07, 2012). 
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Modest improvements in Transparency International ratings are one aspect that 
Jamaica can champion as a success, to say that hopefully we've turned around the 
way that Jamaica was going in respect of its corruption and the perception that the 
public has about the levels of corruption within the JCF and also the wider law 
enforcement agencies in the island. (Justin Felice, 2011) 
In elaborating on policy changes within the JCF, Mr. Felice espoused, "The JCF has also 
been making strides in ridding the organisation of corrupt individuals through its 
cleansing programme. One of the methods being used is an increased use of polygraph 
tests, where, through random administering of polygraph tests, it is ensured that recruits 
are ethical and of the highest integrity."77 To ensure that the senior ranks of the police 
force are not involved in corrupt activities, Mr. Felice stated, "Promotions now within 
JCF are all subject to ethical interviews by the newly formed Ethics Committee, which 
was set up in August 2010, and also polygraph (testing). So, all the senior officers who 
have been recently promoted have all been subject to a rigorous vetting procedure which 
78 is taking place within the organization." The head of the ACB pays attention to 
Jamaica's rank on TI's CPI. Felice also accorded the modest reduction in corruption 
perceptions of J amaica t o the efforts by the JCF. 
In stating some of the accomplishments of the ACB, Major V. "Dave" Anderson 
in his presentation entitled, Police Corruption-Successful Approaches and Systems, 
states, "since the establishment of the ACB as a unit dedicated to anti-corruption in the 
police force, over 150 officers has been removed."79 In addition to including TI in his list 
77 Assistant Commissioner of Police Mr. Justin Felice, quoted by Jamaica Information Service, 
Anti-Corruption Conference to be held from March 22-23," http://www.iis.gov.im/news/l 12-national-
security/27089-anti-coiTuption-confeience-to-be-held-from-mavch-22-23 (accessed April 07, 2012). 
78 Ibid 
79 Major V. "Dave" Anderson, "Police Corruption-Successful approaches and Systems" 
(Presentation at the Inaugural staging of the Regional Law Enforcement Anti-Corruption Conference, 
Kingston: Jamaica. March 22 and 23, 2011). 
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of Global anti-corruption approaches, Major Anderson championed, "The ACB's success 
is strongly supported by the public and has largely assisted in improving Jamaica's rating 
in the Corruption Perception Index 2010."80 With this said, and in light of the position 
postulated by the head of the ACB in addition to a Major Anderson; one can assert that 
the reduction in the perceptions of corruption in Jamaica can be attributed to the ACB. 1 
will examine the performance reports from 2008-2011 to see whether such correlations 
can be made. This is important because the ACB not only follows recommendations of 
TI, but it goes as far as to take some of the credit in Jamaica's improved performance on 
the CPI. 
Prior to the establishment of the ACB, the data on corruption charges were not 
available. Hence the findings discussed will be on the years 2008 - 2011. The 
Performance Reports of the ACB for 2008 indicates that 69 persons were arrested 
between January and December 2008. Of the 69, there were four convictions and eight 
acquittals. Cases pending DPP's decision totaled 30 and cases before the court was 51. Of 
the individuals arrested in 2008 the majority were police personal—a total of 56 with 13 
civilians accounting for the balance. During 2008 the total number of corruption related 
files submitted for investigation for the period amounted to 98 with a total of 68 
corruption related files being submitted to the DPP. The total number of personnel 
transferred from the anti-corruption branch wasl4, the number of recruits for the year 
was seven, promotions totaled seven consisting of three sergeants and four corporals. A 
total of 39 personal were trained for that year.81 
so Ibid. 
Sl Additional data on the year 2008 can be found 
http://www.acb.gov.im/html/index.php/performance-reports-2012/2008-2/ (accessed May 1, 2012). 
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Table 6.1 below presents the following; in 2008 there were four convictions out of 
69 arrests (5.80%). In 2009, four convictions out of 64 arrests (6.25%) In 2010 there were 
13 convictions out of 106 arrests (12.26%). In 2011 there were 24 convictions out of 88 
arrests (27.27%). The trend over 2008 — 2011 shows a marked increase in the conviction 
rates as a percentage of individuals arrested. 
Table 6.1. Showing 2008—2011 Conviction Rate for Corruption 
Year Arrests Charges Files sent to 
DPP 
Rulings 
received from 
the DPP 
Acquittals Conviction %of 
conviction to 
arrests 
2008 69 68 8 4 5.80% 
2009 64 50 60 *2009—28 3 4 6.25% 
*2009—32 Previous files— 
Previous 32 
files—18 
2010 106 71 76 *2010—50 60 4 13 12.26% 
Past yrs—26 *2010—28 
Past yrs—22 
2011 88 60 62 *2011—39 66 *2011—30 7 24 27.27% 
Past yrs—23 Past yrs—36 
The number of police personnel arrested in 2009 declined compared to 2008. But there 
was a significant increase in the number of civilians arrested. Whereas in 2010, 57 police 
officers were arrested and 36 charged while 49 civilians were arrested and 35 charged. 
Additionally, when the gender component is factored in the findings supports Anand 
Swamy et. al. study on Gender and Corruption, which showed women to be less 
corrupt. There are some scholars who suggest females are less corrupt than males. 
S2Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Yung Lee, and Omar Azfar, "Gender and Corruption, " (JRJS 
Center, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park) ~N ov., 1999. 
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Table 6.2. Arrests by ACB 
Year Police Personnel Civilians Gender 
Arrested Charged Arrested Charged Males Females 
2008 56 13 
2009 42 22 
2010 56 36 49 35 99 7 
2011 65 41 23 19 84 4 
The JCF consist of an estimated 11,000 officers at different levels and ranks. In 2010, the 
number of police officers not permitted to re-enlist was 137, an additional 28 were retired 
in the public interest and 23 were dismissed as a result of corruption. Thirty-six members 
of the JCF staff were charged for corruption and 35 civilians were charged for corrupting 
JCF staff. In 2011 the total number of police officers not permitted to re-enlist was 72, 
while two were retired in the public interest and a total of 11 police officers were 
dismissed as a result of corruption. The number of JCF members charged for corruption 
equaled 41 and the number of civilian charged for corrupting JCF staff was 19. While 
there was a marked decline in the number of police officers not permitted to re-enlist in 
2011 compared to the previous year it could possibly be argued that it is not necessarily a 
case of less work being done by the ACB, but officers are increasingly cognizant that 
corruption is being taken more seriously compared to previous years. 
With any newly created organization after a few years the organization tends to 
get better with time. Thus, the performance reports of the ACB improved noticeable over 
the years. It increased significantly in style and details when compared to 2008, which 
was a very basic performance report. The JCF 'Ethics and Integrity Policy' emphasize the 
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important steps being undertaken by the JCF to rid the force of corrupt officers. As 
Commissioner Ellington83 noted, 
The senior leadership of the Jamaica Constabulary Force is committed to 
transforming the organisation into a highly ethical and professional body that its 
members can be proud of and that the community can have confidence and trust 
in. The community of Jamaica is entitled to high standards of ethics and integrity, 
and professional behaviour by their police force that is free of corruption and 
misconduct. (Commissioner Ellington, 2011) 
The policy statement of the Ethics and Integrity Policy further highlight how significant 
the JCF is treating corruption, 
It is the policy of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) that sworn and non-
sworn members conduct their roles and responsibilities with integrity and 
transparency, and shall be in a manner consistent with the strategic objectives, 
ethical standards, confidentiality and professionalism set by the JCF, respective 
national legislation and international convention on human rights. Unethical and 
corrupt behaviour will not be tolerated by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) 
in the delivery of services on behalf of the government and to the community. It is 
the JCF's policy to comply with all laws, rules and regulations governing the 
administration of law in delivering services to the community of Jamaica. (JCF, 
Ethics AND Integrity Policy. 2012, 3) 
This expressed policy on dealing with corruption is reflected in the subsequent yearly 
reports produced by the ACB. A possible factor that might account for the gains made by 
the JCF is shown in the intelligence/corruption reports received. When 2010 and 2011 are 
compared in 2010 the total number of reports received was 270, of which corruption 
related reports equaled 148 (54.81 %) and others 122. For the year 2011 the total number 
of reports received was 525, of which 335 was corruption related reports (63.81 %) and 
190 labeled as others. This is a 51.43 % increase in a single year. This can be interpreted 
as either the citizens have gained more trust and confidence in the police force and are 
formally making more reports on corruption or what they perceive to be corruption. It 
83Commissioner Owen Ellington Foreword, Jamaica Constabulary Force. "Ethics and Integrity 
Policy," April 2011 p.2 http://www.acb.gov.im/html/index.php/kev-documents/ (accessed May 1,2012). 
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might be however a combined factor of increased citizen awareness and or more 
advertisements by the police to report corruption. But the significant difference in the 
reports made in the one-year period is particularly important. 
Another factor, which might account for the increase is that on January 18, 2009 
the ACB launched the I-8OO-CORRUPT line.84 This is monitored offshore. As the ACB 
elaborates, "the aim of the toll free number provides an independent, secure and 
anonymous telephone line through which members of the J amaica Constabulary Force, 
Customs and General Public may pass information/intelligence on corrupt 
practices/actions of employees of the Jamaica Constabulary Force and Custom 
Officials."85 Based on the increase in the volume of reports to the offshore line it would 
appear that this method 
Submission of files to Director of Public Prosecutions /Commissioner of Police 
The submission of files to the DPP and Commissioner of Police will give a better 
understanding of not only police work but also the efficiency of the DPP's office. 
Therefore, in addition to arrest and charges being made for corruption, the rate of 
conviction might also have some implication. In 2009 a total of 50 cases were sent to the 
DPP, 32 of which were for 2009 and 18 were files from past years. The number of rulings 
totaled 60, 28 of which were for 2009 files and 32 were previous files. Interestingly there 
were only four convictions that year. There were however 18 suspensions and 13 
dismissals. Conversely, in 2010, 76 files were sent to the DPP, a 44 % increase over the 
84Anti-Corruption Branch, "1 -SOO-CORRUPT" http://www.acb.gov.im/htinl/index.php/l-800-
corruption/ ("accessed April 20, 2012). 
85 Ibid. 
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previous year. Fifty of these were 2010 files—a 46% increase and 26 from past years. 
The number of rulings received was 60, 38 of which were 2010 files and 22 files from 
past years. In 2011 there was a decline in the total number of files sent to the DPP: 62 
compared to 76 in the previous year—18.42% of which 39 were 2011 files and 23 from 
previous years. The number of rulings received totaled 66, 30 of which were for 2011 
files and 36 from past years. When 2010 and 2011 are compared the ACB prepared more 
files in 2010, but there was an increase in the number of persons arrested in 2011 
compared to 2010. 
The performance report from 2008-2011 indicates that there is indeed a 
correlation between the improvement of Jamaica's position on TI's CPI and the changes 
within the JCF and the ACB. But a correlation does not equal causation. Nonetheless, 
with greater focus on corruption within the JCF, if the ACB maintains its concerted 
effort, there is an increased likelihood that corruption within the JCF and individuals 
corrupting JCF staff will see greater reduction over time. The ACB is still relatively new; 
nonetheless being that it is still in its developmental years it can be projected that if the 
ACB at least maintain its current strategies it will continue to see results. That said, over 
time, it is expected that the ACB will not only maintain its current statistics but it will 
improve even further. 
Conclusions 
Jamaica's response to TI's CPI is noticeable for a number of reasons. The 2007 
specially created Anti-Corruption Branch of the JCF attribute the reduction in the 
country's CPI to the concerted effort by the ACB to rid the police force of corrupt 
officers as one of the main reasons for the gains made in reducing the country's score on 
TI's CPI. To the extent to which this can be attributed to the ACB's effort is not 
quantifiable per se, in that TI's method of ranking countries has a lagged effect on using 
polls of polls. But it is a remarkable gesture by the ACB to claim their efforts are leading 
to the reduction in the perceptions of corruption in Jamaica. The work of the OCG is also 
significant. Since 2005, when Greg Christie took up stewardship of the OCG, there has 
been a marked change in policy recommendations and greater demand for transparency 
and accountability. While no one individual can change everything, there is a general 
sentiment that he is effective and has caused public officials to be more transparent. 
While the OCG has faced and still faces significant bureaucratic hurdles, under the 
stewardship of Christie for the first time public boards have submitted their quarterly and 
annual report on time and with a 100% compliance rate. One of the key recommendations 
by the OCG is seemingly closer to becoming a reality and not just a policy 
recommendation and that is the creation of a single anti-corruption body. 
It is particularly interesting that while the laws dealing with corruption in Jamaica 
are relatively strong, the enforcement of the law is seemingly lackluster. The newly 
created ACB has been making steady gains. It can be argued that if the ACB continues to 
improve on the gains it has made over time the perceptions of corruption in Jamaica will 
continue to decline. The legislative body to some extent is slow in implementing its own 
government body's recommendations; a case in point is the OCG. If the government 
wants to be taken seriously in regard to fighting corruption it ought to pay closer attention 
to its different arms of government. Based on the keen attention the OCG pays to TI's 
CPI, in addition to different government ministers at the local or national level referring 
to the CPI, leads credence to the fact the Jamaican government does pay attention to TL 
Key interest groups and influential sectors of the Jamaican political and economic sectors 
meeting with Tl to discuss Jamaica's progress also indicates that policymakers at all 
levels responds to Jamaica's ranking on TI's CPI. Finally Tl matters in the sense that it 
reinforces what many Jamaicans perceive the perceptions of corruption in the country to 
be. But for a country trying to remain competitive and improve its favorability as it 
pertain attracting foreign direct investments, Jamaica cannot afford to lag behind or not 
make marked steps to improve the perceptions of corruption. While perceptions are not 
the wherewithal to change everything, it plays an important role. Jamaica needs to realize 
that it is part of a competitive global economy and there are many other countries that are 
willing and able to attract investors; the same investors who might have invested in 
Jamaica if the issues of corruption were not so grave. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
You live in a society where everybody steals. Do you choose to steal? The 
probability that you will be caught is low. because the police are very busy 
chasing other thieves, and, even if you do get caught, the chances of your being 
punished severely for a crime that is so common are low. Therefore, you too steal. 
By contrast, if you live in a society where theft is rare, the chances of your being 
caught and punished are high, so you choose not to steal. (Uslaner: 2004, 6) 
The complexity of corruption cannot be understated. No country is immune to its 
effects. It occurs in all countries around the world to varying degrees, in a variety of 
forms, involving a host of different players and institutions and with differing levels of 
consequences. It is a major cause of poverty around the world. The negative impacts of 
corruption are widespread and have particularly serious effects, especially in developing 
countries. As a civil society group, Transparency International has succeeded in bring 
corruption to the forefront of discussions where other international civil society groups 
have not fared so well. TI's Corruption Perceptions Index, now in its eighteenth year and 
ranks 183 countries, is one of the most referenced sources regarding corruption around 
the world. 
Having carved out a niche for itself in the international community, Tl is the first 
transnational civil society group on corruption. By all indications, TI's prominence as a 
civil society group has increased tremendously since its conception. Globalization and the 
information revolution have not only compressed time and space, but the level of 
interconnectedness and ready access to information has transformed society 
tremendously. In previous decades it was easier for governments to hide corruption 
scandals but today this has changed. Civil society groups such as Tl have capitalized on 
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the digital age which has made networking and organizing its over 100 national chapters 
quick and easy. 
Undoubtedly, given the importance that academics and policymakers both give to 
cornjption's effect on development, one would expect that TI's CPI, the most cited and 
referred authority on corruption score would have some measured impact on 
development policymakers. Emphasizing that the community of donors claims that 
literally billions of dollars in official development assistance depends in part on a 
recipient's CPI score. 
Subsequently, given this evident importance, one would expect the large-scale 
indicators of development—amounts of foreign aid; foreign direct investment; bond 
yield; credit rating; corruption enforcement—would respond to changes in the CPI. 
However, the study finds, by contrast, that the CPI has no demonstrable effects on 
anything other than corruption enforcement efforts. And this surprising finding leads one 
to ask: why does the most important measure of corruption fail to explain changes in 
development economics and politics? The study shows that world's economic and 
political policymakers do not adjust their behavior when the CPI is published. While 
policymakers will refer to the CPI as it regards countries score, there is no evidence of 
this translating into measurable policies. Lip service is paid to the CPI but a countries 
volume of foreign aid is not penalized because the country's corruption score worsen. 
In grasping the absence of effects of the CPI on policymakers it can be argued 
that part of the problem with corruption is that it is a persistent phenomenon that 
responds only slowly to enforcement. Perceptions of corruption exhibit an even greater 
lag. Thus, one reason the CPI appears to have no effect is that we simply have not had 
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enough time for it to affect corruption. Subsequently, given a sufficient time series, and a 
sufficiently large cross section, there is a possibility that we might be able to find effects 
in a time-series cross-section study (TSCS). Likewise, it may be that other factors are 
confounding the relationship between the CPI and the market and policy responses as one 
have observed in the study. For example, exchange rates, bond yields and credit ratings 
all respond to a multitude of economic and political factors beyond corruption. Therefore 
with a richer multivariate model, there is the increased possibility that one might find 
effects of the CP! that are consistent with the hypothesis that the CPI impacts 
policymakers"' behavior. Additionally, other modeling approaches in the future would 
incorporate first differences of credit rating and or bond yields rather than absolute 
values, and also testing for reverse causality. In that, can the world's markets be used to 
predict future values of the CPI? And if this were the case, it would suggest that markets 
price the risks of corruption before the CPI is published yearly. This would suggest that 
the CPI essentially follows other indicators, and therefore it may be unessential. 
Political corruption is considered one of the most destructive yet unresolved 
problems common to most societies.1 It "impedes governmental performance and reduces 
citizens' trust in the government's capability to address their demands. Corruption not 
only distorts the way public interests are articulated and aggregated, but also diverts 
administrative resources and activities to areas where marginal gains from corruption are 
maximized."2 Not surprisingly, "among the various political factors, it is performance of 
1 Eric C.C. Chang and Yun-han Chu, "Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian 
Democracies? The Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 2, May 2006, pp. 259-271, p.259. 
2 Donatella della Porta 2000, "Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption." 
quoted by Eric C.C. Chang and Yun-han Chu, "Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian 
Democracies? The Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 2, May 2006, pp. 259-271, p.261. 
political institutions that most significantly influences citizens' political trust."J 
Therefore, when a government is seen to be tough on corruption and actively taking steps 
to curb and reduce corruption in the system this enhances citizens' trust. 
Perceived corruption in some instances might also be just as important as actual 
corruption as the long-term effects rendered to an institution, country, and or government 
are significant. Deborah Hardoon, in giving her views on the state of corruption in 
developing countries, posits "It is true that in the developing world, there are particular 
issues to consider with respect to corruption. A country on a development path must 
make strategic investment decisions to facilitate growth and social and economic 
development."4 With this in mind, countries like Jamaica will need to be mindful that, "at 
the government level, when corruption results in an allocation of national resources and 
the making of policy decisions, which are in the interests of private individuals rather 
than the national population, this will have particularly painful consequences."5 
Moreover, "in countries where there is a need to invest in basic services such as health, 
education, utilities and infrastructure, failure to do this efficiently costs lives and the 
medium and long term prospects for the countries' citizens."6 
The fundamental question of this dissertation is whether or not TI's CPI matters 
to development policymakers. An important finding from the study is that Tl matters. But 
3Ji-Young Kim, "Bowling Together" isn't a Cure-All: The Relationship between Social Capital 
and Political Trust in South Korea," International Political Science Review (2005), Vol 26, No. 2, 193-213, 
p. 195 summarizing the works of March, 1988; North, 1990; Uslaner, 2002; Mishier and Rose, 2001, 
discussion on institutional theories. 
4 Deborah Hardoon, Senior Research Coordinator, Transparency International, email to the 
Author, March 13, 2012. 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
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this is in regard to policymakers within Jamaica giving credence to Tl. At the 
international level the world's political and economic responses shows that lip service is 
given to TI's CPI but it does not shift policy directions towards a country such as 
Jamaica. 
The findings, as it pertains to world's political responses, indicate that Tl matters 
to the level where the CPI is the benchmark used to assess countries' levels of corruption. 
The recognition Tl receives from international organizations such as World Bank, 
OECD, and Asian Development Bank amongst other entities, leads one to infer that, 
while these organizations might not decline aid and financial assistance to a country 
because it is perceived to be corrupt, these institutions refer to the CPI and often donate 
to Tl. Nonetheless the perceptions of being corrupt might be used as a guideline for 
stricter measures and policies towards countries perceived to be corrupt. 
Consequently, in an environment where foreign aid and development assistance is 
often given with an expectation of good governance and corruption reforms, it is in the 
interest of the soliciting countries to pay attention to the institutions they are seeking aid. 
If the institution they are seeking aid from is praising Tl, then it is reasonable deduce that 
these institutions are paying attention to TI's CPI. A case in point: In 2005 Wolfensohn 
of the World Bank hailed TI's report as another important and practical contribution in 
curbing corruption and was quoted as stating, "Tl has once again shown its ability to 
combine research and policy analysis not just to shine a light on the deeply embedded 
problems of corruption in the international construction industry, but to propose 
progressive solutions to safeguard public monies and public trust."7 This indicates that 
7 World Bank, Press Release, "World Bank Hails Transparency International's Annual Report" 
http://go.worldbank.org/WA8QXX5JX0 (accessed March 18, 2012). 
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Jamaica and other developing countries need to pay attention to the CPI. While the World 
Bank's policies do not specifically cite Tl, it can be inferred that the Bank is paying 
attention to Tl based on the praises given to Tl by the Bank's leaders. And or, the 
principles on good governance emphasized by the Bank coincide, furthermore, with some 
of the areas in which Tl focuses. Subsequently, the political responses to TI's CPI 
indicate that in this case the global civil society group matters. 
The EU highlights corruption as a priority area in Jamaica's development but 
there is no direct evidence that the European Commission pays attention to TI's CPI 
rating of Jamaica. Additionally, the US Department of State Annual International 
Narcotics Strategy Reports cites TI's CPI as the measure for countries level of 
corruption. Furthermore, when TI's board of director member and the managing director 
of TI's US Chapter, Nancy Zucker Bowell, is also a board member of the Trade and 
Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC), it might be in Jamaica's interest to 
incorporate into their decisions its CPI score. Similarly, the International Narcotics 
Board in its 2010 report pays attention to TI's CPI. It also makes the important linkage 
between corruption and other crimes. One of the strongest forms of evidence to illustrate 
that Tl matter can be found in the level of involvement Tl had in policy developments 
related to the tsunami reconstruction effort in Indonesia in 2005. This Jamaica should pay 
special attention to, as the island is itself prone to natural disasters. If an event on the 
level of the 2005 tsunami were to affect Jamaica it is highly likely that international 
development agencies might refer to Tl as Jamaica is already perceived to be a highly 
corrupt country. One must bear in mind that in the unfortunate event of a natural disaster 
the influx of emergency aid and reconstruction development opens up the society to 
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greater levels of corruption through aid being siphoned off and relief funds being 
misappropriated. 
Contrary to the qualitative evidence, quantitative analyses of the world's 
economic responses to TI's CPI do not rise to the level of statistical significance. This 
could be a factor of deficiencies within the data, however. The paucity of data means 
there are very few observations; consequently the statistical tests have very large standard 
errors, which ultimately makes it unlikely to find significant effects. This in and of itself 
can lead to a type II error, or the inferential error of finding no effects when in fact there 
may be some. 
Political institutions heed to TI's CPI. In general, the CPI is used as a standard 
measure for countries' perception levels by the various agencies within the US 
Department of State. But while there is increased use of TI's CPI by policymakers there 
is no clear evidence that aid and or loans have been withheld because of a country's 
corruption perception level. Yes, leaders acloiowledge Tl and give lip service to the CPI, 
but when it comes to actual decisions regarding aid, the evidence suggests that the CPI 
has little or no effect. What is more likely to happen is that the country seeking aid and or 
a loan is more likely to go through a more rigorous process in meeting the prerequisites 
for obtaining assistance. This might be an indirect effect of being ranked as a highly 
corrupt country. 
Additionally the implications of the economic findings lead to the suggestion that 
one of the findings of no effect—that the CPI has no effect on investment ratings 
agencies, for example—might be wrong. Theoretically, with the interconnectedness in 
the world's market, if the CPI reports drastic changes in a country's corruption 
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perceptions it should have some effect on investors. But, if anything, the CPI seems to 
reflect already existing knowledge on a country rather than being causative. Thus, it 
could be argued that in essence, from an economic policy perspective, TI's CPI does not 
change the behavior of market investors but instead reflect what the market already 
knows about Jamaica. In general the CPI captures and reflects the world's economic 
reactions to Jamaica during the years in which Jamaica is represented on the CPI. This 
indirectly would seem to add credibility to the CPI. hi addition it seems to point out that 
the strength of the CPI lies in its combination of multiple data sources into one single 
index. As Johann Lambsdorff points out, "the erratic findings from one source can be 
Q 
balanced by at least two other sources." Consequently, 
This reduces the probability of misrepresenting a country's perceived level of 
corruption. Involving local business people and country analysts alongside non­
resident experts is also an advantage. It makes it possible to recognise the 
specificities of local customs through the views of local experts, while at the same 
time enhancing the consistency of judgment across countries by involving non­
residents. The high correlation between the different sources used in the CPI 
indicates that methodological differences between sources have only a minor 
impact on the findings. In an area in which objective data is not available, such an 
approach helps our understanding of real levels of corruption. (Lambsdorff, 2009) 
While the world's economic responses indicate that TI's ranking of Jamaica 
might not have influenced investors' decision, the CPI reflects the general trends in 
investors' behavior. It is therefore in the country's interest, since it is seeking foreign 
investment, to enhance its development to ensure its economy is more conducive to 
investors. The global economy with increased levels of technology provides vast markets 
from which companies may choose. If Jamaica continues to foster an environment where 
its market is not attractive to investors another, country will benefit at Jamaica's expense. 
8 Johann Lambsdorff, "Macro-perspective and micro-insights into the scale of corruption: focus on 
business," in Global Corruption Report,( 2009): 395. 
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In the end companies are interested in making profit on their investments, and if a 
country is not proving itself to investors, there are other markets competing for the same 
investments. Additionally, despite significant levels of FDI over the years, on average, 
Jamaica's annual growth in GDP per capita has been a lackluster one percent. This is an 
indication that the FDI is not translating into GDP growth. A possible explanation for this 
could be that the country is either lacking absorptive capacity to benefit from FDI 
requiring highly skilled employment as a significant portion of inputs are not sourced 
locally, or is suffering from deadweight losses due to entrenched corruption. Either way, 
the country is losing out where it could have benefited. 
Jamaica's reaction to TI's CPI is significant. By all indication the government has 
given credence to Tl from the inception of the country's initial rank and especially to 
date. However, a key finding as it regards the country's reaction to TI's CPI is intricately 
linked to the specific individual at the helm of a particular government agency. The 
intensity to which the OCG pays attention to the issue of corruption within Jamaica has 
not gone unnoticed. The keen attention to details that the OCG has been operating within 
inadvertently changes the behavior of actors. The changes within the JCF, the creation of 
an Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), in addition to a collaborative effort where British 
Police officers were recruited and placed in senior position in the force seemed to have a 
positive feedback. For instance, Assistant Commissioner Justin Felice made the 
correlation with the modest improvement Jamaica has made on TI 's ranking with the 
changes in the JCF. Greg Christie from the OCG has been very vocal about corruption 
and TL Assessing the previous OCG reports, there is no mention of Tl prior to Christie's 
tenure as contractor general. Therefore, the role and or personality of the individual who 
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is at the helm and or leadership positions of different government agencies plays a role in 
how active and seemingly efficient are significant. It also plays a role in whether 
government agencies consider Tl and or repeatedly refer to the country's rank on the 
international scene. 
The office of the DPP, on the other hand, has been cautious and has not produced 
and or released any press statements on corruption or Tl specifically. Thus this study has 
found only one presentation by Senior Deputy DPP, Dirk Harrison, where mention was 
made of the country's corruption perceptions on TI's CPI. Postulating the opinion that, 
"in the prevailing climate inside and out of our country notwithstanding the improved 
rating by Tl—it speaks more to the efforts of stakeholders to combat corruption as 
against the perception of us being less corrupt."9 
There have been some gains in tackling corruption. The ACB of the JCF, created 
in 2007, has consistently made improvements in terms of fighting corruption. This is 
reflected in not only the increased levels of arrest, but also in the purging of the JCF of 
over 150 corrupt officers that has strengthened the image of the force. The improved 
tactics of preventing corruption include the 1 -800-corrupt hotline, inspectorate division of 
the Ministry of Finance and the commission for the prevention of corruption. The Office 
of the DPP has also seen improvement in the instances of convictions. But not until 
fundamental changes are made with regard to the prosecution, the gains made by the 
ACB will not see a reflection in prosecutions. 
The creation of the ACB funneled specialized forces to tackle corruption, but 
while the ACB has made increased gains on arresting and referring matters to the DPP, 
9 Mr. Dirk Harrison in expounding on The National Integrity Action Forum—its objectives, its 
roles and effectiveness note in regards to opinion. 
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overall there is a lack of concerted effort being meted out by the DPP. The proposed 
creation of a single corruption agency with power to prosecute would help to alleviate the 
over "18,000 matters/breaches referrals to be prosecuted for breaches under the 
Corruption Prevention Act [2003 - present day]."10 While the DPP's office is making 
small gains it is clearly evident that significantly more needs to be done. Currently, with 
the over 18,000 matters/breaches referrals alone, in addition to new referrals, the office of 
the DPP will be inundated with corruption matters for an extensive period of time. 
The ACB was a positive policy initiative, but the capacity of office of the DPP 
needs significant improvement. The increased arrest and referrals by the ACB clearly 
demonstrate that a specialized area on specific crime is effective at one level, but if the 
Office of the DPP's capacity is not improved simultaneously then a bottleneck such as 
there is now will be created. Currently, the DPP's legal staff comprises of 43 prosecutors 
and three paralegals. Based on the caseload, as in referrals for corruption alone, it is 
evident that either staffing ought to be increased or the law needs amending by, for 
example, creating the single anti-corruption agency with prosecutorial power. The 
concerted and positive efforts made with the ACB coupled with a lack of similar 
undertakings by the Office of the DPP show that policy creation needs to be assessed 
more uniformly. A fundamental flaw in the directives of the country is a lack of 
coordination and coherence in policy development. A policy will be created to affect one 
institution, but a second directly connected institution will not be updated to reflect and 
or meet the changes in the other institution. The lack of coordination in policy 
development is another significant problem, which the country has not grasped. 
10 Dirk Harrison, Senior Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, (Paper Presented at Is1 Regional 
Law Enforcement Anti-Corruption Conference" Kingston: Jamaica, March 22-23, 2011). 
205 
Therefore, not until a paradigm shift occurs where development policies are 
created simultaneously and in tandem with the development needs of the other branches 
of government will there be significant gains in anti-corruption efforts. If not. the system 
will continue finding itself in a chokehold. The Office of the DPP does not hold a 
favorable view in the country at large. But while this could be a factor of the nature of its 
office it could be a combination of perceptions of inefficiency, citizens' impatience with 
delays, i.e., justice delayed is justice denied, or the citizenry's higher expectations with 
the quality of the judicial system than is being actually delivered. It seems obvious that 
changes are needed. One branch of government cannot make improvements when another 
does not. Resource expansion and increased allocations are needed. Increased workload 
without an increase operational budget does not create positive solutions. 
On another level, institutional trust can be seen as a materialistic form of specific 
support that is highly contingent on rational voters' assessments of economic 
performance. The improvements made by the ACB and the detailed analysis and policy 
recommendations emanating from the OCG can be cited as being linked to Chang and 
Chu's hypothesis that "pragmatic citizens will express higher trust in institutions if they 
perform well in the economic domain."11 Their findings that "citizens who perceive 
higher levels of fairness, satisfaction, and brightening economic prospects reveal higher 
trust in institutions,"12 corroborated their initial speculation that more educated 
respondents express lower institutional trust. This finding is also consistent with the 
" Chang and Chu, 265. 
12 Ibid., 
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works of Seligson. Furthermore, "among the various pol itical factors, it is performance 
of political institutions that most significantly influences citizens' political trust."14 
Therefore and not surprisingly, "political trust hinges on citizens rational evaluations of 
institutional performance, and the level of such trust in government is highly associated 
with government performance."15 The Bruce Golding led JLP administration suffered 
from a trust and credibility issue. Even though Jamaica's CPI decreased in the latter years 
of the JLP administration, they still suffered a significant loss even with a new leader, 
Andrew Holness, at the helm. As it regards the ACB unit, if it can maintain its current 
rate of arrests and investigations, while improving the quality, materials, resources and 
infrastructures of the officers, there is a high probability that they will continue to rid the 
force of corrupt officers while at the same time arresting citizens who are attempting to 
bribe the police. To some extent the publicity campaign by the JCF has worked in their 
favor. In the end, dispensing of information as it regards actions to take when faced with 
a corrupt public official is proving likely to improve Jamaica's CPI. 
Additionally, social capital and political trust are important, hence the argument 
that political trust evolves from the same origins as social trust. As Ji-Young Kim puts it, 
"political trust, like social trust, is fundamentally grounded on, and generated by, 
interpersonal trust, formed by socialization early in life as well as cultural norms."16 The 
trust in the JCF has improved significantly. The measure of using the I-8OO-CORRUPT 
13 Mitchell Seligson, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A comparative Study of 
Four American Countries." Journal of Politics 64, no. 2 (2002): 408-33. 
l4Ji-Young Kim, "Bowling Together" isn't a Cure-Ail: The Relationship between Social Capital 
and Political Trust in South Korea," International Political Science Review, Vol 26, no. 2, (2005): 195. 
15 Ibid. 
16Kim, 195. 
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hotline illustrates that when citizens are confident of anonymity in reporting incidents, 
actual and or suspected, of corruption without fear of reprisal they are inclined to 
corporate. 
At TI's 2012 regional meeting of the Americas, held in Jamaica, Minister of 
Justice, Golding, noted that an advisory committee has been set up to see to the early 
implementation of the legislation for the establishment of the proposed single anti-
corruption body. The committee, Golding states, will "examine the matter; consult with 
the relevant stakeholders, including the various institutions with an anti-corruption 
mandate, in formulating new proposals, and report to me with an optional design for 
Jamaica's institutional and legislative anti-corruption arrangement."17 The JIS also 
reported, "Minister Golding also commended Transparency International for placing 
corruption high on the international political and business agenda over the last 18 years, 
and for the 'unrelenting commitment to higher standards of conduct' in the overall fight 
18 
against corruption." Golding's positive comments about Tl illustrates that there has 
been consistency across the board as it relates to different government administrations 
and their reaction to Tl. 
Subsequently, on June 4, 2012 the JCF held its press launch for the Major 
Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Task Force (MOCA) which is another key element 
in the JCF's arsenal to tackle crime. Minister of National Security Peter Bunting surmised 
17 Mark Golding being quoted by Jamaica Information Service. "Advisory Committee to Advance 
Anti-Corruption Legislation" http://www.iis.gov.im/news/1 eads/30799 (accessed June 2, 2012). 
18 Ibid. 
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the focus of MOCA by using the phrase "taking profit out of crime"19 which is unlike 
other anticoiruption initiatives. MOCA's purpose, as the JCF emphasized, is "to focus on 
the identification, investigation and prosecution of major organized criminals, kingpins, 
their facilitators, and corrupt public officials."20 
While this new initiative is a step in the right direction the insurmountable 18,000 
plus breaches/referrals already at the DPP's office leave much to be desired. Successful 
implementation of MOCA will lead to more arrests adding to the backlog of cases to be 
decided by the DPP's office. This is another example where the system is not working in 
tandem with all its elements. Noting that this new initiative from the JCF, even if 
temporary gains were made in disrupting major organized crime one these individuals are 
arrested, without significant steps to improve the quality of the DPP office, MOCA will 
not be a deterrent to organized crime. In all likelihood, without the creation of the single 
independent anti-corruption Agency with prosecutorial powers, the new matters and 
referrals to the DPP's office will add to the backlog. Consequently, with the number of 
years it takes to settle one case, the corruption light bulb case involving Kern Spencer21 
can be cited as an example, while M OCA might do a stellar job, the justice system needs 
improving. 
Over the last fifteen years the effort put forward by the Jamaican Government, 
across different administrations and political parties, clearly shows that the Jamaican 
Government pays attention to Tl and TI's ranking of Jamaica does matter to 
' 'Minister of National Security Peter Bunting being quoted by the JCF in "MOCA Launched" 
http://www.icf.gov.im/news/06/2012/moca-launched (accessed June 02, 2012). 
20 Ibid 
21 To date, it has been over four years and still no verdict since Mr. Spencer was arrested and 
charged, there is no end in sight for this case. 
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policymakers. There is constant referral to the CPI and the desire by policy makers to 
improve the score and ranking in order to present a more favorable picture of Jamaica. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the increased efforts being made by Jamaica to strengthen 
its laws on corruption the perception of Jamaica being highly corrupt has increased. This 
begs the question: Do countries which are actively making steps to reform their 
corruption legislation and arresting and prosecuting individuals fall prey to their own 
efforts by inadvertently opening up the country to more scrutiny adding to the perception 
of being corrupt? Paradoxically, noting that Jamaica is actively fighting corruption 
highlights actual corruption and in turn adds to the perception of Jamaica being corrupt. 
With increased transparency in the way the Jamaican Government operates and 
the steps taken by the JCF to rid the force of corrupt and or questionable cops, it would 
seem that Jamaica is improving and or making increased gains in fighting corruption but 
nonetheless the ranking on the CPI continues to decrease. While Tl will be the first to say 
that the index cannot be compared yearly, this is an inherent flaw in their argument. If Tl 
is admonishing a country to improve its corruption perceptions, clearly if a country is 
improving or getting worse, it must be going from one point to another. 
A skeptic assessing TI's CPI might advise Jamaica that while policymakers might 
consider TI's CPI, fundamentally the index does not prevent the country from attracting 
foreign aid or development. Another might encourage Jamaica to improve its CPI score 
as this would make it more attractive to business. The country could also benefit from aid 
from developed countries which pay attention to corruption when they donate. Citing 
that, high corruption rates often reflect other fundamental issues within a society such as 
the high cost of doing business, inefficient systems, high taxation, high murder per capita 
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rate, infrastructure, productivity lost due to power outages, level of skilled employees 
amongst other factors that might be more significant to attracting and retaining foreign 
investors. Some companies will invest in Jamaica in spite of its corruption level and some 
might invest because of the corruption and the ability to be locked-in to the market once 
the firm has made inroads. 
An important aspect of the corruption debate is the demand side versus supply 
side of corruption. Tl has been criticized for its narrow focus on the demand for 
corruption while largely ignoring the supply side of the coin. Most importantly, for any 
act of corruption there is a demand and a supply. The supplying of bribes is just as 
important or might even be more important than the demand itself. Tl ignores the supply 
side of corruption. In this way it puts the onus on the developing countries. Instances 
where international firms, predominantly from developed industrialized nations, go into 
developing countries and offer bribes to enhance their business ventures are many but the 
perceptions of corruption is held against the developing country and not equally against 
the corrupt businessmen or the country they are from. TI's CPI needs equity. The premise 
on which the index is based is stacked against the developing country from the onset. 
To some extent with TI's CPI narrowed focus it can be argued that Tl sees only 
one half of the problem of corruption. This analysis can be juxtaposed to the US war on 
drugs; it puts the focus and or pressure on the drug trafficking countries but does not 
address its domestic demand for the drugs. So essentially, like the US that shifts the cost 
to the developing countries to address the drug problem instead of focusing on its own 
citizen's demand for the drugs, TI's CPI shifts the cost of corruption reform on the 
developing countries and not necessarily on addressing supply and demand of corruption 
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holistically. The businessmen from the developed countries, by participating in corrupt 
and bribe paying activities are knowingly breaking the laws in another country, yet 
surveys often filled out by these individuals are used to judge and perceive developing 
countries as corrupt but the CPI does not consider the willingness of these individuals 
venturing into developing countries and are paying bribes. Thus to enhance equity and 
transparency, maybe Tl ought to adjust its methodology to account for individuals from 
both countries who pay and receive bribes. Corruption is a transnational problem but the 
focus is placed on the developing country to "effect change" instead of focusing on the 
companies from developed countries who break the laws in developing countries and pay 
bribes. 
Tl can be criticized for helping governments achieve Pareto improving 
agreements, but without sharing the costs of improvement equitably. Corruption only 
became an issue in governance in the 1990s. Previously, powerful states ignored acts of 
corruption; it was an associational cost of doing business. But this was always predicated 
on the 'corrupt' country doing business in the interest of the powerful state. The dynamic 
shift with the end of the Cold War rendered ending the East West divide where issues and 
acts of corruption were largely overlooked had come to an end. The World Bank and 
other institutions became and grew concerned with good governance. How do "we" fix 
these developing countries issues? Tl emerging in the early 1990s, along with other non-
state actors, now had a 'voice' in international relations. Their causes and concerns were 
taken more seriously as it relate to development matters. 
Consequently, Krasner's "global communications have been characterized not by 
Nash equilibria that are Pareto suboptimal but rather by disagreements over which point 
along the Pareto frontier should be chosen, that is, by distributional conflicts rather than 
99 by market failure"" is relevant. Corruption as a development issue was overlooked once 
it served the interest of the developed industrial North. The change in the international 
system where developing countries were no longer suited pawns in being client states 
lead to a change in focus on "fixing" their problems. The World Bank, for example, has 
expressed its concerns with the supply of corruption in a number of reports and papers. 
One audit2j showed that since the adoption of the new Governance and Anticorruption 
strategy, the World Bank, to some degree, has remained too focused on improving its 
own resources and reputation in dealing with those issues. Navin Girishankar, the study's 
main author said, "The bank has to focus on helping countries develop the capacities to 
govern. That's what the bank should be focused on ... There is a gap between the plans 
and the follow-through that needs to be filled."24 Additionally, it is easy to become overly 
focused on the micro-interactions that take place in a corrupt exchange. Those are 
important and powerful factors, but so are the surrounding institutions that allow the 
exchange to take place. Or as an economist might see it: there is a demand of corruption, 
a supply of corruption, and a set of "market" conditions that drive the transaction. Those 
market conditions are the nation's institutions. 
Subsequently Krasner's analysis is in line with the findings of the audit: 
...dilemmas of common aversions and dilemmas of common interests are 
distributions of preferences that do create incentives to establish and maintain 
22 Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," 
World Politics, (1991): 336. 
2j  Independent Evaluation Group, IEG Annual Report 2011: Results and Performance of the 
World Bank Group. 2011. 
24Navin Girishankar, quoted by Bloomberg, "World Bank Should Refocus its Anti-Corruption 
Fight, Audit Says," August 31,2011 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 1-08-31/world-bank-should-
refocus-its-anti-corruption-fight-internal-audit-savs.html (accessed May 13, 2012). 
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international regimes. Both involve strategic interaction. Dilemmas of common 
aversions refer to situations in which actors must coordinate their policies by 
agreeing on some set of rules or conventions, to avoid mutually undesirable 
outcomes. The specific content of these rules will matter only if the actors 
disagree about which is the most desirable outcome. (Krasner 1991, 338) 
It is in the interest of Jamaica and other developing countries to improve their countries' 
corruption perceptions. Institutions like the World Bank and or IMF, which Jamaica has a 
long-standing relationship, factor in good governance as it relates to spending loans and 
grants. Corruption reform is a key aspect of good governance. Thus the inference can be 
made that an improved corruption score will have positive effects on Jamaica's reviews 
and reports. 
The reliance on foreign aid and development assistance from institutions such as 
the World Bank is cause enough to strive for better perception scores. Essentially, there is 
no incentive for Jamaica to not improve or to not create policies that would give the 
impression that the country is fighting corruption. Thus with minimal level of 
coordination (Jamaica continues to enact laws and policies to fight corruption and its TI 
score keeps improving, then both will be on the same level eventually), in the long run 
Jamaica's CPI will improve if it keeps enacting and enforcing laws to reduce corruption. 
The OECD in attempting to address both the demand and supply of corruption 
notes: 
It is clear that there are two sides to bribery. As the largest exporters of trade and 
investment in the world, multinationals represent, by far, the greatest potential 
source of bribe money. The supply side was a logical place for our countries to 
start, notably given that these countries are home to most multinational 
enterprises. However, the problem of the demand for bribes is not being 
neglected. The OECD promotes cooperation with a number of other regions of the 
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world, and other international instruments also offer sound strategies to combat 
the demand side.2i 
Corruption reforms and results from the reform process do not happen overnight. In many 
instances it will take decades to see actual measurable effects. While the new laws and 
agencies are being created it will take several years to see measured results of how 
effective the system has become. Jamaica lacks the financial resources in many instances 
to effect simultaneous changes in the varied the departments, which need the coordinated 
efforts to effect better results. 
What can he learned from TI's CPI and how to move forward? 
For a country aiming to develop its economy and based on its 2030 Development 
plan, the need to address, effectively reduce and mitigate the impact of corruption is 
significant. Jamaica like "many developing countries are on the path to creating an 
efficient and competitive private sector. Corruption in the private sector severely 
threatens this development, by disadvantaging small and young firms and undermining 
competitiveness and efficiency in the market place."26 Ultimately every individual 
country has its own challenges with corruption. Jamaica has made some steps in the right 
direction but it has a long way to go. In Jamaica there are several Acts that addresses 
corruption such as the Contractor General Act, Corruption Prevention Act, Parliament— 
Integrity of Members Act, Special Prosecutor Bill, in addition, the proposed Independent 
Anti-Corruption Agency. 
2iFighting Bribery and Corruption 
http://www.oecd .Org/documenl/18/0.3746.en 2649 34859 35430226 1 11 1.00 .h tml#supplv side 
(accessed June 02, 2012). 
26  Ibid. 
Political institutions give credence to TI's CPI. In general, the CP1 is used as a 
standard measure for countries' perception levels by the various agencies within the US 
Department of State. But while there is increased use of TI's CPI by world policymakers 
there is no clear evidence that aid and or loans have been withheld because of a country's 
corruption perception level. Yes, leaders acknowledge T1 and give lip service to the CPI, 
but when it comes to actual decisions regarding aid, the evidence suggests that the CPI 
has little or no effect. What is more likely to happen is that the country seeking aid and or 
a loan is more likely to go through a more rigorous process in meeting the prerequisites 
for obtaining assistance. This might be an indirect effect of being ranked as a highly 
corrupt country. 
Another important finding of the study is that with the theoretical and policy 
attention devoted to the CPI is clearly out of proportion with its apparent impact on 
corruption. Furthermore, TI itself notes that the CPI is not comparable across countries or 
over time. While claiming that each score has its own scale so this in and of itself means 
that any two scores cannot be compared, academics, scholars, politicians, and even TI 
itself compare a country's score overtime and also across countries. The fact that TI will 
say a country has improved or worsen on its CPI is evident that it is comparing countries 
overtime and also how one country perform compared to others. The study also shows 
that the CPI lacks construct validity, in that, it exhibits no correlation to other measures 
that it should correlate with if indeed it measured the perceptions of business and policy 
leaders. 
Additionally, given that the study shows the CPI has no evident effect one might 
conclude that TI's work is irrelevant. Nonetheless, this is not my claim. Despite the lack 
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of measured effects of the CPI on policymakers TI itself serves other purposes. Although 
the CPI is TI's most recognized contribution to development economics, the organization 
has other programs as well to combat corruption for example the business principles for 
countering bribery, national integrity assessment system, corruption fighters' toolkits, 
global corruption barometer, bribe payers index, country profiles, national reports and 
policy positions amongst other focus areas to enhance transparency and accountability 
within and between states relations. Nonetheless, TI should be held accountable for 
changes in its methodology and its apparent lack of concern for comparability. On the 
other hand, it may very well be that the CPI does indeed have effects even if the study 
lacks the data with which to find these effects. Finally, a poor measure of corruption is 
probably still better than none at all. Even an invalid measure of corruption can make a 
contribution by generating attention to the problem of corruption. Hence even a bad 
measure is better than none. 
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